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"Citizen rights defence campaigns reflect the changing lives and priorities of Chinese citizens, both urban and rural. The term weiquan, or rights defence, was first coined by the Chinese party-state as part of a process of promotion of various laws, and was thus used by government-affiliated organisations to promote the rights of women, children, and consumers, and to develop citizens' legal awareness. Subsequently, first private citizens, then groups of citizens, then lawyers, appropriated the term as a means of dispute resolution in areas such as private property rights, rights for the handicapped, corruption claims and grievances with officials. Rights defence is important not just because of the political ramifications of its campaigns, but also because of the strategies its activists have used. Rights defence campaigns have taken novel forms unprecedented in China, including the use of the Internet by rights campaigners, the development of rights entrepreneur (or people who have set up businesses linked to rights defence), and the selection of representatives and leaders in rights defence campaigns. In recent years, the idea of rights defence has become used as a tool to attack the party-state, specifically by lawyers and legal campaigners. The growth of rights defence movements reflects the increasing capacity of Chinese citizens to shape their own civic discourse to achieve diverse goals. While rights defence may not pose an immediate threat to the authority of the party-state, it is nonetheless an important symbol of a developing social pluralism in China. This book offers essential insight into the development of rights in contemporary China and will be highly relevant for students, scholars and specialists in legal developments in Asia as well as anyone interested in social movements in China"--

"Citizen rights defence campaigns reflect the changing lives and priorities of Chinese citizens, both urban and rural. The term weiquan, or rights defence, was first coined by the Chinese party-state as part of a process of promotion of various laws, and was thus used by government-affiliated organisations to promote the rights of women, children, and consumers, and to develop citizens' legal awareness. Subsequently, first private citizens, then groups of citizens, then lawyers, appropriated the term as a means of dispute resolution in areas such as private property rights, rights for the handicapped, corruption claims and grievances with officials. Rights defence is important not just because of the political ramifications of its campaigns, but also because of the strategies its activists have used. Rights defence campaigns have taken novel forms unprecedented in China, including the use of the Internet by rights campaigners, the development of rights entrepreneur (or people who have set up businesses linked to rights defence), and the selection of representatives and leaders in rights defence campaigns. In recent years, the idea of rights defence has become used as a tool to attack the party-state, specifically by lawyers and legal campaigners. The growth of rights defence movements reflects the increasing capacity of Chinese citizens to shape their own civic discourse to achieve diverse goals. While rights defence may not pose an immediate threat to the authority of the party-state, it is nonetheless an important symbol of a developing social pluralism in China. This book offers essential insight into the development of rights in contemporary China and will be highly relevant for students, scholars and specialists in legal developments in Asia as well as anyone interested in social movements in China"--

Political posters, banners, and similar objects are extremely common in China. This article uses political design from contemporary China, particularly emphasising the government's Chinese Dream campaign, to analyze what at first appears to be a paradox. The subjects of the campaigns and the language they use are mandated by the central government and promoted through central and local publicity departments. But the graphic aspects of these campaigns, such as the choice of colours, images, layout, and typeface, are much less strictly controlled, and are decided by local governments or authorities. This makes political design in China decentralized. Decentralized design is inconsistent with the principles of global marketing and with the PRC's reliance on set forms of political discourse, both of which rely on the assumption that uniformity will lead to more effective communication of messages and persuasion of the public. Evidence from local design campaigns indeed shows that Chinese political posters are often designed hastily and without expertise, resulting in strange and unpersuasive images. Despite this, this article shows that decentralized design is not paradoxical. This is largely because the Chinese party-state uses propaganda as a method of "signalling" its overall power, more than as a tool of indoctrination or persuasion about particular topics. The central government's reliance on incentives and metrics to regulate local authorities also means that the production of propaganda is also a means by which local governments can signal their loyalty to the Centre. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

This article assesses stability maintenance (weiwen) as a means of conflict resolution in China. It argues that the resolution of local disputes in China, particularly outside cities, is now being influenced and facilitated by the discourse and practice of stability maintenance, rather than legal methods and traditional mediation processes. This conclusion adds to the existing academic views of stability maintenance, which have previously emphasized social control to the exclusion of almost all else, and suggests that stability maintenance-focused conflict resolution may have practical benefits to Chinese citizens, given the state's withdrawal from legal conflict resolution methods and its ambiguous attitude towards mediation. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Microblogs, epitomized by Twitter in the West and Weibo in China, have attracted considerable attention over the past few years. There have been a number of optimistic accounts about their potential to stimulate political activism and social change, juxtaposed with suggestions that their networks are too weak and that they are too easily censored for such change to occur. Yet, in this debate, little attention has been paid to the medium itself; microblogs have too often been treated as mere conduits for information, and the practical and aesthetic experience of microblogging has been marginalized.This article addresses this imbalance in two ways. First, it argues that the microblog is a distinctive medium with special potential for political communication. It applies Rancière's 'politics of aesthetics' and Baudrillard's 'private telematics' to microblogs, suggesting that the particularly immersive quality of microblogs provides new and distinct opportunities for the promotion of opinions and social movements. Second, it argues that by allowing, re-modelling, monitoring and censoring the Weibo service, the Chinese party-state, acting collaboratively with the key microblog companies and the market as a whole, is consciously manipulating the medium of the microblog to reduce the risk of activism, controversial use, and network formation. Thus, the medium of Weibo differs from other microblogs – of which Twitter is the key example – in several important ways, each of which, the article argues, are intended to maximize the cacophonous spectacle of entertainment and to minimize reasoned discussion and debate. Furthermore, while pure censorship of information can be evaded in many ways, it is more difficult for dissenters to evade state control when it is applied to the medium itself.

This working paper explores the history and potential of "stability maintenance" (weiwen) as a form of conflict resolution in China. Its emphasis on conflict resolution is novel. Previous examinations of the weiwen apparatus have concentrated on its political function, namely to manage resistance within society and maintain the authority of the party-state. This avenue of investigation has proved fruitful as a means of characterising the political motivation and the higher-level strategies involved in stability maintenance. Nonetheless, there remain significant conceptual and empirical gaps relating to how stability maintenance offices and processes actually function, particularly out of larger cities and at local levels. The research described in this paper aims to consider the effectiveness of stability maintenance as a part of the "market" for conflict resolution in local China, and to test the hypothesis that conflict resolution as facilitated by weiwen is the most pragmatic and effective means of actually resolving conflicts in the current Chinese political context, notwithstanding the closeness of the stability maintenance discourse to state authority and its relative distance from rule of law-based methods of dispute resolution.