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Terrorist violence is a distinct type of violence. It has a different design architecture than personal (suicide), interpersonal (murder, theft, assault), or collective (mob, riot, crowd) violence. Employing three primitives, the social roles of perpetrator, victim, and target, which can be distributed across different sets of individuals, one-step, two-step, and three-step models are derived as structural descriptions of personal, interpersonal/collective, and terrorist violence. Why the unique design properties of terrorist violence poses a problem for the present theory of collective violence is also discussed.

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Wallerstein came of age intellectually at Columbia University, where he was an undergraduate, graduate student and faculty member for a quarter of a century (1947-1971). While we often think of his work on African politics and his concern with third world development as precur-sors to world-system theory, a large part of his intellectual biography was shaped by those Columbia years. They mark the high point of a triple hegemony of university, city, and nation, as at this time Columbia was the leading university in the leading city of the hegemonic nation. It was a time before the 1960s when the New Left and Berkeley would challenge the centrality of New York and Columbia as undisputed centers of American social thought and it was before what would be called the policy intellectuals would emerge in Washington DC in the 1970s/80s. It was also a time before the great in?ux of federal money in the 1960s which spurred social research and lifted other universities to prominence. It was a time of what I will call The Columbia Social Essayists, referring to scholar/intellectuals such as C. Wright Mills, Daniel Bell, Lionel Trilling, Richard Hofstadter and Meyer Schapiro.

Our task is to reflect upon Wagar's idea of a world party. In case such reflections are affected by the recent historical situation of the collapse of communism/existing socialism in 1989 and the implications this has for visions of progressive politics going into the 21st century. This event colors most political thinking, although for many the response has been that existing socialism was not real socialism, or that existing socialism was but the Stalinist deformation that, if avoided in the future, the 1917 project could again be resumed and human history and social relations remade anew. I don't see it that way. What existing socialism stood for in terms of the role of a vanguard party taking state power for the larger good is, now after the fall, I think off the board as a realistic program that can be sold to anyone.

This paper identifies four distinct stages in the 20th century emergence of a new direction in Marxian theory. Called here "Semiotic Marxism," its central assumption is a reversal of the classic base/superstructure logic of determinate relations between the economic base and the political and ideological superstructure. Each stage builds upon the theoretical reconstitutions of the previous stage. To illustrate this step-by-step transformation, the theoretical logic of a representative Marxist theorist is explicated. These four stages in the emergence of a Semiotic Marxism are: (1) the initial inversion of base/superstructure logic (Gramsci), (2) the expansion of the logic of the ideological downward to merge with the logic of the political (Althusser), (3) the further expansion downward of the logic of the now merged ideological/political sphere to absorb the logic of the economic sphere (Poulantzas), and finally, (4) the recasting of the once Marxian social formation comprised of social relations in production, into the new Semiotic Marxist "discursive formation" composed of linguistic relations between subject identities (Laclau and Mouffe).

During the 1980s, a transition to democratic politics occurred in two very different parts of the world: state socialist Eastern Europe and dependent capitalist Latin America. This paper asks, "why'? Why did regime change occur in the 1980s and why in the semiperipheral zone of the world system? Why, for instance, was there no regime instability on a similar scale in the core or the periphery? This paper proposes an answer that links convulsive political restructuring to the downturn phase of long Kondratieff-like economic cycles of the world-economy. Specifically, the generalized downturn that the world-economy entered in the 1970s is seen as the beginning of a Kondratieff B-Phase of economic difficulty, the political response to which is mediated by a state's zonal position in the larger world system. More powerful core nations respond by acting outwardly, in an effort to control the external environment through mechanisms such as the formation of economic blocs, like moves toward Europe an economic cooperation in 1992, and North American free-trade negotiations. Semiperipheral nations, being more constrained and weaker, act inwardly, changing their regimes to better deal with economic hardships. Finally, peripheral nations, weakest and most constrained, take little or no political action.