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Many democratic nations are experiencing increased levels of false information circulating through social media and political websites that mimic journalism formats. In many cases, this disinformation is associated with the efforts of movements and parties on the radical right to mobilize supporters against centre parties and the mainstream press that carries their messages. The spread of disinformation can be traced to growing legitimacy problems in many democracies. Declining citizen confidence in institutions undermines the credibility of official information in the news and opens publics to alternative information sources. Those sources are often associated with both nationalist (primarily radical right) and foreign (commonly Russian) strategies to undermine institutional legitimacy and destabilize centre parties, governments and elections. The Brexit campaign in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the United States are among the most prominent examples of disinformation campaigns intended to disrupt normal democratic order, but many other nations display signs of disinformation and democratic disruption. The origins of these problems and their implications for political communication research are explored.

Technology-enabled networks of contention differ from physically co-present networks in that communication more saliently structures relations among actors. Technology platforms may even take on some roles of organizations in providing information, distributing resources, and coordinating action. Although many observers claim that online networks tend to concentrate public displays of attention and recognition in power-law hierarchies, we propose that technology-enabled contentious networks may seek or avoid concentrated hierarchies as reflections of the participants' underlying values and technology preferences. The article identifies three ideal type power signatures in technology-enabled networks-highly concentrated, moderately concentrated, and dispersed. Different power signatures can result in similar political outcomes, suggesting that none of them represents a generally more effective way to organize power in networks. However, in particular situations, different power configurations can affect how action is framed, how individuals become engaged, and the degree of fit between mobilizations and political contexts. ; AuthorCount:2;

Technology-enabled networks of contention differ from physically co-present networks in that communication more saliently structures relations among actors. Technology platforms may even take on some roles of organizations in providing information, distributing resources, and coordinating action. Although many observers claim that online networks tend to concentrate public displays of attention and recognition in power-law hierarchies, we propose that technology-enabled contentious networks may seek or avoid concentrated hierarchies as reflections of the participants' underlying values and technology preferences. The article identifies three ideal type power signatures in technology-enabled networks-highly concentrated, moderately concentrated, and dispersed. Different power signatures can result in similar political outcomes, suggesting that none of them represents a generally more effective way to organize power in networks. However, in particular situations, different power configurations can affect how action is framed, how individuals become engaged, and the degree of fit between mobilizations and political contexts. Adapted from the source document.

From the Arab Spring and los indignados in Spain, to Occupy Wall Street (and beyond), large-scale, sustained protests are using digital media in ways that go beyond sending and receiving messages. Some of these action formations contain relatively small roles for formal brick and mortar organizations. Others involve well-established advocacy organizations, in hybrid relations with other organizations, using technologies that enable personalized public engagement. Both stand in contrast to the more familiar organizationally managed and brokered action conventionally associated with social movement and issue advocacy. This article examines the organizational dynamics that emerge when communication becomes a prominent part of organizational structure. It argues that understanding such variations in large-scale action networks requires distinguishing between at least two logics that may be in play: The familiar logic of collective action associated with high levels of organizational resources and the formation of collective identities, and the less familiar logic of connective action based on personalized content sharing across media networks. In the former, introducing digital media do not change the core dynamics of the action. In the case of the latter, they do. Building on these distinctions, the article presents three ideal types of large-scale action networks that are becoming prominent in the contentious politics of the contemporary era. ; AuthorCount:2;

Changes related to globalization have resulted in the growing separation of individuals in late modern societies from traditional bases of social solidarity such as parties, churches, and other mass organizations. One sign of this growing individualization is the organization of individual action in terms of meanings assigned to lifestyle elements resulting in the personalization of issues such as climate change, labour standards, and the quality of food supplies. Such developments bring individuals' own narratives to the fore in the mobilization process, often requiring organizations to be more flexible in their definitions of issues. This personalization of political action presents organizations with a set of fundamental challenges involving potential trade-offs between flexibility and effectiveness. This paper analyses how different protest networks used digital media to engage individuals in mobilizations targeting the 2009 G20 London Summit during the global financial crisis. The authors examine how these different communication processes affected the political capacity of the respective organizations and networked coalitions. In particular, the authors explore whether the coalition offering looser affiliation options for individuals displays any notable loss of public engagement, policy focus (including mass media impact), or solidarity network coherence. This paper also examines whether the coalition offering more rigid collective action framing and fewer personalized social media affordances displays any evident gain in the same dimensions of mobilization capacity. In this case, the evidence suggests that the more personalized collective action process maintains high levels of engagement, agenda focus, and network strength.

Activists often have difficulties getting messages to larger publics. This is particularly challenging in the U.S. press/politics system, where the mainstream media tend to open the news gates only after government institutions engage with issues. Yet there are signs in recent years that activists are finding creative ways of publicizing their causes by attaching political messages to familiar corporate brands. For example, complex messages about labor conditions in foreign factories making shoes and apparel may travel more easily when attached to a major brand, for example, Nike sweatshop. The first part of this analysis examines how branded political communication works and how it may be effective. The second part looks at possible downsides of getting consumer audiences to actually grasp the larger import of the politics behind the brands and getting targeted companies and industrial sectors (fashion, food, forest products, etc.) to change their offending behaviors.

The question addressed in this analysis is one with broad theoretical and comparative implications: how do key political and social institutions, which we call regulatory mechanisms, affect the marketplace of ideas in different polities? First, election and party systems, interest groups, political financing, and the mass media are identified as the most obvious market mechanisms operating to regulate the flow of ideas in democratic societies. Second, this framework is then applied to case studies of party and candidate rhetoric in recent Swedish and American national elections. Although more developed in the United States than in Sweden, both cases reveal a drift toward negative equilibrium in the marketplace, characterized by the decline of party loyalties and voting participation, along with a widespread loss of faith in politicians and political language.

Examines factors affecting the production, representation, and influence of political ideas in a democracy, as demonstrated by the creation of new tax policy. Discusses the influence of election and party systems, campaign finance methods, interest group systems, and the mass media; focuses on the US Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Swedish Tax Reform Act of 1990.