Suchergebnisse

The hopefulness that accompanied the establishment of the Republic of Hungary in 1989 was soon tempered by divided politics that seemed unable to address systemic economic woes facing the nation. Though the 1956 Revolution remains foundational, parts of the polity remain uneasy with the concept of the liberal state and instead hearken back to the Christian National politics of the interwar years to legitimize a vision of the Hungarian nation not dependent on institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), let alone the European Union (EU) which Hungary joined in 2004. The promise of economic prosperity found in EU member states such as Austria remains elusive and many Hungarians yearn for the social security system of the 1970's communist era while at the same time subscribing to a resurrection of the strong state. The populist rhetoric of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán draws sharp contrast between the EU's dream of a Europe without Borders and the localized/nativist vision of Hungarian national identity that resonates with a large part of the polity that provided his FIDESZ (Young Democrats)/KDNP (Christian Democrats) coalition with parliamentary majorities in 2010 and 2014. Further to the right, Jobbik (the better ones) excoriates both gypsies and Jews for undermining the state. The current refugee crisis has been cast by Orbán as an Islamic tide that will reconfigure Europe into bloodless and docile societies. Orbán's decision to build a fence in summer 2015 to keep out refugees seems prescient to those subscribing to these nativist beliefs. The State forwards a public presentation of history that absolves the interwar regime of the Lord Protector Miklós Horthy, 1920-1944 of alliance with the Axis and genocide. Though there remains substantial opposition to current nationalist sentiment, the prospects for the survival of liberalism seem bleak without a unified opposition. Interestingly, there remains an embedded dissonance in History curriculum and texts that challenges the State's interpretation of History. This article studies the state's public presentation of history in contrast to that found in curriculum and textbooks to understand the contrast between Orbán's stated aim to create an illiberal state and stories found in texts that undergird the dream of a liberal republic found in the failed revolutions of 1848 and 1956. Disturbingly, previous regimes that extoled the strong state have imaginatively rearranged history so that the two strains of political desire antithetical to each other are reconciled. How does the Hungarian case help us better understand the resurrection of strong state politics that seem to have infiltrated the global stage?

On New Year's Day 2000, the Crown of St Steven, the symbol most central to the founding legends of the Hungarian kingdom c.1000 AD, was moved from the National Museum of Hungary to the parliament at the behest of the centre-right coalition government of Victor Orbán, prime minister of Hungary 1998-2002. Proponents of the crown's move looked back to the medieval kingdom and its former glory as a major power on the European continent as a source of national inspiration. Those opposed to the crown's move worried that the political symbolism of the crown would vivify memory of Hungary's alliance with the Axis powers during the second world war and the accompanying history of repression and genocide. The opposition's fears seemed to be realized with the Hungarian Justice and Life Party's (MIEP) decision to call for a re-examination of the trial of László Bárdossy, Hungary's prime minister from 1941 to 1942. Bárdossy had been tried by the Hungarian People's Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in November 1945 and executed on 9 January 1946. Immediately after 1989 factional debates in Hungary tended to centre on each party's association with neo-liberal ideology set in contrast to the various post-second world war regimes. Always in the background, however, were factional issues centred on collaboration with Hungary's two second world war regimes. What seems at first glance to be a matter of recidivist politics is actually a much more complicated matter; in fact, it lies at the heart of transition politics in Hungary. Histories of this period raise questions about the former prime minister's role in the politics that led Hungary into the second world war and about the legitimacy of the war crimes trials that were held in Hungary following the armistice on 20 January 1945. This article investigates the various factional interpretations of Hungary's role in the second world war under the regime of Miklós Horthy, using the trial of László Bárdossy as an exemplar and further, it examines its broader significance in the development of civil society in the twenty-first century.