Suchergebnisse

Several hypotheses of government regulation are generated & tested, using comparative empirical analysis of the factors determining state regulatory commission policy concerning electric rates. The results challenge key assumptions of the "capture" theory of regulation (eg, Bernstein, M. H., Regulating Business by Independent Commission, Princeton: Princeton U Press, 1955). An explanation of the policies of state regulatory commissions requires consideration of two objectives of commissioners: (1) implementing the dominant "nonpecuniary" guide for policy choice among regulatory officials, ie, the principle that the major determinant of regulated utility rates should be the cost of providing service; & (2) the goal of "survival," ie, remaining in office & maintaining sufficient order & political support to function effectively in the regulatory process. The analysis suggests that commission professionalism & information are important resources, & affect the ability of regulatory personnel to achieve their objectives. Furthermore, there is evidence that the representation of consumer interests at regulatory proceedings & the extent to which these proceedings are open to the public influence policy by affecting the incentives of commission personnel & widening information resources. 6 Tables, 1 Figure, 56 References. Modified HA