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We consider a persuasion game between a decision‐maker and a set of experts. Each expert is identified by two parameters: (i) "quality" or his likelihood of observing the state (i.e., learning what the best decision is) and (ii) "agenda" or the preferred decision that is independent of the state. An informed expert may feign ignorance but cannot misreport. We offer a general characterization of the equilibrium. From the decision‐maker's standpoint, (a) higher quality is not necessarily better, (b) extreme agendas are always preferred, and (c) the optimal panel may involve experts with identical (rather than conflicting) agendas.

Accepted manuscript version. Published version at http://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130055 . ; We study the role of intergroup mobility in the emergence of conflict. Two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources. We allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, which the opposition can accept or reject, and wage conflict. Agents can also switch group membership. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but implies a higher threat of conflict. Our main finding is that the possibility of intergroup mobility affects the likelihood of conflict in a nonmonotonic way. Open conflict can arise at intermediate costs of mobility. (JEL D71, D72, D74)

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and wage conflict. Expropriating a large share of resources increases political strength by attracting opposition members, but such economic exclusion implies lower per capita shares and higher risk of conflict. In equilibrium, allocations are non-monotonic in the cost of mobility. Moreover, limited commitment with respect to mobility gives rise to inefficient conflict in equilibrium.