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Introduction. - 1. The chemical weapons taboo. - Part I: A strategic taboo. - 2. Setting the redline. - 3. Ghouta and ideological innovation. - 4. Obama's taboo. - Part II: A failed taboo. - 5. Chemical weapons and false hierarchies. - 6. Escalating the crisis. - Conclusion

This book examines the use of concepts - specifically 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD) - in US foreign policy discourse. Current analysis of WMD definition has made headway into identifying the repercussions that the conceptual conflation of such diverse weapons - typically understood as a reference to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - has for international security. While the concept assumes these weapons are 'equal', the vast disparity between them, and their disparity from the conventional weapons from which they are supposedly distinct, means this approach is seen as unreflecti

This book examines the use of concepts - specifically 'weapons of mass destruction' (WMD) - in US foreign policy discourse. Current analysis of WMD definition has made headway into identifying the repercussions that the conceptual conflation of such diverse weapons - typically understood as a reference to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - has for international security. While the concept assumes these weapons are 'equal', the vast disparity between them, and their disparity from the conventional weapons from which they are supposedly distinct, means this approach is seen as unreflecti.

Even political actors who disregard the international consensus against aggressive war may still fear the taboos surrounding the most powerful weapons.

The conceptualization of taboo within international relations (IR)—that is, what we understand to be taboo—is inadequate. Specifically, current analysis fails to sufficiently distinguish between taboo and non-taboo forms of prohibitory norm, where this failure often facilitates a tendency (explicit or implicit) to comprehend the concept primarily in terms of actor compliance with a taboo in question. This understanding is shown here to be analytically unrepresentative and that it sets unrealistic expectations for actor behavior, especially where those expectations are then employed as the foundation of quantifiable conceptual comprehension and study within IR. In response to this critical need for a new understanding of taboo relevant to IR, the article constructs an original analytic model based on disgust, stigmatization, and fetishization. The article additionally outlines the conceptual and methodological implications of adopting this new model, including where it subsequently demonstrates that taboos are more prevalent and more influential than certain sectors of the IR discipline have previously given them credit for.

AbstractThe clash between national security and civil rights comprises one of the most controversial aspects of counter-radicalisation strategy. Analysts present this as a conflict between the need for restrictive security measures (for example, surveillance) and the need to uphold civil liberties (for example, privacy and freedom of speech). In responding to this dilemma, the article examines how this binary normative struggle impacts on the rhetorical presentation of counter-radicalisation policies – in particular, the UK Prevent Strategy and the rhetoric employed by UK Prime Minister and former Home Secretary, Theresa May. It argues that the normative environment has obliged May to construct rhetoric within the context of, what is termed here, normative invalidation. In facing two comparably compelling and related norms of action, May is necessarily required to invalidate or neutralise any norm not adhered to as an essential characteristic of rhetorical strategy. This is discussed in relation to the Strategic Narratives paradigm.

Intervention comprises one of the most contentious issues in International Relations. This controversy results from the way normative understanding is structured around two key, but mutually exclusive, taboos: the moral expectation to respond in cases of humanitarian need and the protection of state sovereignty. In examining this dilemma, this article asks: what happens to the construction of rhetorical strategy, where that strategy seeks to justify intervention (or not), within a binary normative environment? It is argued that actors can only successfully construct a rhetorical case by engaging in, what is termed here, normative invalidation. In a binary situation, actors cannot adhere to both taboos. These taboos are so compelling, however, that actors must necessarily invalidate or neutralise any taboo not adhered to. This is discussed in relation to the Strategic Narratives paradigm and comparative case studies on the presidential rhetoric of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama.