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List of figuresList of tablesPrefaceAcknowledgements1 Introduction: The impact on public safety of corruption2 Data, definition of terms, method, theory and presentation3 Case studies3.1 Nuclear soldiers3.2 The Marine Electric loss3.3 The Hillsborough football stadium disaster3.4 The Adam Air disaster3.5 The Volkswagen emissions scandal3.6 The Grenfell Tower disaster3.7 The Beirut ammonium nitrate explosion4 Conclusions5 Policy recommendationsGlossaryBibliography

1. Empowering emergency responders / Roger Miles -- 2. Terrorism and the risk society / David Waddington and Kerry McSeveny -- 3. The emergent nature of risk as a product of 'heterogeneous engineering' : a relational analysis of oil and gas industry safety culture / Anthony J. Masys -- 4. The inhuman : risk and the social impact of information and communication technologies / David Alford -- 5. Risk as workers' remembered utility in the late-modern economy / Clive Smallman and Andrew M. Robinson -- 6. Aviation and corporate social responsibility / Simon Bennett -- 7. Investigating resilience, through 'before and after' perspective on residual risk / Hugh Deeming, Rebecca Whittle and Will Medd -- 8. Managing risks in climatically dynamic environment : how global climate change presents risks, challenges and opportunities / Todd Higgins -- 9. A future for late-modern social formations in Detroit? / Simon Bennett -- 10. Conclusion / Simon Bennett.

This paper views America's 'drones-first' counter-insurgency effort in Pakistan through the lens of Merton's theory of the unintended consequences of purposive action. It also references Beck's Risk Society thesis, America's Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine, Toft's theory of isomorphic learning, Langer's theory of mindfulness, Highly Reliable Organisations theory and the social construction of technology (SCOT) argument. With reference to Merton's theory, the CIA-directed armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) campaign has manifest functions, latent functions and latent dysfunctions. Measured against numbers of suspected insurgents killed, the campaign can be judged a success. Measured against the level of collateral damage or the state of US-Pakistan relations, the campaign can be judged a failure. Values determine the choice of metrics. Because RPV operations eliminate risk to American service personnel, and because this is popular with both US citizens and politicians, collateral damage (the killing of civilians) is not considered a policy-changing dysfunction. However, the latent dysfunctions of America's drones-first policy may be so great as to undermine that policy's intended manifest function – to make a net contribution to the War on Terror. In Vietnam the latent dysfunctions of Westmoreland's attritional war undermined America's policy of containment. Vietnam holds a lesson for the Obama administration. ; Publisher PDF

This paper views America's 'drones-first' counter-insurgency effort in Pakistan through the lens of Merton's theory of the unintended consequences of purposive action. It also references Beck's Risk Society thesis, America's Revolution in Military Affairs doctrine, Toft's theory of isomorphic learning, Langer's theory of mindfulness, Highly Reliable Organisations theory and the social construction of technology (SCOT) argument. With reference to Merton's theory, the CIA-directed armed Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) campaign has manifest functions, latent functions and latent dysfunctions. Measured against numbers of suspected insurgents killed, the campaign can be judged a success. Measured against the level of collateral damage or the state of US-Pakistan relations, the campaign can be judged a failure. Values determine the choice of metrics. Because RPV operations eliminate risk to American service personnel, and because this is popular with both US citizens and politicians, collateral damage (the killing of civilians) is not considered a policy-changing dysfunction. However, the latent dysfunctions of America's drones-first policy may be so great as to undermine that policy's intended manifest function – to make a net contribution to the War on Terror. In Vietnam the latent dysfunctions of Westmoreland's attritional war undermined America's policy of containment. Vietnam holds a lesson for the Obama administration.

Incidents and accidents are frequently ascribed to "operator" or "human error." Until recently accident investigators have focused more on the immediate or proximate causes of incidents and accidents than on such underlying or contextual factors as production imperatives, conditioning, expectation, peer pressure, ergonomics or the quality and currency of rules, procedures and training. Some theorists, however, have attempted to sensitize accident investigators to the potential impact on human perception and behavior of contextual factors. As a consequence of the work of Job (1996), Reason (1995; 1997), Snook (2000) and others accident investigators now have the opportunity to apply a systems approach to accident investigation. The primary purpose of this paper is to illustrate and then test the systems or "context" approach with reference to a major incident with significant outcomes. To this end the work of Job, Reason, Snook and others is used to frame, analyze and draw conclusions from a major incident—the clash between US and North Vietnamese naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin during the early stages of the Vietnam War. The paper's secondary purpose is to deconstruct, illuminate and explain the incident with a view to adding to (if not correcting a part of) the historical record of the Vietnam War. 2004 marks the 40th anniversary of the Tonkin Gulf incident, described by Wise (1968) as "The Pearl Harbor of the Vietnam War." Following the alleged second attack on US naval forces by North Vietnamese warships President Johnson ordered a major escalation of the war against the Viet Cong. Today most analysts agree that the second attack never took place. Given the significance and outcomes of the "phantom attack" (for example the loss of 58,000 American and over three million Vietnamese lives) it is important that we understand how and why the attack came to be imagined—for at least two reasons. First because some blamed the escalation of the Vietnam War on the "incompetence" of the sailors of the USS Maddox and USS C. Turner Joy. This misunderstanding has persisted for four decades. Secondly, because consequential military errors still occur—as with the accidental shoot-down of an Iranian Airbus by an American warship in 1988 that some believe led to the Lockerbie bombing.Having applied the "context" approach to the Tonkin Gulf incident it is suggested that such factors as the sailors' knowledge of the political and diplomatic background to their situation, their duty to protect their ship and very recent encounter with the North Vietnamese led them to "construct" (perceive) a second incident. It is concluded that, as in the 1988 Vincennes incident, knowledges, experiences and expectations bore down upon the sailors to create a threat that existed only in their collective consciousness. In short, the macro impacted the micro experience to the point where judgment was degraded.