Suchergebnisse

A successful speculative attack against one currency is a wake-up call for speculators elsewhere. Currency speculators have an incentive to acquire costly information about exposures across countries to infer whether their monetary authority's ability to defend its currency is weakened. Information acquisition per se increases the likelihood of speculative currency attacks via heightened strategic uncertainty among speculators. Contagion occurs even if speculators learn that there is no exposure. Our new contagion mechanism offers a compelling explanation for the 1997 Asian currency crisis and the 1998 Russian crisis, both of which spread across countries with seemingly unrelated fundamentals and limited interconnectedness. The proposed contagion mechanism applies generally in global coordination games and can also be applied to bank runs, sovereign debt crises, and political regime change.

Im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert verbrachten viele Stadtbürger von Florenz mehrere Monate im Jahr auf dem Land. Der enge Austausch zwischen Stadt und Land führte zur veränderten Wahrnehmung des Raumes und zur Entwicklung perspektivischer Raumkonzepte. Die Villa im Florentiner Umland bildete einen Rückzugsort für die merkantile Mittelschicht von Ladenbesitzern und Tucherzeugern, Notaren oder Bankiers. Ihr Idealtyp verdeutlicht komplexe geisteswissenschaftliche und sozialhistorische Entwicklungslinien: Die Leitidee der toskanischen Renaissance, Leben und Arbeiten, erzeugte ein stets labiles Gleichgewicht zwischen humanistischem Ideal und wirtschaftlichen Interessen. Die politische und wirtschaftliche Aneignung und Ausbildung der stadtnahen Kulturlandschaft des contado beeinflusste die Wahrnehmung von Natur. Jenseits einer Kunstgeschichte als Herrschaftsgeschichte werden in diesem Buch die Anwesen von Florentiner Familien - neben denjenigen der Medici - sowie anonyme Architekturen präsentiert

Using a novel rich dataset at the regional level, this paper provides new empirical evidence on the €fiscal transmission mechanism in the Eurozone. Our baseline estimates reveal a government spending relative output multiplier of 2.9, an employment multiplier of 1.9, and a cost per job created of €24,000. Moreover, we €find that a regional €fiscal stimulus leads to a signi€ficant increase in private investment, productivity, durable consumption, and real wages together with a signi€ficant rise in total hours worked driven by changes in the extensive margin (total employment), whereas the intensive margin (hours per worker) barely reacts. We estimate only small regional €fiscal spillovers but detect notable state dependencies. Regional fi€scal multipliers are larger in economic recessions, during €fiscal consolidations, and in the core countries of the Eurozone.

Abstract
Both the academic literature and the policy debate on systematic bailout guarantees and Government subsidies have ignored an important effect: in industries where firms may go out of business due to idiosyncratic shocks, Governments may increase the likelihood of (tacit) coordination if they set up schemes that rescue failing firms. In a repeated-game setting, we show that a systematic bailout regime increases the expected profits from coordination and simultaneously raises the probability that competitors will remain in business and will thus be able to "punish" firms that deviate from coordinated behaviour. These effects make tacit coordination easier to sustain and have a detrimental impact on welfare. While the key insight holds across any industry, we study this question with an application to the banking sector, in light of the recent financial crisis and the extensive use of bailout schemes.

Both the academic literature and the policy debate on systematic bailout guarantees and Government subsidies have ignored an important effect: in industries where firms may go out of business due to idiosyncratic shocks, Governments may increase the likelihood of (tacit) coordination if they set up schemes that rescue failing firms. In a repeated-game setting, we show that a systematic bailout regime increases the expected profits from coordination and simultaneously raises the probability that competitors will remain in business and will thus be able to "punish" firms that deviate from coordinated behaviour. These effects make tacit coordination easier to sustain and have a detrimental impact on welfare. While the key insight holds across any industry, we study this question with an application to the banking sector, in light of the recent financial crisis and the extensive use of bailout schemes.