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Introduction -- Democratic processes and political risk: evidence from foreign exchange markets -- When markets party: stocks, bonds, and cabinet formation -- The cross-national financial consequences of political predictability -- Cabinet dissolutions and interest rate behavior -- Bargaining and bonds: the process of coalition formation and the market for government debt in Austria and New Zealand -- Time, shares, and Florida: the 2000 presidential election and stock market volatility -- Polls and pounds: exchange rate behavior and public opinion in Britain -- Conclusion: political predictability and financial market behavior

Although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies, their institutional structures—their levels of independence—differ greatly. My explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking. Government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process, potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and, in a multiparty government, coalition partners. An independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts. Politicians will choose an independent bank (1) if government ministers, party legislators, and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and (2) if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute. I statistically test the argument against the cross-national variation of central bank institutions. I also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in Germany, Britain, and Italy.

Although central banks possess a similar function across the industrial democracies, their institutional structures - their levels of independence - differ greatly. My explanation of this variation emphasizes the informational asymmetries of monetary policymaking. Government ministers have informational advantages in the policy process, potentially creating conflicts with backbench legislators and, in a multiparty government, coalition partners. An independent central bank can help alleviate these conflicts. Politicians will choose an independent bank (1) if government ministers, party legislators, and coalition partners have different monetary policy incentives and (2) if government ministers fear that party legislators and coalition partners will withdraw their support over a policy dispute. I statistically test the argument against the cross-national variation of central bank institutions. I also use the theoretical framework to examine episodes of institutional choice and reform in Germany, Britain, and Italy. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Intro -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1. Legislative Style and Congressional Careers -- Chapter 2. Measuring Legislative Style with Daniel Sewell -- Chapter 3. The Styles -- Chapter 4. Explaining Freshman Styles -- Chapter 5. Transitions in Style -- Chapter 6. The Electoral Consequences of Legislative Style -- Chapter 7. Styles, Lawmaking, and Legislative Success -- Chapter 8. Career Advancement and Legislative Styles -- Chapter 9. Legislative Styles and Evaluations of Congress -- Notes -- Works Cited -- Index.

We argue that bill cosponsorship in Congress represents an institutional arrangement that provides credibility to commitments of support. We predict that if cosponsorship fosters legislative deals, MCs will only rarely back out on their pledges to support a bill if it comes up for a floor vote, and when they do, these choices will reflect strategic calculations. Further, legislators who violate their cosponsorship agreements will face punishment from colleagues, compromising their ability to gain support for their own bills. We explore the causes and effects of MCs' choices to renege on a pledge by voting no on a bill for which they were a cosponsor, focusing on all cosponsorship decisions in the 101st–108th Houses. The results reveal that patterns of reneging and its consequences are consistent with the idea that cosponsorship functions as a commitment mechanism.

Asset market performance conditions the strategic context of cabinet terminations. In turn, information about cabinet terminations shapes how market actors evaluate the government's commitment to specific policies, affecting overall economic performance. To understand how the economy affects cabinet terminations, therefore, we must account for the endogeneity between cabinet outcomes and market performance. In this article, we model both cabinet terminations and speculative currency attacks. We argue that changes in the probability of different types of cabinet ends condition the probability that currency traders will sharply shift their assets out of a country. In turn, the probability of a speculative attack influences the probabilities of different types of cabinet ends-for instance, the higher the likelihood of speculative attack, the lower the chance of an early strategic election. We connect separate models of cabinet termination and speculative attacks using an instrumental-variables framework. Adapted from the source document.

Asset market performance conditions the strategic context of cabinet terminations. In turn, information about cabinet terminations shapes how market actors evaluate the government's commitment to specific policies, affecting overall economic performance. To understand how the economy affects cabinet terminations, therefore, we must account for the endogeneity between cabinet outcomes and market performance. In this article, we model both cabinet terminations and speculative currency attacks. We argue that changes in the probability of different types of cabinet ends condition the probability that currency traders will sharply shift their assets out of a country. In turn, the probability of a speculative attack influences the probabilities of different types of cabinet ends—for instance, the higher the likelihood of speculative attack, the lower the chance of an early strategic election. We connect separate models of cabinet termination and speculative attacks using an instrumental-variables framework.

We investigate the impact of parliamentary political processes on exchange rate volatility. During periods of potential political change, currency traders have less certainty about the future of government policy. Consequently, these periods will be associated with higher volatility -- a measure of the predictability of exchange rate movements. We estimate a series of fractionally integrated exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models on four currencies using daily data: the British pound, the French franc, the Belgian franc, & the Swedish krona. The results indicate that, while political events often increased exchange rate volatility, participation in the European Monetary System helped stabilize the level of the exchange rate & reduce volatility. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.