Suchergebnisse

As pointed out by many scholars, Germany is going through a period marked by a deep crisis of the major German parties, characterized by the advance of the Populist Party and the far right Alternative fuer Deutschland (AFD). In 2018 this situation seemed to be a harbinger of change, not only internally, but also in what we can now call Germany's European policy. It is therefore an extremely relevant issue, since the history of Germany is closely linked to that of the European Community, itself in constant transfor-mation, and which in turn, over time and for the Germans, has taken on the function of "cage" (1949-1965), "cradle" (1966-1990) and "frame" (1991-2012). The present work, therefore, in addition to retrac-ing, in detail, the salient moments of the relationship between Europe and the Federal Republic of Germany first and then Germany, wants to be a first reflection on the current relationship between Germany and the European Union in light of the crises that have characterized the last five years of global relations: from the Syrian crisis to the Covid-19 pandemic.

The end of the Great War brought with it a strong downsizing of the Italian, French and Rus-sian naval fleets and, last but not least, and caused the disappearance of the German naval fleet, the lat-ter firmly wanted by William II and itself decisive element of that idea of a "proof of strength" that had been affirmed between the end of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th century. Unexpectedly, as a result of this momentous change, new spaces of commercial opportunity opened up and, above all, new possibilities in the field of the balance of power between the naval powers were disclosed. These ex-traordinary opportunities were clear to the American presidential candidates, who in the early summer of 1920 were competing for the role of republican and democratic presidential candidate. Moreover, Wash-ington had never hidden in the years before the war that it wanted to play a more audacious role at a global level, in full competition with the British Royal Navy. The one, whether democratic or republican, who had won the elections would have had the chance to redesign the US political and naval role at the global level and at the same time guarantee the best commercial platform for American products and manufactured goods. On the basis of the reports of the Italian naval attaché at the Royal Italian Embassy in Washington DC, Piero Civalleri, the paper deals with the launch of the new US naval policy, an in-strument of the future American economic power, whose deductions and analyses were the basis of the future Washington Naval Agreements.

In times of populism and Euroscepticism, it is appropriate to reflect once again on what has been and still is the long economic crisis (2007-2017) which has upset the European and world economic system. A crisis that has challenged European democracies, unable to secure citizens' rights and basic services, and with them the EU project. The paper is an attempt to scrutinize the events that have taken place over the last ten years, and to analyze with the utmost objectivity the role played by different Europeancountries and, above all, by Germany in countering or aggravating the crisis in the so-called Euro area. The crisis, triggered by US subprime, is a structural, systemic crisis one, rooted in poor manage-ment of public affairs by the so-called advanced economies, which had long cradled in the idea of an "unstoppable growth". The paper is based on the documents of the Bank for International Regulations, as well as on a reasoned bibliography

The essay analizes the concept of total, partial or no adhesion to the political-economic system created by US after the end of the second world war; a system based on a sharp division between the western capitalist world and the Soviet planned economy, whose fundamental assumption was the absence of any dialogue between the two parties. The absence of dialogue also concerned their commercial and financial relations, and was aimed at avoiding any acquisition of know how and equipment by Moscow, necessary to its industrial development. If at the end of the fourties the sharp division between East and West advocated by the United States was widely shared by European allies, in the mid-fifties it would become, if not anachronistic, difficult to achieve, especially in the field of trade relations. As loudly stated by Adenauer in 1958, at the climax of Berlin's Crisis, the Western European states continued to trade with Moscow (forgetting to say that RFT was doing exactly the same). This created the conditions for a hard and lasting dispute between Western European states and US. The main reason of this conflict was the desire of West Europeans to enter into trade relationships with Eastern European states and to improve them significantly. Italy, case study of this paper, was part of this trend, especially through its Istituto per il Commercio Estero (ICE).