Suchergebnisse

Research on the impact of participatory institutions in Latin America has not yet examined how they work in authoritarian settings. National autocrats in Mexico implemented participatory reforms during that country's national electoral authoritarian regime. Building on research on political decentralization in authoritarian regimes, I argue that participatory institutions can be used to channel citizen demands and to incorporate citizens into authoritarian systems, thereby strengthening authoritarian rule. However, following research on democratic participatory governance, I also argue that participatory institutions will work better in this regard when designed from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Statistical analysis of patterns of municipal-level electoral authoritarian support in Mexico shows that bottom-up-designed participatory institutions implemented during electoral authoritarian rule strengthened local political control to a greater extent than top-down-designed political systems. The study supports research revealing the anti-democratic effects of participatory institutions in democratic Latin American nations. (JPLA/GIGA)

Scholars have long held that partisan politics cause aggregate-level fluctuations in markets. However, if investors hold different policy preferences, the effects of election campaigns on their behavior should be more nuanced. In particular, investors in economic sectors benefiting from neo-liberal economic policies might respond favorably to gains in support by right-leaning candidates, whereas those expected to profit from state-led economic development might react favorably to gains by left-leaning contenders. To test these propositions, I examine stock market performance by economic sector during Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of pre-election polls and stock market returns during the campaign reveals that, although investors did not react to potential partisan policy change in the ways originally expected, they did respond to polling news differently by economic sector. The findings demonstrate the importance of disaggregating stock, bond, and currency markets according to economic criteria, and thus the limitations of aggregate level analysis for research on politics and markets.

The editor of this thematic journal volume notes that the papers herein were first presented at the conference "Mexico, Elections 2006," coordinated by the Centro de Estudios Espinosa Yglesias & the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas in Apr 2007. The contributions focus on Mexico's presidential & legislative elections of 2 July 2006, which will always hold a special place in Mexico's democratic history for two reasons: (1) the country's two primary parties, the National Action Party (PAN) & the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI [which held hegemony for decades]), had an important rival, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD); & (2) only 233,831 (0.56%) of the total national vote placed the PAN ahead of the PRD, leaving the PRI in third place. Both the close competition & the accusations of fraud put forth by the PRD made this an extraordinary election. The parties, the candidates, & their respective campaigns are the topics of the nine articles that follow. S. Stanton

This study analyzes whether subnational ethnic group & institutional variation leads to variation in ethnic group political behavior. To this end, I focus on the political behavior of indigenous groups in Mexico. Though Mexico has a small indigenous population compared to many other countries in Latin America & does not host ethnic-based political parties, it benefits from certain institutional & demographic features that allow analysis of how different electoral laws interact with ethnicity to shape political behavior. To this end, I study Mexico's state of Oaxaca where municipal governments have been legally allowed to adopt different kinds of electoral rules & where ethnic group heterogeneity is high. Statistical analysis of municipal institutions, indigenous group density, and federal election results in this state show that certain municipal electoral rules exacerbate ethnic group abstention, although they have had no impact on electoral margins or partisan support. Adapted from the source document.

Do investors assess the credibility of campaign rhetoric? To answer this question, I develop several alternative arguments for how investors might consider candidates' policy platforms and apply them to Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of polling trends and the Mexican stock market shows that rising electoral uncertainty lowered market performance, while growing support for either the left-leaning Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (PRD) or the market-friendly Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (PAN) reduced market volatility. These findings reveal that investors discounted Lopez Obrador's left-leaning rhetoric but did not ignore the effect of a tight race on the value of their assets. Adapted from the source document.

Do investors assess the credibility of campaign rhetoric? To answer this question, I develop several alternative arguments for how investors might consider candidates' policy platforms and apply them to Mexico's 2006 presidential race. Statistical analysis of polling trends and the Mexican stock market shows that rising electoral uncertainty lowered market performance, while growing support for either the left-leaning Andrés Manuel López Obrador (PRD) or the market-friendly Felipe Calderón Hinojosa (PAN) reduced market volatility. These findings reveal that investors discounted López Obrador's left-leaning rhetoric but did not ignore the effect of a tight race on the value of their assets.