Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- CHAPTER ONE. Introduction -- CHAPTER TWO. A Literature Built on Weak Foundations -- CHAPTER THREE. The Modern System -- CHAPTER FOUR. The Modern System, Preponderance, and Changing Technology -- CHAPTER FIVE. Operation MICHAEL-The Second Battle of the Somme, March 21-April 9, 1918 -- CHAPTER SIX. Operation GOODWOOD-July 18-20, 1944 -- CHAPTER SEVEN. Operation DESERT STORM-January 17-February 28, 1991 -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Statistical Tests -- CHAPTER NINE. Experimental Tests -- CHAPTER TEN. Conclusion -- APPENDIX. A Formal Model of Capability -- Notes -- Index

"Military Effectiveness" published on by Oxford University Press.

Ein Rückzug der Amerikaner aus Afghanistan wäre "der größte außenpolitische Fehler der Neuzeit". Der Verfasser entwirft ein "Horrorszenario": Die Amerikaner ziehen sich zurück, die Regierung unter Karsai wird gestürzt, die Taliban errichten einen Zufluchtsort in Afghanistan, Pakistan kollabiert und seine Atomwaffen fallen in die Hände von Al Kaida. Zudem hätte eine solche Entwicklung eine Signalwirkung in anderen schwachen Staaten.Um das zu verhindern, muss sich Obama für den riskanten und teuren Krieg entscheiden. Es muss dabei mit einer stärker werdenden Bewegung gegen den Afghanistan-Krieg rechnen. Ein Truppenabzug würde auch die Zukunft der Demokraten aufs Spiel setzen. (ICE2)

Stephen Biddle onThe U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.By the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Forward by David H. Petraeus, James F. Amos, and John A. Nagl. Introduction by Sarah Sewall. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007. 472p. $15.00.

Hezbollah's conduct of its 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has become an increasingly important case for the U.S. defense debate. Some see the future of warfare as one of nonstate opponents employing irregular methods, and advocate a sweeping transformation of the U.S. military to meet such threats. Others point to the 2006 campaign as an example of a nonstate actor nevertheless waging a state-like conventional war, and argue that a more traditional U.S. military posture is needed to deal with such enemies in the future. This monograph seeks to inform this debate by examining in detail Hezbollah's conduct of the 2006 campaign. The authors use evidence collected from a series of 36 primary source interviews with Israeli participants in the fighting who were in a position to observe Hezbollah's actual behavior in the field in 2006, coupled with deductive inference from observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their larger strategic intent for the campaign ; Stephen Biddle; Jeffrey A. Friedman