Suchergebnisse

Preface / by Eric Maskin -- "Introduction", September 2019 -- "Learning and strategic pricing", Econometrica, 64:1125-1150, 1996 -- "Experimentation in markets", 2000, Review of economic studies, 67:213-234 -- Market diffusion with two-sided learning", RAND journal of economics, 28:773-795, 1997 -- Entry and vertical differentiation", 2002, Journal of economic theory, 106:91-125 -- "Dynamic pricing of new experience goods", 2006, Journal of political economy, 114, 713-743 -- "Dynamic common agency", 2003, Journal of economic theory, 111:23-48 -- "Dynamic price competition", 2006, Journal of economic theory, 127, 232-263 -- "Dynamic venture capital financing, learning and moral hazard", Journal of banking and finance, 22:703-735, 1998, joint with Ulrich Hege -- "The financing of innovation", 2005 , RAND Journal of economics, 36, 719-752, (lead article) joint with Ulrich Hege -- Learning about the arrival of sales," Journal of economic theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1699-1711, July, joint with Robin Mason 2011 -- "Learning and information aggregation in an exit game", 2011, Review of economic studies, 78:1426-1461, joint with Pauli Murto -- Information acquisition and efficient mechanism design", 2002, Econometrica, 70:1007-1034, -- "The dynamic pivot mechanism", 2010, Econometrica, 78, 771-789 -- "Dynamic revenue maximization : a continuous time approach", Journal of economic theory, 2015, 159, 819-853, with Philipp Strack -- "Dynamic mechanism design : an introduction." Journal of economic literature, 2019.

Foreword -- Introduction -- Robust mechanism design -- Ex post implementation -- Robust implementation in direct mechanisms -- Robust implementation in general mechanisms -- The role of the common prior in robust implementation -- An ascending auction for interdependent values : uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty -- Robust virtual implementation -- Multidimensional private value auctions -- The robustness of robust implementation -- Rationalizable implementation -- Pricing without priors

A set of players have preferences over a set of outcomes. We consider the problem of an "information designer" who can choose an information structure for the players to serve his ends, but has no ability to change the mechanism (or force the players to make particular action choices). We describe a unifying perspective for information design. We consider a simple example of Bayesian persuasion with both an uninformed and informed receiver. We extend information design to many player and relate it to the literature on incomplete information correlated equilibrium.

We develop a model with many advertisers (products) and many advertising markets (media). Each advertiser sells to a different segment of consumers, and each medium is targeting a different audience. We characterize the competitive equilibrium in the advertising markets and evaluate the implications of targeting. An increase in targeting leads to an increase in the total number of consumer‐product matches, and hence in the social value of advertising. Yet, targeting also increases the concentration of firms advertising in each market. Surprisingly, we then find that the equilibrium price of advertisements is first increasing, then decreasing, in the targeting capacity. We trace out the implications of targeting for competing media. We distinguish offline and online media by their targeting ability: low versus high. As consumers' relative exposure to online media increases, the revenues of offline media decrease, even though the price of advertising might increase.