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Proposed ways of governing climate engineering have most often been supported by narrowly framed and unreflexive appraisals and processes. This article explores the governance implications of a Deliberative Mapping project that, unlike other governance principles, have emerged from an extensive process of reflection and reflexivity. In turn, the project has made significant advances in addressing the current deficit of responsibly defined criteria for shaping governance propositions. Three such propositions argue that (1) reflexive foresight of the imagined futures in which climate engineering proposals might reside is required; (2) the performance and acceptance of climate engineering proposals should be decided in terms of robustness, not optimality; and (3) climate engineering proposals should be satisfactorily opened up before they can be considered legitimate objects of governance. Taken together, these propositions offer a sociotechnical framework not simply for governing climate engineering but for governing responses to climate change at large.

Large-scale intervention in the Earth's climate system features centrally both in definitions of, and proposed responses to, the Anthropocene. In its deliberate guise – as climate geoengineering – such intervention is highly contentious, threatening to profoundly reshape the geography and politics of environmental governance frameworks, not to mention the nature of the environments towards which those frameworks are oriented. Yet, even as experiments with geoengineering technologies are growing in number, geographers continue to engage seldom with scientific, political or indeed public debates about them. In this paper we contend that geographical ideas about space, scale, power and geopolitics must urgently be brought to bear on ongoing efforts to experiment with geoengineering, and to deliberate its future role in responses to climate change. We develop this argument in two parts. First, we suggest that ongoing debates about the acceptability of geoengineering experimentation would benefit from recognising incumbent spatial and scalar categorisations (e.g., small scale vs. large scale, indoors vs. outdoors) not as fixed ontological anchors, but as relational and provisional constructs, open to being rethought in new, potentially productive ways. Second, we call for geographers to document and contest inequalities and injustices, both in debates about what geoengineering is or might become, and in the outcomes generated by efforts to undertake geoengineering in practice. Here there are opportunities for geographers to reshape the frames of reference used by others to comprehend the implications of the Anthropocene itself, drawing on traditional disciplinary strengths in ecofeminism, political ecology and environmental justice, as well as the production of space and critical geopolitics. Such endeavours, we contend, will form a vital complement to existing geographical engagements with the concept of the Anthropocene, reaffirming the value of the discipline's distinctive – and explicitly normative – voice within ongoing policy and public deliberations.

Abstract
This article explores the influence of personal values and ontological beliefs on people's perceptions of possible abrupt changes in the Earth's climate system and on their climate change mitigation preferences. The authors focus on four key areas of risk perception: concern about abrupt climate change as distinct to climate change in general, the likelihood of abrupt climate changes, fears of abrupt climate changes, and preferences in how to mitigate abrupt climate changes. Using cultural theory as an interpretative framework, a multimethodological approach was adopted in exploring these areas: 287 respondents at the University of East Anglia (UK) completed a three-part quantitative questionnaire, with 15 returning to participate in qualitative focus groups to discuss the issues raised in more depth. Supporting the predictions of cultural theory, egalitarians' values and beliefs were consistently associated with heightened perceptions of the risks posed by abrupt climate change. Yet many believed abrupt climate change to be capricious, irrespective of their psychometrically attributed worldviews or "ways of life." Mitigation preferences—across all ways of life—were consistent with the "hegemonic myth" dominating climate policy, with many advocating conventional regulatory or market-based approaches. Moreover, a strong fatalistic narrative emerged from within abrupt climate change discourses, with frequent referrals to helplessness, societal collapse, and catastrophe.

Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is considered a key mitigation technology in most 1.5–2.0°C compatible climate change mitigation scenarios. Nonetheless, examples of BECCS deployment are lacking internationally. It is widely acknowledged that widespread implementation of this technology requires strong policy enablers, and that such enablers are currently non-existent. However, the literature lacks a more structured assessment of the "incentive gap" between scenarios with substantive BECCS deployment and existing policy enablers to effectuate BECCS deployment. Sweden, a country with progressive climate policies and particularly good preconditions for BECCS, constitutes a relevant locus for such examinations. The paper asks to what extent and how existing UN, EU, and Swedish climate policy instruments incentivize BECCS research, development, demonstration, and deployment in Sweden. The analysis is followed by a tentative discussion of needs for policy reform to improve the effectiveness of climate policy in delivering BECCS. Drawing on a tripartite typology of policy instruments (economic, regulatory, and informational) and the ability of these instruments to create supply-push or demand-pull, the article finds that: (1) no instruments create a demand-pull to cover operational expenditure; (2) economic instruments provide partial support for research and the capital expenditure associated with demonstration, and; (3) regulatory instruments provide partial clarity on environmental safeguards and responsibilities. A few regulatory barriers also continue to counteract deployment. The article concludes that the existing policy mix requires considerable reform if BECCS is to contribute substantially to the Swedish target for net-zero emissions. Continued effort to dismantle regulatory barriers must be complemented with a strong demand-pull instrument that complements the current focus on supply-push incentives. If unreformed, the existing policy mix will most likely lead to substantial public expenditure on BECCS research, development, and demonstration without leading to any substantial deployment and diffusion.

Societal issues involving policies and publics are generally understudied in research on ocean-based Negative Emission Technologies (NETs), yet will be crucial if novel techniques are ever to function at scale. Public attitudes are vital for emerging technologies: publics influence political mandates, help determine the degree of uptake by market actors, and are key to realizing broader ambitions for robust decision-making and responsible incentivization. Discourses surrounding ocean NETs will also have fundamental effects on how governance for the techniques emerges, shaping how they are defined as an object of governance, who is assigned the authority to govern, and what instruments are deemed appropriate. This Perspective brings together key insights on the societal dimensions of ocean NETs, drawing on existing work on public acceptability, policy assessment, governance, and discourse. Ocean iron fertilization is the only ocean NET on which there exists considerable social science research thus far, and we show that much evidence points against its social desirability. Taken in conjunction with considerable natural science uncertainties, this leads us to question whether further research is actually necessary in order to rule out ocean iron fertilization as an option. For other ocean NETs, there is a need for further research into social dimensions, yet research on analogous technologies shows that ocean interventions will likely evoke strong risk perceptions, and evidence suggests that the majority of ocean NETs may face a greater public acceptability challenge than terrestrial NETs. Ocean NETs also raise complex challenges around governance, which pose questions well-beyond the remit of the natural sciences and engineering. Using a conceptual exploration of the ways in which different types of discourse may shape emerging ocean NETs governance, we show that the very idea of ocean NETs is likely to set the stage for a whole new range of contested futures.