Our thesis deals with the following problem: one of the theoretical justifications for patenting inventions is based on institutional arbitration, through temporary monopolies, offering incentives to certain individuals and discouraging others. But this trade-off is complex and the impact of patents on research, innovation and general welfare is theoretically and empirically still uncertain.The number of patents registered annually has tripled in just 20 years, rising from 500,000 to 1.5 million patents issued annually worldwide. Patents entail significant costs, and it is therefore estimated that more than a quarter of total private R&D expenditure in the United States is spent solely on defending patents. Given the significance of these figures, and the lack of solid evidence to justify the current arbitration, should we decline to recommend this public policy?There are two opposing schools of thought:• The conservative wait-and-see approach: Given the uncertainty, patents should be retained until further information is available because it is risky to reform such a highly developed institution without further knowledge. Patents are widespread worldwide and have been for a long time; with such a degree of uncertainty, it is unwise to make changes that are liable to cause short-term disruption, increase costs and result in errors and inefficiency.• The experimental reformist approach: Given the uncertainty, patents should be reformed immediately because it is risky to preserve such a highly developed institution without further knowledge. With such a degree of uncertainty, it is unwise to retain an institution that could be harmful and less than ideal.Our thesis defends the experimental reformist option for the following main reason: patents should be reformed for epistemic reasons because there is a new difficulty: standardisation. Indeed, since the worldwide virtual standardisation of patent law in 1995 (WTO TRIPS agreements) it has become extremely difficult to study patents lacking means of comparison. ...
Our thesis deals with the following problem: one of the theoretical justifications for patenting inventions is based on institutional arbitration, through temporary monopolies, offering incentives to certain individuals and discouraging others. But this trade-off is complex and the impact of patents on research, innovation and general welfare is theoretically and empirically still uncertain.The number of patents registered annually has tripled in just 20 years, rising from 500,000 to 1.5 million patents issued annually worldwide. Patents entail significant costs, and it is therefore estimated that more than a quarter of total private R&D expenditure in the United States is spent solely on defending patents. Given the significance of these figures, and the lack of solid evidence to justify the current arbitration, should we decline to recommend this public policy?There are two opposing schools of thought:• The conservative wait-and-see approach: Given the uncertainty, patents should be retained until further information is available because it is risky to reform such a highly developed institution without further knowledge. Patents are widespread worldwide and have been for a long time; with such a degree of uncertainty, it is unwise to make changes that are liable to cause short-term disruption, increase costs and result in errors and inefficiency.• The experimental reformist approach: Given the uncertainty, patents should be reformed immediately because it is risky to preserve such a highly developed institution without further knowledge. With such a degree of uncertainty, it is unwise to retain an institution that could be harmful and less than ideal.Our thesis defends the experimental reformist option for the following main reason: patents should be reformed for epistemic reasons because there is a new difficulty: standardisation. Indeed, since the worldwide virtual standardisation of patent law in 1995 (WTO TRIPS agreements) it has become extremely difficult to study patents lacking means of comparison. Patents must therefore be reformed in order to produce institutional diversity; through longitudinal and transversal comparisons, it will then be possible to empirically test the effects of patents on innovation.Addressing the main objection, i.e. the risks we incur by playing institutional sorcerers' apprentices, we offer three arguments: (1) the risks are low in many technological fields. A significant proportion of current innovation does not involve patents (around 70 %), and this proportion will tend to increase with the growing importance of IT innovations; (2) the costs of the changes and the risks of poor adjustment can be tested in the laboratory. We are demonstrating that this type of experiment is possible. We have carried out such an experiment in the laboratory. We focused on social acceptance and the effect on creativity of being forced by the majority to abandon patents. Our experiment demonstrates that the removal of patents in the laboratory does not reduce the incentive to invent among the most creative individuals, since they are not the ones who vote for patents; (3) various institutional solutions can be tested in the field without requiring the total abolition of patents. We identify ex ante (pre-marketing) / ex post (post-marketing) institutional mechanisms that would be worth testing and that differ from current patent law. For example, we propose a mechanism, the iVAT, which, while maintaining the current patent system, offers immunity to anyone marketing a patent-protected product, since the State would ensure that a proportion of the VAT was transferred to the owner of the patent in the form of royalties. ; Cette thèse traite du problème suivant : la justification théorique principale des brevets repose sur un arbitrage institutionnel, par le monopole temporaire, entre l'incitation offerte à certains individus et l'inhibition produite sur d'autres. Mais cet arbitrage est complexe et l'impact des brevets sur la recherche, l'innovation et le bien-être général est théoriquement et empiriquement toujours incertain.Le nombre de brevets déposés annuellement a triplé en seulement 20 ans passant de 500 000 à plus d'1,5 million de brevets délivrés annuellement dans le monde. Les brevets entraînent des coûts important, il est estimé que plus d'un quart du total des dépenses privées en R&D aux États-Unis est uniquement dépensé pour défendre les brevets. Au vu de l'importance de ces chiffres, en l'absence de preuves solides pour justifier l'arbitrage actuel, faut-il ne pas recommander cette politique publique ?Deux thèses s'opposent :• La thèse conservatrice attentiste : Au vu de l'incertitude, il faut conserver les brevets en attendant d'en savoir plus, car il est risqué de réformer une institution si développée sans avoir plus de connaissances à son sujet. Les brevets sont répandus de manière planétaire et depuis longtemps, il est déraisonnable de provoquer des changements susceptibles de générer des perturbations à court terme, augmenter les coûts, provoquer des erreurs et des inefficacités.• La thèse réformiste expérimentaliste : Au vu de l'incertitude, il faut réformer les brevets dès à présent, car il est risqué de conserver une institution si développée sans avoir plus de connaissances à son sujet. Il est déraisonnable de garder avec un tel niveau d'incertitude une institution qui pourrait être néfaste et sous-optimale.Notre thèse défend l'option réformiste expérimentaliste et la principale raison est la suivante : il faut réformer les brevets pour des raisons épistémiques car il s'est ajouté une difficulté nouvelle : l'uniformisation. En effet, depuis la quasi-uniformisation planétaire du droit des brevets en 1995 (accords ADPIC de l'OMC) il est devenu extrêmement difficile d'étudier les brevets par manque de moyens de comparaison. Il faut donc réformer les brevets afin de produire de la diversité institutionnelle, ce qui permettra de tester empiriquement, par comparaison longitudinale et transversale les effets des brevets sur l'innovation.Face à l'objection principale, c'est-à-dire, les risques que nous encourons à jouer aux apprentis-sorciers institutionnels, nous répondons par trois arguments : (1) Les risques sont faibles dans de nombreux domaines technologiques. Une part importante de l'innovation actuelle se fait hors brevet (environ 70 %) et cette part tendra à s'agrandir avec l'augmentation de l'importance des innovations informatiques. (2) Les coûts du changement et les risques d'inadaptation peuvent être expérimentés en laboratoire. Nous montrons que ce type d'expérimentation est possible. Nous avons réalisé une telle expérimentation en laboratoire. Nous nous sommes concentrés sur l'acceptation sociale et l'effet sur la créativité d'être forcés par l'avis majoritaire à abandonner les brevets. Notre expérimentation montre que supprimer les brevets en laboratoire ne réduit pas l'incitation à inventer chez les plus créatifs car ce ne sont pas eux qui votent pour les brevets. (3) De multiples solutions institutionnelles peuvent être expérimentées sur le terrain sans exiger l'abolition pure et simple des brevets. Nous identifions des mécanismes institutionnels ex ante (avant commercialisation) / ex post (après commercialisation) qu'ils seraient prometteurs d'expérimenter et qui diffèrent du droit des brevets actuel. Nous proposons par exemple un mécanisme, la iTVA, qui tout en maintenant le système actuel des brevets, offre une immunité à toute personne qui commercialiserait un produit protégé par brevet, car l'État serait garant du transfert d'une part de la TVA en royalties vers le détenteur du brevet.
Studies have shown that intergroup conflict may result from two distinct human motives: the desire to obtain personal retributions from conflict ( egoism), and the desire to sacrifice for the benefit of the ingroup ( parochial altruism). Yet, the relative strength of these motives is open to debate. In this study, we compare behaviors in two Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemmas (IPD), which respectively capture altruistic and egoistic motives to generate conflict. Egoistic motives result in about 40% more conflict than altruistic motives. Yet, parochial altruism generates more conflict when three conditions are gathered: i) other ingroup members are parochial altruists, ii) the outgroup is aggressive and iii) the outgroup is rich. Implications regarding the diverging structural causes of terrorism and civil wars are discussed.
International audience ; Studies on parochial altruism have insofar focused on the causes leading individuals to attack any outgroup on the behalf of one's group. Yet, we lack clues to understand why parochial altruists target specific groups, such as dominant groups in some contexts and minority groups in others. The present paper introduces an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals costly attack strong versus weak outgroups. In a first study, 300 participants played a repeated Inter-group Prisoner Dilemma involving multiple groups and inter-group differences in resources. Results show that individuals have a preference for targeting strong outgroups, but that attacks decrease when the inequality in destructive capacity between groups is high. Besides, individuals target weak outgroups when they are threatening their ingroup status. Decisions in the game correlate with participants' political ideology and Social Dominance Orientation. In a second study, we provide evidence that our results generalize to historical linkages between economic inequality and left-wing versus right-wing terrorist attacks.
International audience ; Studies on parochial altruism have insofar focused on the causes leading individuals to attack any outgroup on the behalf of one's group. Yet, we lack clues to understand why parochial altruists target specific groups, such as dominant groups in some contexts and minority groups in others. The present paper introduces an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals costly attack strong versus weak outgroups. In a first study, 300 participants played a repeated Inter-group Prisoner Dilemma involving multiple groups and inter-group differences in resources. Results show that individuals have a preference for targeting strong outgroups, but that attacks decrease when the inequality in destructive capacity between groups is high. Besides, individuals target weak outgroups when they are threatening their ingroup status. Decisions in the game correlate with participants' political ideology and Social Dominance Orientation. In a second study, we provide evidence that our results generalize to historical linkages between economic inequality and left-wing versus right-wing terrorist attacks.
International audience ; Studies on parochial altruism have insofar focused on the causes leading individuals to attack any outgroup on the behalf of one's group. Yet, we lack clues to understand why parochial altruists target specific groups, such as dominant groups in some contexts and minority groups in others. The present paper introduces an experiment to analyze the conditions under which individuals costly attack strong versus weak outgroups. In a first study, 300 participants played a repeated Inter-group Prisoner Dilemma involving multiple groups and inter-group differences in resources. Results show that individuals have a preference for targeting strong outgroups, but that attacks decrease when the inequality in destructive capacity between groups is high. Besides, individuals target weak outgroups when they are threatening their ingroup status. Decisions in the game correlate with participants' political ideology and Social Dominance Orientation. In a second study, we provide evidence that our results generalize to historical linkages between economic inequality and left-wing versus right-wing terrorist attacks.
This study attempts to experimentally capture the effects of democratic reform of intellectual property (IP) and measure how a vote "against IP" can disappoint the most talented innovators and reduce their creativity. Contrary to expectations, the results show that such a vote increases overall creativity. Actually, the most talented innovators do not vote in favor of IP. Rather, those who vote in favor of IP are those who benefit relatively more from royalties. Surprisingly, no correlation is found between these two populations: the IP in our experiment seems not to reward the best players, but the players choosing an 'autarkic' strategy of relying on their own creationsand forego cross-fertilization with other players. These are not particularly brilliant players thatopt for a rent-seeking strategy that maximises gainsfromthe IP systemitself. There are plausible arguments to argue that this result is at least partly valid in the real world, especially for complexand highly sequential innovations where it has been proven that patent trolls and anti-competitivestrategies are important. These findings lead us not to recommend IP constitutional protections,because there are no major "tyranny from the majority" concerns.
This study attempts to experimentally capture the effects of democratic reform of intellectual property (IP) and measure how a vote "against IP" can disappoint the most talented innovators and reduce their creativity. Contrary to expectations, the results show that such a vote increases overall creativity. Actually, the most talented innovators do not vote in favor of IP. Rather, those who vote in favor of IP are those who benefit relatively more from royalties. Surprisingly, no correlation is found between these two populations: the IP in our experiment seems not to reward the best players, but the players choosing an 'autarkic' strategy of relying on their own creationsand forego cross-fertilization with other players. These are not particularly brilliant players thatopt for a rent-seeking strategy that maximises gainsfromthe IP systemitself. There are plausible arguments to argue that this result is at least partly valid in the real world, especially for complexand highly sequential innovations where it has been proven that patent trolls and anti-competitivestrategies are important. These findings lead us not to recommend IP constitutional protections,because there are no major "tyranny from the majority" concerns.
Studies on parochial altruism have insofar focused on the causes leading individuals to attack any out-group on the behalf of one's group. Yet, we have no clue to understand why parochial altruists target specific groups, such as big firms in some contexts and refugees in other contexts. The present paper introduces an experiment to analyse the conditions under which individuals costly attack strong versus weak out-groups. In our study, 300 participants played a repeated Inter-group Prisonner Dilemma (IPD) involving multiple groups and inter-group differences in resources. The results show that individuals have a basic preference for targeting strong out-groups, but that attacks decrease when the inequality in destructive capacity between groups is high. Besides, individuals target weak out-groups when they are threatening their in-group status. Decisions in the game correlate with participants' political ideology and social dominance orientation. Overall, the results give clues to understand historical variations in the targets of political violence.
Studies on parochial altruism have insofar focused on the causes leading individuals to attack any out-group on the behalf of one's group. Yet, we have no clue to understand why parochial altruists target specific groups, such as big firms in some contexts and refugees in other contexts. The present paper introduces an experiment to analyse the conditions under which individuals costly attack strong versus weak out-groups. In our study, 300 participants played a repeated Inter-group Prisonner Dilemma (IPD) involving multiple groups and inter-group differences in resources. The results show that individuals have a basic preference for targeting strong out-groups, but that attacks decrease when the inequality in destructive capacity between groups is high. Besides, individuals target weak out-groups when they are threatening their in-group status. Decisions in the game correlate with participants' political ideology and social dominance orientation. Overall, the results give clues to understand historical variations in the targets of political violence.