Suchergebnisse

Dimensions of political difference -- Policy positions and theoretical models of political competition -- Empirical policy spaces -- Measurement policy positions -- The dimensional structure of policy spaces -- Left and right in comparative context -- In conclusion

PUBLISHED ; Well-established methods exist for measuring party positions, but reliable means for es- timating intra-party preferences remain underdeveloped. While most efforts focus on es- timating the ideal points of individual legislators based on inductive scaling of roll call votes, this data suffers from two problems: selection bias due to unrecorded votes, and strong party discipline which tends to make voting a strategic rather than a sincere indi- cation of preferences. By contrast, legislative speeches are relatively unconstrained, since party leaders are less likely to punish MPs for speaking freely as long as they vote with the party line. Yet the differences between roll call estimations and text scalings remain es- sentially unexplored, despite the growing application of statistical analysis of textual data to measure policy preferences. Our paper addresses this lacuna by exploiting a rich fea- ture of the Swiss legislature: On most bills, legislators both vote and speak many times. Using this data, we compare text-based scaling of ideal points to vote-based scaling from a crucial piece of energy legislation. Our findings confirm that text scalings reveal larger intra-party differences than roll calls. Using regression models we further explain the dif- ferences between roll call and text scalings by attributing differences to constituency-level preferences for energy policy

In this review article, I identify the key questions raised by the treatment of electoral systems not as causal influences on party systems but as effects or byproducts of party systems. Framing these questions in the context of the classic consequences-oriented study of electoral institutions, I first review the classic approach, which treats electoral systems as causes, and explore the potential implications when electoral systems are viewed instead as outcomes of party systems. I then survey a variety of principal explanations of the origins and change of electoral laws, followed by a focus on several of the more explicitly defined models of this process. I conclude by discussing-and contesting-the notion that except for exceptional founding episodes of institutional choice, electoral systems eventually stabilize as equilibrium institutions. Adapted from the source document.

The main point of this essay is straightforward: The distinction between quantitative and qualitative research, when applied to empirical political analysis, is exaggerated and largely artificial. In fact, most political scientists can happily perform valid and useful research without being concerned about where they stand on the quantitative-qualitative divide. Furthermore, qualitative characterizations are often easily converted into quantitative characterizations, and many qualitative characterizations are implicitly quantitative to begin with. Finally, qualitative characterizations of the empirical world are almost always more useful when converted into quantitative ones.

Electoral systems are commonly treated as exogenous determinants of political party systems, yet our theoretical understanding remains limited as to how these institutions themselves are determined. Part of the problem lies with the subject matter itself: electoral system change is frequently idiosyncratic, often occurring during episodes of exceptional political change. Yet another aspect of the problem is that explanations of electoral system change frequently occur piecemeal in application to specific cases, without systematic or comparative development. Addressing both problems, I first survey the existing literature to develop a comprehensive typology of explanations of electoral system change & persistence. I then set forth a theory predicting the conditions under which electoral systems should change, linking motivations for institutional change to instrumentally rational political parties seeking to maximize their legislative seat shares. The theory predicts that electoral laws will change when a coalition of parties exists such that each party in the coalition expects to gain more seats under an alternative electoral institution, & that also has sufficient power to effect this alternative through fiat given the rules for changing electoral laws. To contrast this model to other explanations of electoral system change, I point to its observable implications & outline how it could be confirmed or disconfirmed in empirical research. The comparison also highlights limitations in other approaches to explaining electoral system change, & underscores the importance of institutions in inducing equilibriums in both electoral systems & party systems. 1 Figure, 55 References. [Copyright 2003 Elsevier Ltd.]