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Theories of political redistribution are tested using data collected in three phases of the International Social Survey Programme. Individuals categorized as having high, middle, or low incomes were asked whether they consider the overall tax burden in their countries too high, too low or about right. Very few citizens indicated that they were satisfied with tax systems; most believed that taxes on low & middle incomes are too high, while taxes on high incomes are too low. Support for tax systems is bimodal within the income classes, with the richest 5% being the most supportive, & the median in a population being second. Ideological values have a strong impact on political support for redistribution across all income classes. The results bear witness to the multidimensional nature of preferences for redistribution, & to the delicate question of the effectiveness of democracy in implementing citizens' preferences. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

stimates of the Stevens' power law model are often based on the averaging over individuals of experiments conducted at the individual level. In this paper we suppose that each individual generates responses to stimuli on the basis of a model proposed by Luce and Narens, sometimes called separable representation model, featuring two distinct perturbations, called psychophysical and subjective weighting function, that may differ across individuals. Exploiting the form of the estimator of the exponent of Stevens' power law, we obtain an expression for this parameter as a function of the original two functions. The results presented in the paper help clarifying several well-known paradoxes arising with Stevens' power laws, including the range effect, i.e. the fact that the estimated exponent seems to depend on the range of the stimuli, the location effect, i.e. the fact that it depends on the position of the standard within the range, and the averaging effect, i.e. the fact that power laws seem to fit better data aggregated over individuals. Theoretical results are illustrated using data from papers of R. Duncan Luce. ; Estimates of the Stevens' power law model are often based on the averaging over individuals of experiments conducted at the individual level. In this paper we suppose that each individual generates responses to stimuli on the basis of a model proposed by Luce and Narens, sometimes called separable representation model, featuring two distinct perturbations, called psychophysical and subjective weighting function, that may differ across individuals. Exploiting the form of the estimator of the exponent of Stevens' power law, we obtain an expression for this parameter as a function of the original two functions. The results presented in the paper help clarifying several well-known paradoxes arising with Stevens' power laws, including the range effect, i.e. the fact that the estimated exponent seems to depend on the range of the stimuli, the location effect, i.e. the fact that it depends on the position ...

In an overlapping generations model with two social classes, rich and poor, parents of the different social classes vote on two issues: redistributive policies for them and education investments for their kids. Public education is the engine for growth through its effect on human capital; but it is also the vehicle through which kids born from poor families may exchange their positions with kids born from rich families. This is because education reduces the probability of the mismatch, i.e. individuals with low talent but coming from rich families being placed in jobs which should be reserved to people with high talent (and vice-versa). We find a political economy equilibrium of the voting game using probabilistic voting. When the poor are more politically influent, the economy is characterized by a higher level of education, growth and social mobility than under political regimes supported by the rich; pretax inequality is greater in the first case, but post-tax is lower.