Suchergebnisse

AbstractGlobally, China's Ministry of Public Security has one of the largest appetites and regulatory scopes for new technology use in policing. Using the case study of Police Cloud—a cloud infrastructure project, this paper examines a national wave of cloud migration initiated in Shandong in 2013. Police Cloud began to tackle the deep‐rooted challenges of information sharing across all levels of government. The analysis draws upon a dual dataset of government documents (n = 10) and newspaper articles (n = 277), qualitatively triangulated with Chinese academic articles and grey literature. The findings show how the Ministry of Public Security's switch to platformization triggered an overall change in public security governance. Contrary to platform policing experiences in other parts of the world, the Ministry of Public Security adopted Police Cloud by aiming to retain autonomy and control over private providers. Police Cloud also began enabling functional modularity of surveillance elements of China's public security.

Ausma Bernot reviews Crisis Vision: Race and the Cultural Production of Surveillance by Torin Monahan

Over the last two decades, the emerging Chinese Party-state has used commercial ties with North American and European providers of surveillance technologies to grow national prowess of public security, fostering a transnational state-corporate symbiosis. The exports of surveillance technologies from the Global North to China started in the late 1970s, and now Chinese technology companies are competing with and replacing those suppliers in the globalized neoliberal market. This research explores the two-way dynamic of China's state and private surveillance capacity underscored by international companies' profit-seeking behaviors and domestic technological and economic growth. Four case studies of companies from Canada, China, and the US are used to highlight the changing dynamics in the global circulation of surveillance technologies. Particular attention is paid to the cyclical nature of such technologies through which unresolved issues of global governance continue to emerge and, accordingly, support the growth of technology-powered authoritarianism worldwide.

AbstractThe literature on crisis management reports that crises can be critical for organizations, including state and extra‐state actors; they either break down or reinvent themselves. Successful organizations, those that do not break down, use situations of crisis to restructure themselves and improve their performance. Applicable to all crises, this reasoning is also valid for the COVID‐19 pandemic and for government organizations in China. Drawing on documentary analysis, this article examines China's pandemic response from the social–political, technological and psychological perspectives using a holistic crisis management framework. It demonstrates that the Chinese state bureaucracy has assembled, expanded and strengthened its surveillance strategies to strive for comprehensive crisis response.

Xi Jinping's ascent to power as Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was accompanied by changes in national governance strategies in the People's Republic of China (PRC) that have progressively incorporated the use of big data. Shortly after, in May 2015, the Chinese State Council released a set of policy reforms under the abbreviation fang guan fu 放管服 (decentralise, manage, and service). These reforms promoted big data led (1) market regulation, (2) supervision and management systems, and (3) service provision processes. By applying a case study analytical approach, this paper explores how advancements in big data contributed to these reforms aimed at centralising information in China. Combining the joint knowledge of surveillance and China studies scholarship, this paper offers evidence of big data surveillance streamlining China's fragmented intergovernmental policy system. We build on David Murakami Wood's 2017 outline of a political theory of surveillance and argue that decentralisation of data collection points and centralisation of both bureaucratic and public access to information are key components of the Party-state's regulatory governance strategy incorporating the use of big data and comprehensive surveillance. Our findings have implications for future analyses of the relationship between political organisations and surveillance within other nation-state contexts, particularly in situations where Chinese technologies and systems are being adopted and adapted.