"In this concise book, John Bew offers a history of the concept of Realpolitik in the English-speaking world: its origins as an idea; its practical application to statecraft in the recent past; and its relevance to the foreign policy challenges facing the United States and its allies in the future. Now most often associated with the conduct of foreign policy, Realpolitik has traditionally had pejorative connotations in the English-speaking world and sits uneasily alongside notions of "enlightenment," "morality" and "virtue." But it has also had its defenders, admirers and exponents, who regard it as the best tool for the successful wielding of political power and the preservation of global order. As such, Realpolitik has both successes and failures to its name, as Bew's comprehensive and even-handed overview displays"--
"Realpolitik is approaching its 160th birthday, though it has existed as a form of statecraft for centuries and is arguably as old as the conduct of foreign affairs itself. Associated with great thinkers from Machiavelli to Kissinger, it is deeply rooted in the history of diplomacy yet also remains strikingly relevant to debates on contemporary foreign policy in the Obama administration today. Despite the fact that Realpolitik has had something of a renaissance in recent years, however, it remains a surprisingly elusive notion, defying easy categorization. In this concise book, John Bew aims to address this gap, offering a history of the concept of Realpolitik in the English-speaking world: its origins as an idea; its practical application to statecraft in the recent past; and its relevance to the foreign policy challenges facing the United States and its allies in the future. Now most often associated with the conduct of foreign policy, Realpolitik has traditionally had pejorative connotations in the English-speaking world and sits uneasily alongside notions of "enlightenment," "morality" and "virtue." But it has also had its defenders, admirers and exponents, who regard it as the best tool for the successful wielding of political power and the preservation of global order. As such, Realpolitik has both successes and failures to its name, as Bew's comprehensive and even-handed overview displays. Bew begins by charting the evolution of the idea through the work of important thinkers or statesmen from Machiavelli, Cardinal de Richelieu, and Thomas Hobbes up through Carl Schmitt, Kissinger, and Dennis Ross. He then examines how Realpolitik has been evoked and operationalized in US and UK foreign policy during specific episodes in the twentieth century, looking at such cases as the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953, and President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China in 1972 - often taken as the archetypal instance of Realpolitik in action. Bew then uses this historical platform to look forward to emerging foreign policy challenges in a changing, multi-polar, geo-political scene - in which Realpolitik and agile statecraft seems as important as ever. Suggesting that there is a uniquely Anglo-American version of Realpolitik, which reflects an attempt (not always a successful one) to reconcile Western ideological and moral norms with purely utilitarian conceptions of the national interest, Bew argues that a more accurate and sustainable version of Anglo-American Realpolitik is one that recognizes the draw Enlightenment values and ideas. Directed at a broader audience of current policy-makers, legislators and commentators with an interest in foreign affairs, this is a brilliant introduction to an important topic from one of the field's rising stars"--
"Hardly is a figure more maligned in British history than Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh. One of the central figures of the Napoleonic Era and the man primarily responsible for fashioning Britain's strategy at the Congress of Vienna, Castlereagh was widely respected by the great powers of Europe and America, yet despised by his countrymen and those he sought to serve. A shrewd diplomat, he is credited with being one of the first great practitioners of Realpolitik and its cold-eyed and calculating view of the relations between nations. Over the course of his career, he crushed an Irish rebellion and abolished the Irish parliament, imprisoned his former friends, created the largest British army in history, and redrew the map of Europe. Today, Castlereagh is largely forgotten except as a tyrant who denied the freedoms won by the French and American revolutions. John Bew's fascinating biography restores the statesman to his place in history, offering a nuanced picture of a shy, often inarticulate figure whose mind captured the complexity of the European Enlightenment unlike any other. Bew tells a gripping story, beginning with the Year of the French, when Napoleon sent troops in support of a revolution in Ireland, and traces Castlereagh's evolution across the Napoleonic Wars, the diplomatic power struggles of 1814-15, and eventually the mental breakdown that ended his life. Skillfully balancing the dimensions of Castlereagh's intellectual life with his Irish heritage, Bew's definitive work brings Castleragh alive in all his complexity, variety, and depth."--Publisher's website
In one memorable scene in the Hollywood spectacular The Patriot, Lord Charles Cornwallis, the corpulent, pompous, preening servant of King George III, unleashes a volley of abuse at his subordinates. He denounces them for their inability to deal with the farmers with pitchforks who comprise the American revolutionary forces. For Cornwallis, the lessons of the American experience were as much political as they were military. The war had been caused by bad policy, and bad policy had made it extremely difficult to fight effectively. While the British won most of the conventional military engagements, they were operating in a hostile environment, partly of their making. Their local allies were not only hapless on the field; their reckless behavior helped to create a growing number of irreconcilables to swell the revolutionaries' ranks. Perhaps one final word on George III is merited, to whom Cornwallis was unfailingly loyal, but by whom he was periodically exasperated. Adapted from the source document.
This article responds to the critique of our work offered by Paul Dixon in this issue of Political Quarterly. We correct the numerous inaccuracies and straightforward errors in his work, which, in our view, distort and misrepresent our arguments.
