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Abstract
Business power is thought to increase over time when private actors are involved in the provision of public goods and services. This paper argues that this is partially true—and that in certain circumstances, state actors can even swiftly regain control of sectors previously ceded to private interests. When the latter fulfill some public functions on behalf or as delegates of the state, policymakers face ever greater pressures to sustain a relationship flawed by principal-agent problems—allowing business actors to derive appreciable political benefits. However, these conditions do not hold true after deregulation—when state actors retreat from a sector and attempt to direct the newly created market through licensing, norms, and standard setting. We demonstrate that deregulation sets the stage for a more competitive environment, making it harder for private interests to cooperate. This, in turn, can allow policymakers to enhance regulatory capacities and seize opportunities to highlight the shortcomings of private provision. After establishing this argument theoretically, we illustrate its implications through the comparative historical analysis of the health insurance sector in two European countries—Belgium and France. Despite their initial similarities, they experience contrasting developments regarding the welfare state's dependency on private insurers for the provision of crucial collective goods.

The literature has often presented European healthcare systems as being less exposed to the growing dependencies on global finance observed in other areas of social policy. This article explores the sources and dynamics of a regulatory path to healthcare systems' financialization that challenges this depiction. Building on analogies with the case of pension policy, we show that the integration of the private health insurance sector into the European Union financial regulation framework has resulted in perceptible processes of financialization. Notably this manifested in the growing role of financial firms, in non-profit health insurers' adoption of 'financialized' business practices and eventually in a noticeable change of these actors' positioning in domestic healthcare reform. After having discussed the theoretical implications, the article provides an empirical illustration of this argument by documenting the implementation of the Solvency II insurance directive by health insurers in France, and describes its more general consequences and implications beyond this case study.

Straipsnyje glaustai apžvelgiami dabartiniai politiniai ir administraciniai santykiai Europos parlamentinės demokratijos sąlygomis. Daugiausia dėmesio skiriama įtakai, kurią šiems santykiams padarė nepriklausomos reguliavimo agentūros (NRA), ir empiriniams duomenims, patvirtinantiems trijų skirtingų scenarijų galimybę: (1) politikai atsižada galios kontroliuoti NRA interesų grupių naudai; (2) NRA išlieka autonomiškos arba de facto nepriklausomos tiek nuo politikų, tiek nuo interesų grupių; (3) politikai susigrąžina NRA ir jų sprendimų kontrolę. Straipsnio autoriaus nuomone, net susiklosčius palankioms politinėms sąlygoms antrajam scenarijui įvykti, esant reguliacinei tvarkai nereikėtų nuvertinti politizavimo galimybės.

Le marché du risque santé en France connaît depuis une trentaine d'années un vaste mouvement d'européanisation. Dans les années 1990, une première série de directives remanie les relations entre les acteurs (mutuelles, institutions de prévoyance et sociétés d'assurance). En 2016, l'entrée en vigueur de la directive Solvabilité II s'accompagne de nouvelles exigences réglementaires. Pourtant, et pendant la même période, une série de mesures adoptées à l'échelon national a renforcé la présence de l'État dans ses activités. Il en ressort une situation paradoxale : d'un côté, les principaux assureurs santé en France sont certainement plus européanisés qu'auparavant mais, d'un autre côté, les politiques nationales pèsent de façon croissante sur leurs activités.

L'article apporte un éclairage sur quatre modalités d'intégration de résultats qualitatifs et quantitatifs en science politique. Elles sont appliquées à des configurations différentes, mais où le but est à chaque fois de répondre à une même question de recherche. Ces différentes approches sont illustrées à partir d'exemples tirés de la littérature en économique politique, portant respectivement sur la syndicalisation dans les démocraties capitalistes avancées, sur le vote économique, sur la régulation du secteur pharmaceutique et sur la régulation financière.

AbstractWe offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.

International audience ; This essay provides a concise overview of the current state of political-administrative relations in Europe's Parliamentary democracy. It is more particularly focused on presenting the implications that the growth of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) has had on such relationship, and on reviewing the empirical evidence in support of three distinct scenarios-one in which politicians abdicate their control power over IRAs to the benefit of interest groups; one where IRAs maintain and expand their autonomy or de facto independence both vis-à-vis politicians and interest-groups; and one where politicians regain control over IRAs and their decisions. I argue that even if the second scenario has received extended empirical support, politicization under the regulatory order could well be underestimated with broader implications for political-administrative relations that are briefly introduced.

International audience ; This essay provides a concise overview of the current state of political-administrative relations in Europe's Parliamentary democracy. It is more particularly focused on presenting the implications that the growth of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) has had on such relationship, and on reviewing the empirical evidence in support of three distinct scenarios-one in which politicians abdicate their control power over IRAs to the benefit of interest groups; one where IRAs maintain and expand their autonomy or de facto independence both vis-à-vis politicians and interest-groups; and one where politicians regain control over IRAs and their decisions. I argue that even if the second scenario has received extended empirical support, politicization under the regulatory order could well be underestimated with broader implications for political-administrative relations that are briefly introduced.

Thisessay provides aconcise overview of thecurrent state of political-administrative relations in Europe's Parliamentary democracy. It is more particularly focused on presenting theimplications that thegrowth of independent regulatory agencies(IRAs) has had on such relationship, and on reviewing theempirical evidence in support of threedistinct scenarios– one in which politicians abdicate their control power over IRAs to thebenefit of interest groups; one where IRAs maintain and expand theirautonomy or de facto independence both vis-à-vis politicians and interest-groups; and one where politicians regain control over IRAs and theirdecisions. Iargue that even if thesecond scenario has received extended empirical support, politicization under theregulatory order could well be under-estimated– with broader implications for political-administrative relations that are briefly introduced. ; Straipsnyje glaustai apžvelgiami dabartiniai politiniai ir administraciniai santykiai Europos parlamentinės demokratijos sąlygomis. Daugiausia dėmesio skiriama įtakai, kurią šiems santykiams padarė nepriklausomos reguliavimo agentūros(NRA), ir empiriniams duomenims, patvirtinantiems trijų skirtingų scenarijų galimybę: (1)politikai atsižada galios kontroliuoti NRA interesų grupių naudai; (2)NRA išlieka autonomiškos arba de facto nepriklausomos tiek nuo politikų, tiek nuo interesų grupių; (3)politikai susigrąžina NRA ir jų sprendimų kontrolę. Straipsnio autoriaus nuomone, net susiklosčius palankioms politinėms sąlygoms antrajam scenarijui įvykti, esant reguliacinei tvarkai nereikėtų nuvertinti politizavimo galimybės.

International audience ; For Torben Iversen, capitalism is not responsible for the crisis democracies are currently facing. After Jenny Andersson, Cyril Benoît underlines the limits of this optimistic interpretation.

International audience ; For Torben Iversen, capitalism is not responsible for the crisis democracies are currently facing. After Jenny Andersson, Cyril Benoît underlines the limits of this optimistic interpretation.