Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This research examines France and Rwanda's historical, current and future relations. The consequences of France's past support for Rwanda's pre-genocide regimes indirectly resulted in nearly one million deaths during the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi. France's role during the Rwandan Civil War (1990–1994) against the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) significantly influenced how the post-genocide Rwandan government engaged with France. Since 1994, French-Rwandan relations experienced significant lows, with Rwanda forming closer ties with the United States, European Union and the United Kingdom. However, there have been improved relations under Nicolas Sarkozy and President Emmanuel Macron. Bilateral relations increased under Macron through his personal interests in restoring Rwandan-French relations. This research relies on interpretivist and triangulation methods from interview data collected during multiple fieldwork period to understand through a Neorealist theoretical framework how Rwandan government elites, responsible for the state's foreign policy, perceptions and desired diplomatic relations with France since 1994.

The 2020 arrest and subsequent trial of Paul Rusesabagina fostered controversy about Rwanda's human rights record and the political dominance of President Paul Kagame against oppositional voices. Despite human rights organizations and even the European Union condemning the arrest and questioning the ability for him to receive a fair trial, Rwandans remain resolute in their desire to seek justice against Rusesabagina. He is best known as the African version of Oscar Schindler because of the 2004 movie, Hotel Rwanda. However, the historical narrative of Rusesabagina's heroism is questioned within Rwanda. Additionally, he is accused of forming ties to numerous terrorist groups which committed deadly attacks in Rwanda. This article examines Rusesabagina's role during and after the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi and the impact of his arrest and trial on Rwanda's foreign relations.

Peace and stability have been core challenges in the Great Lakes Region of Africa since the years of independence from European nations. State building processes have been ridden by ongoing violence, characterized by two-sided or multi-party violence perpetrated by militias, national militaries, rogue groups, and even local civilians. The international system has prioritized peace accords and negotiation processes when parties in conflict decide to move past the violence, either required by external actors, or based on the instability of the situation on the ground. When warring parties and international actors sign peace accords to end conflict in an attempt to begin political dialogue, they often reinforce the international legal assumption that these negotiations will bring about positive change, including peace and stability. The cases of Rwanda and Burundi are complicated, with social, historical, political, ideological, and economic factors leading to violence on the ground. The Arusha Accords of 1993 in Rwanda and of 2000 in Burundi were followed only by short-term stability, with an eventual return to conflict. This study examines the effects of the Arusha Peace Accords signed prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the Arusha Accords of 2000, which ended 12 years of civil war in Burundi. As shown in this paper and through our research, peace negotiations and peace processes take place in an unideal situation, yet in order for future peace to be achieved they must be attempted. The failure of Arusha in Rwanda and in Burundi show some of the complexities and challenges faced in these two case studies, and analyze why there was a return to violence in each case.

Peace and stability have been core challenges in the Great Lakes Region of Africa since the years of independence from European nations. State building processes have been ridden by ongoing violence, characterized by two-sided or multi-party violence perpetrated by militias, national militaries, rogue groups, and even local civilians. The international system has prioritized peace accords and negotiation processes when parties in conflict decide to move past the violence, either required by external actors, or based on the instability of the situation on the ground. When warring parties and international actors sign peace accords to end conflict in an attempt to begin political dialogue, they often reinforce the international legal assumption that these negotiations will bring about positive change, including peace and stability. The cases of Rwanda and Burundi are complicated, with social, historical, political, ideological, and economic factors leading to violence on the ground. The Arusha Accords of 1993 in Rwanda and of 2000 in Burundi were followed only by short-term stability, with an eventual return to conflict. This study examines the effects of the Arusha Peace Accords signed prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and the Arusha Accords of 2000, which ended 12 years of civil war in Burundi. As shown in this paper and through our research, peace negotiations and peace processes take place in an unideal situation, yet in order for future peace to be achieved they must be attempted. The failure of Arusha in Rwanda and in Burundi show some of the complexities and challenges faced in these two case studies, and analyze why there was a return to violence in each case.