Suchergebnisse

AbstractIt is generally known that forest fires are one of the main factors of environmental degradation. Although a great deal of scientific literature on this issue exists, little progress has been made to help us understand and explain the reasons for their appearance. In this work we highlight how forest fires could also be the result of the adverse effects of environmental policies related to the management of forest fire emergencies. With regard to the area of the Gargano National Park (Southern Italy) and with the use of a panel data technique, we attempt to observe the forest fire phenomenon as related to some of the socio‐economic conditions existing there. We find a significant statistical relationship between the number of forest fires and the unemployment level in the area. This provides evidence to argue that when setting up environmental safeguarding policies it is important to take into consideration the socio‐economic conditions existing in the area, if the probability of adverse effects is to be avoided and a more socially responsible legislative framework is to be established. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Abstract
We implement an experimental design based on a duopoly game in order to analyse the impact of public subsidies on the willingness to cooperate in research and development (R&D) activities. We first implement six experimental markets by exogenously varying the level of knowledge spillovers (low or high) and the intensity of competition in the product market (low, intermediate, or high). We find that the probability of cooperation increases in the level of spillovers and decreases in that of market competition. We then replicate the six experimental markets by subsidising subjects who cooperate. Whenever they are sufficient to change the incentive structure of the game, subsidies substantially increase the probability of cooperation, causing, however, a reduction of R&D investments. Overall, our evidence suggests that, depending on the characteristics of the market, the provision of subsidies is not always desirable. These might be redundant because firms have sufficient private incentives to invest cooperatively in R&D, or even counterproductive, as they might induce firms to significantly reduce R&D investments compared to the noncooperative scenario.