The Justificatory Force of Experiences: From a Phenomenological Epistemology to the Foundations of Mathematics and Physics
In: Synthese Library v.459
Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Contents -- Part I: A Phenomenological Conception of Experiential Justification -- Chapter 1: Motivating PCEJ -- 1.1 What Is PCEJ? -- 1.2 Initial Motivation for PCEJ -- 1.3 Motivating PCEJ via a Recent Controversy -- 1.4 Defending PCEJ Against a Recent Objection -- Chapter 2: Perceptual Justification -- 2.1 Different Versions of PCEJ in Current Analytic Epistemology -- 2.2 Epistemic Desiderata: Problems for Current Versions of PCEJ -- 2.2.1 Degrees of Justification -- 2.2.2 Empty Seemings -- 2.2.2.1 Cognitive Malfunction -- 2.2.3 Phenomenological Adequacy -- 2.2.3.1 Wishful Thinking -- 2.3 Phenomenology of Self-Givenness -- 2.3.1 The Basic Idea -- 2.3.2 Clarifications -- 2.4 Fulfilling the Epistemic Desiderata -- Chapter 3: Intuitional Justification -- 3.1 Perceptual Learning -- 3.2 What Are Intuitions? -- 3.3 Mathematical Intuitions: Towards a Phenomenological Clarification -- 3.4 Intuitional Learning -- 3.5 Cases of Intuitional Learning -- 3.5.1 Prime Number -- 3.5.2 Pythagoras -- 3.6 Intuition vs. Strong Conviction: Negative Multiplication -- 3.7 Epistemological Lessons from Intuitional Learning -- Chapter 4: How to Supplement Mentalist Evidentialism: Phenomenological Principles Are the Fundamental Epistemological Principl... -- 4.1 Introducing and Motivating Mentalist Evidentialism -- 4.2 Best Explanationism -- 4.3 Problems for Explanationism -- 4.3.1 Is EME Internalist? -- 4.3.2 EME Is Neither Foundationalist Nor Coherentist -- 4.3.3 The Charge of Overintellectualization -- 4.3.4 Degrees of Justification Made Difficult -- 4.3.5 Is Epistemic Justification Grounded in Non-normative Terms? -- 4.4 Phenomenological Mentalist Evidentialism -- 4.5 Virtues of PME -- 4.5.1 PME Is Internalist -- 4.5.2 PME Is Foundationalist -- 4.5.3 No Overintellectualization -- 4.5.4 Degrees of Justification Made Easy.