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The role of dyadic trade dependence in reducing conflict has been a subject of some dispute in the recent literature. Liberals have presented strong evidence that a higher level of trade dependence leads to lower probabilities of dyadic disputes, while an equally compelling literature has generated evidence that elevated levels of trade dependence generally increase the likelihood of disputes, or that dependence only decreases the likelihood of conflict for certain pairs of states under specific conditions. Unfortunately, the direct comparison of these competing perspectives has been hindered by the use of different estimation techniques, variable measurements, data sets, and samples. While recent work has attempted to provide a more systematic analysis of the effect of different data sets and sample choices on the relationship between interdependence and conflict (Schneider, Barbieri, & Gleditsch, 2003), no theoretical reason has been put forward as to why estimation results for some samples should differ from others. This paper employs three different data sets (Russett & Oneal, 2001; Barbieri, 2002; and Gleditsch, 2002) to test the effects of sample choice, especially that of politically relevant dyads, on the relationship between interdependence and conflict. Following Polachek, Robst, and Chang (1999) I note that the gains from trade are not homogeneous across dyad type; thus, the use of a politically relevant sample leads to biased estimates of the relationship between trade and conflict. Using a model that has been found to be critical of the liberal perspective (Barbieri, 2002), the results show that trade dependence does not have the same impact on conflict for dyads of different sizes. In sum, dyads with larger economies and high levels of trade salience have lower probabilities of conflict than dyads with smaller economies and equivalent amounts of trade.

An important question in the conflict processes literature concerns what types of international relationships are more likely to lead to peaceful interactions. Both security and economic ties have been posited as powerful determinants of conflict, yet their effects are often examined independently from one another. Furthermore, a debate exists as to whether it is states' ties to the international order or to each other that are most important in determining conflict. A resolution of the competing perspectives would expect that two states that have a tight network of security and economic relationships, both to each other and to the international order, should be extremely unlikely to engage in hostile action against each other. Surprisingly, a series of multinomial logits using non-directed dyads from 1951 to 1985 suggests that dyads with tight economic and security ties at both the state-to-state and statetosystem levels are only slightly less likely to engage in dyadic disputes than those without such simultaneous ties. However, this study finds that both (1) tight security and economic ties to the international order and (2) tight intra-dyadic security and economic ties have important, independent effects in limiting dyadic hostility. This suggests that the states within a dyad have two separate paths to more peaceful interactions - the first lies in tightening ties between states, the second in strengthening dyadic security and economic ties to the international order.

The influence of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in civil conflict has received important consideration in a growing body of literature. Little research, however, has focused on UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and their ability to determine and affect peacekeeping. New data on UNSC resolutions coded to UCDP/PRIO internal conflicts with peacekeeping operations (PKOs) is presented here. The data illustrate that resolutions vary importantly across conflicts and missions regarding their timing, sentiment toward rebel and government factions, level of action, mandates, authorized force levels, and substantive policies. Through a series of negative-binomial regressions using conflict-month replication data, we demonstrate that PKOs with both higher troops levels and a higher intensity of resolutions that condemn rebel actors experience a significant reduction one-sided rebel violence against civilians. In short, UNSC resolutions differ importantly before and during peacekeeping operations and may have an important impact on PKO effectiveness in civil conflict.

While much literature on peacekeeping seeks to determine the effect of United Nations (UN) intervention on post-conflict peace processes, most peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are deployed to active conflicts. The limited research on peacekeeping in active civil conflicts suggests that robust PKOs reduce hostilities. Yet, if PKOs serve to extend conflict duration, even lowered hostilities can yield greater destruction over time. We thus explore the effect of peacekeeping on conflict duration. We argue that PKOs with larger troop deployments are better able to increase the cost of combat, improve information sharing between belligerents, and provide security guarantees, thus reducing the time to negotiated resolutions. Using fine-grained data on monthly peacekeeping personnel commitments and observations of ongoing conflict between combatants, we examine how variations in mission deployments affect the success of UN peacekeeping in ending civil conflicts. As expected, our findings indicate that larger troop deployments shorten war duration to negotiated resolution.

Ethnopolitical expression spans three primary forms: electoral politics, non-violent protest and violent rebellion. Previous literature has studied these strategies in isolation from one another. Using original data on the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain, this article combines a new method for operationalizing contentious strategies with Gurr's ethnopolitical conflict model to explain communities' movements between categories of the full range of nationalist political behaviour. The findings confirm that organizations acting within a community respond to altered incentives and changing political contexts by moving up and down the 'ladder of contention'; they suggest an under-explored 'strategic dynamism' in ethnonational communities. Capturing this dynamic movement allows for a better understanding of which features of a group's environment have an 'escalatory' impact on conflict and which, conversely, have an 'ameliorative' effect.