Suchergebnisse

This paper examines how territorial claims between states condition the effect of power on interstate conflict. I argue that when the weaker state in a dyad controls a piece of contested territory, increases in power for the state that does not hold the territory lead to increases in the probability of conflict initiation. This has important implications for our understanding of the role that territorial claims play in conflict processes and attempts at conflict management, and provides support for the theoretical claim that the relationship between power and conflict is conditioned by the distribution of benefits.

This paper examines the role that information plays in conflict behavior by focusing on the external component of governmental transparency. Building from the crisis bargaining and the diversionary strategic conflict avoidance literature, I argue that governments that are more externally transparent are less likely to initiate conflict and are less likely to have the opportunity to use force for diversionary purposes. Using original data on the access that foreign media has to states, a large- N statistical analysis is implemented. The empirical analysis suggests that states that are more externally transparent are less likely to initiate conflict and that these same states are less likely to respond to domestic challenges with diversionary uses of force. This research demonstrates the important role of governmental transparency and provides support for some of the conclusions of crisis bargaining models and the strategic conflict avoidance argument in the diversionary literature.

How do human rights organizations (HROs) shape transitional justice policy in countries emerging from conflict? We investigate this question in the context of peace processes, a vital stage when many key post-conflict policies are determined. Using granular data on the content of peace agreements, we show that the robust presence of HROs significantly increases the likelihood of provisions promising criminal accountability for wartime abuses. Yet this association is conditional on prior ratification of international human rights instruments and the existence of impartial third parties in the peace process—background factors that lower barriers to effective HRO advocacy. These findings reveal a novel pathway through which HROs secure transitional justice on the national agenda after conflict.

What role does human trafficking play in the spread of infection, particularly HIV? There is a growing amount of research examining the connection between international security issues and HIV. This work has mostly focused on conflict dynamics and shows that political instability in
the form of international and domestic conflict leads to increases in the prevalence of HIV in Africa. Further, current literature on sex trafficking suggests that this practice may be directly connected to the spread of HIV. However, there is little exploration of this connection beyond case
studies of individual countries. In this paper, we address this research deficit by unpacking the link between sex trafficking and the spread of infection. We develop a theory and conduct an empirical test to assess whether there is any link between trafficking and HIV in a sample of 45 countries
in Africa from 2001 to 2016. We find that places that are destinations for sex trafficking have a higher prevalence of HIV. This research contributes to the literature on human security and epidemiology by revealing important implications for understanding the consequences of human trafficking
and the spread of HIV.

How do human rights organizations (HROs) shape transitional justice policy in countries emerging from conflict? We investigate this question in the context of peace processes, a vital stage when many key post-conflict policies are determined. Using granular data on the content of peace agreements, we show that the robust presence of HROs significantly increases the likelihood of provisions promising criminal accountability for wartime abuses. Yet this association is conditional on prior ratification of international human rights instruments and the existence of impartial third parties in the peace process—background factors that lower barriers to effective HRO advocacy. These findings reveal a novel pathway through which HROs secure transitional justice on the national agenda after conflict.

Human rights prosecutions addressing wartime crimes are often credited with deterring future rights abuses, but routinely occur alongside state repression. This article develops a theory of how such prosecutions generate uneven effects across domestic human rights practice by making some repression tactics costlier than others—in the public visibility of the abuse or ease of attribution to leadership—or by directly substituting certain tactics. We test the implications with a multivariate probit analysis of novel prosecution data in contemporary conflict and post-conflict settings. Trials significantly reduce reliance on political imprisonment and extrajudicial killings, relatively visible abuses, whereas gains for less visible physical integrity rights are limited. Further, trials themselves are sometimes deployed as a direct substitute for political imprisonment. The findings reveal how human rights prosecutions themselves can be part of a government's repressive toolkit, with implications for the study of transitional justice and the judicialization of repression.

How do human rights violations affect post-election protest? Until recently, post-election protests have been explained primarily by election-related factors such as the level of manipulation and the quality of electoral institutions. We argue that there are three dimensions along which human rights violations influence post-election protest: (1) the physical cost to protesters, (2) the ability to connect the violation to an election outcome, and (3) the ability to connect the repressive action to the government. Using this framework, we identify political imprisonment as the physical integrity right violation most likely to increase the probability of post-election protest. We test our hypotheses empirically with data on all national-level elections in the world between 1982 and 2012. We find that political imprisonment, a violation easily connected to government action and election outcomes, and less costly physically than other physical integrity rights violations, increases the probability of post-election protest.

Why does repression sometimes work to stop violent protest and sometimes heighten protest? We argue that the effect of repression on protest depends critically on a "memory of violence" within the state. Without this memory, the costs of continued protest in the face of increased repression are often too great for unrelenting mobilization, effectively suppressing the political violence. We focus on a global sample of repression and protest data at the weekly level from 1990 to 2009. In states with civil war histories, repression can mobilize a population previously primed for violent protest.

ObjectivesThis article examines the impact of women's rights organizations (WROs) in preventing human trafficking and improving state policies on trafficking. WROs, through their knowledge and experience working with governments, and the services they provide to women, are in a strong position to influence trafficking outcomes and policies.MethodsImplementing a cross‐national time series analysis of states between the years 2000 and 2007 with data on WRO presence within states, shaming by WROs, and data on trafficking flows and policy, we test our hypotheses.ResultsWe show support for the hypothesis that WRO presence and shaming can lead to improvements in this important policy area.ConclusionsIn a growing literature on the effects of NGOs on state policy and human rights, this study illustrates an additional important area where NGOs lead to improvements in policy outcomes.

Why does repression sometimes work to stop violent protest and sometimes heighten protest? We argue that the effect of repression on protest depends critically on a "memory of violence" within the state. Without this memory, the costs of continued protest in the face of increased repression are often too great for unrelenting mobilization, effectively suppressing the political violence. We focus on a global sample of repression and protest data at the weekly level from 1990 to 2009. In states with civil war histories, repression can mobilize a population previously primed for violent protest.

At the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council broadened its view on what constitutes a "threat to international peace and security." With the rise of the concept of human security and increased focus on human rights, the Council has been more willing to act in response to domestic political issues such as human rights abuses. Despite an increased commitment to human security, the Council's attention on these issues has been uneven. What determines whose rights capture the Council's attention? What role do efforts by NGOs to "name and shame" play in the setting of the Council's agenda? We find that human rights abuses lead to countries being placed on the Council's agenda, but human rights organization naming and shaming results in more action by the Council—in terms of both meetings held and resolutions passed.