Suchergebnisse

The purpose of this thesis is to study the internal mechanisms of banks' governance and their impact on the risk-taking behavior. We show that Adam Smith had already highlighted the inadequacy of the governance' mechanisms in "Ayr" Bank as the primary factor leading to an excessive risk-taking and, consequently, to its bankruptcy. We develop a model that aims to evaluate the extent to which governance mechanisms play a moderating role on the compensation policy and the level of risk taken by the CEO. We illustrate that a remuneration indexed on risky assets does not imply a greater risk taking. We also conclude that in order to induce the CEO to achieve the best combination of assets, the board of directors (BD) is required to pay the highest compensation. The thesis also focuses on the study of standard BD attributes as well as those related to risk' governance in EU banks from 2005 to 2015. The empirical investigation showed that certain BD features affect the level of non-performing loan and the insolvency of EU banks. The results of the fixed-effect quantile regression reveal that the effect of the standard BD and risk' governance attributes on risk-taking is heterogeneous. More specifically, we can note that the positive effect of the independence and frequency of board meetings on bank' risk management is more significant in the riskier banks. In addition to this, our empirical results suggests that the prevention of excessive risk taking by EU banks requires the improvement of the effectiveness of BD through the establishment of risk an audit committees. ; L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à étudier les liens entre les mécanismes internes de gouvernance des banques et le comportement de prise de risque. Nous montrons qu'Adam Smith avait déjà mis en évidence la défaillance des mécanismes de gouvernance dans la Banque « Ayr » comme principal facteur induisant la prise de risque excessive et, par conséquent, sa faillite. Nous développons un modèle qui illustre qu'une rémunération indexée sur les actifs ...

The purpose of this thesis is to study the internal mechanisms of banks' governance and their impact on the risk-taking behavior. We show that Adam Smith had already highlighted the inadequacy of the governance' mechanisms in "Ayr" Bank as the primary factor leading to an excessive risk-taking and, consequently, to its bankruptcy. We develop a model that aims to evaluate the extent to which governance mechanisms play a moderating role on the compensation policy and the level of risk taken by the CEO. We illustrate that a remuneration indexed on risky assets does not imply a greater risk taking. We also conclude that in order to induce the CEO to achieve the best combination of assets, the board of directors (BD) is required to pay the highest compensation. The thesis also focuses on the study of standard BD attributes as well as those related to risk' governance in EU banks from 2005 to 2015. The empirical investigation showed that certain BD features affect the level of non-performing loan and the insolvency of EU banks. The results of the fixed-effect quantile regression reveal that the effect of the standard BD and risk' governance attributes on risk-taking is heterogeneous. More specifically, we can note that the positive effect of the independence and frequency of board meetings on bank' risk management is more significant in the riskier banks. In addition to this, our empirical results suggests that the prevention of excessive risk taking by EU banks requires the improvement of the effectiveness of BD through the establishment of risk an audit committees. ; L'objectif de cette thèse consiste à étudier les liens entre les mécanismes internes de gouvernance des banques et le comportement de prise de risque. Nous montrons qu'Adam Smith avait déjà mis en évidence la défaillance des mécanismes de gouvernance dans la Banque « Ayr » comme principal facteur induisant la prise de risque excessive et, par conséquent, sa faillite. Nous développons un modèle qui illustre qu'une rémunération indexée sur les actifs ...