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Working paper
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 103, S. 100-118
The disincentive effects of social assistance programs on registered (or formal) employment are a first order policy concern in developing and middle income countries. Means tests determine eligibility with respect to some income threshold, and governments can only verify earnings from registered employment. The loss of benefit at some level of formal earnings is an implicit tax - a notch - that results in a strong disincentive for formal employment, and there is extensive evidence on its effects. We study an income-tested program in Uruguay and extend this literature by developing an anatomy of the behavioral responses to this program and by establishing its welfare implications in full. Our identification strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity in the program's eligibility rule. We rely on information on the universe of applicants to the program for the period 2004-2012 (about 400,000 individuals) from the program's records, from administrative data on registered employment from the social security administration, and from a complementary follow-up survey with information on informal work. We construct the anatomy of the program's effects along four dimensions. First, we establish that, as predicted by the theory, beneficiaries respond to the program's incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 percentage points. Second, we find substantial heterogeneity in these effects: the program induces a larger reduction of formal employment for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered employee, suggesting some form of segmentation - those with a low propensity to work formally do not respond to the financial incentives of the program, probably because they have limited opportunities in the labor market to begin with. Third, the follow-up survey allows us to establish that the fall in registered employment is due to a larger extent (about two thirds) to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent (about one third) to a shift towards non-employment. Fourth, we find an elasticity of participation in registered employment of about 1.7. These results imply a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses to the program of about 3.2% of total registered labor income.
BASE
The disincentive effects of social assistance programs on registered employment are a first order policy concern in developing countries. Means tests determine eligibility with respect to some income threshold, and governments can only verify earnings from registered employment. The loss of benefit at some level of formal earnings is an implicit tax that results in a strong disincentive for formal employment. We study an income-tested program in Uruguay and extend previous literature by developing an anatomy of the behavioral responses to this program. Our identification strategy is based on a sharp discontinuity in the program's eligibility rule and uses information from the program's records, social security administration data, and a follow-up survey. First, we establish that beneficiaries respond to the program's incentives by reducing their levels of registered employment by about 8 percentage points. Second, we find the program induces a larger reduction of formal employment for individuals with a medium probability to be a registered employee, suggesting some form of segmentation – those with a low propensity to work formally do not respond to the financial incentives of the program. Third, we find evidence that the fall in registered employment is due to a larger extent to an increase in unregistered employment, and to a lesser extent to a shift towards non-employment. Fourth, we find an elasticity of participation in registered employment of about 1.7, implying a deadweight loss from the behavioral responses to the program of about 3.2% of total registered labor income.
BASE
In: Development Policy Review, Band 31, Heft 5, S. 531-551
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Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10197
SSRN
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10310
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 8198
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Working paper
In: Partnership for Economic Policy Working Paper No. 2020-03
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Working paper
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 39, Heft 3, S. 530-549
ISSN: 1460-2121
Abstract
This article discusses the challenges and potential policy choices for levying progressive taxes and taxing the rich in Latin America, a region known for its high-income inequality, limited tax-collection capacity, and low share of taxes collected from personal income and wealth. Factors such as high exemption thresholds, low top marginal tax rates, and limited administrative capacity undermine the redistributive ability and revenue collection of the tax systems in the region. Moreover, the income composition for the top percentiles largely comes from capital, and the effective tax rates they face are often low due to the preferential treatment of capital income and wealth. After discussing the evidence of how the rich in Latin America respond to progressive taxes on income and wealth and changes in enforcement policy, we provide some insights on potential policy choices to tax them effectively. These may include broadening the income tax base by lowering the number of exempt and non-taxable income items and the statutory exemption thresholds, reevaluating preferential tax rates on capital income, monitoring foreign income, addressing the abuse of tax treatment by business earners, and enhancing tax administration capacity. Additionally, wealth taxes may complement the tax system with updates to property registers and scrutiny of foreign assets.
In: Eastern European economics: EEE, Band 55, Heft 2, S. 168-196
ISSN: 1557-9298
In: PEP working paper serie 2016-23
SSRN
Working paper
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 10342
SSRN
In: World development: the multi-disciplinary international journal devoted to the study and promotion of world development, Band 139, S. 1-18
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