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"Bringing together world-class scholars who have devoted themselves to the study of legal obligation, this book addresses key dimensions of the current debate: providing novel insights and perspectives, as well as critically discussing the leading theories of legal obligation. The notion of legal obligation is widely regarded as fundamental by both legal practitioners and legal theorists. For the language that explicitly refers to obligation is pervasive insofar as paradigmatic legal materials make reference to obligation either directly, by specifying what a subject is obligated to do, or indirectly, by attributing rights, privileges, powers, permissions, and other normative statuses to both single individuals and groups. There is, then, broad agreement that obligation constitutes a central element in legal studies. At the same time, however, there is considerable disagreement among contemporary legal theorists about how legal obligation can or should be elucidated. This book accounts for both the significance of obligation in law and the variety of views of legal obligation championed in legal philosophy today"--
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 201, Heft 4
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 249-266
ISSN: 2194-5624
AbstractIn this contribution, I defend a robust model of political idealism, making the case for such an approach to both the theory and practice of politics. On this view, not only in framing a political philosophy but also in putting forward policy proposals and institutional designs, we need not think about feasibility as an overriding, make-or-break criterion for evaluating the soundness of that theory or proposal, neither of which loses its point simply because it is deemed to be unlikely to be implemented. Feasibility, in other terms, cannot be taken as the only standard, or even as the main standard, on which basis to assess the practical worth of a political strategy.
In: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Crime, Security and Law Working Paper No. 2022/02
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In: S. Bertea, "Contemporary Theories of Legal Obligation: A Tentative Critical Map", in S. Bertea (ed.), Contemporary Perspectives on Legal Obligation, Oxford, Routledge, 2021, 1-17
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In: in M. De Araujo Kurt and M. Willaschek (eds.), Defeasibility in Law, Berlin, De Gruyter, Forthcoming
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In: Revus, Band 37, Heft 2019
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In: Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy, Band 42, Heft 2017
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In: S. Bertea, "Why Practical Reasons Are Not Just One's Own Private Affair", Philosophical Inquiry, 41, 2017, 63-85
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