Privacy concerns, voluntary disclosure of information, and unraveling: an experiment
In: Discussion paper SP II 2013-208
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In: Discussion paper SP II 2013-208
In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, Band 78
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In: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Band 120, Heft 4, S. 1260-1278
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9280
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In: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Abteilung Verhalten auf Märkten, Band SP II 2013-208
We study the voluntary revelation of private, personal information in a labor-market experiment with a lemons structure where workers can reveal their productivity at a cost. While rational revelation improves a worker's payout, it imposes a negative externality on others and may trigger further unraveling. Our data suggest that subjects reveal their productivity less frequently than predicted in equilibrium. A loaded frame emphasizing personal information about workers' health leads to even less revelation. We show that three canonical behavioral models all predict too little rather than too much revelation: level-k reasoning, quantal-response equilibrium, and to a lesser extent inequality aversion. (author's abstract)