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European Union (EU) climate politics have polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU's level of ambition, stirring some turbulence in EU climate politics. Yet, with the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2019, the European Commission has likewise created turbulence in the Polish parliament's climate debate. This article analyses those debates and identifies three distinct policy narratives: Poland is in a unique situation, Poland pursues an alternative pathway, and climate policy endangers competitiveness. The alternative pathway narrative, which advocates for the continued use of coal while capturing emissions, faded at roughly the same time when the EGD was proposed at the EU level. Simultaneously, the unique situation narrative, which calls for recognition of Poland's uniqueness in combination with increased (financial) support, became stronger. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party's narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.

European Union (EU) climate politics have polarised over the past decade. Poland especially stands out as the EU member state that has most vehemently opposed numerous decisions to increase the EU's level of ambition, stirring some turbulence in EU climate politics. Yet, with the publication of the European Green Deal (EGD) in 2019, the European Commission has likewise created turbulence in the Polish parliament's climate debate. This article analyses those debates and identifies three distinct policy narratives: Poland is in a unique situation, Poland pursues an alternative pathway, and climate policy endangers competitiveness. The alternative pathway narrative, which advocates for the continued use of coal while capturing emissions, faded at roughly the same time when the EGD was proposed at the EU level. Simultaneously, the unique situation narrative, which calls for recognition of Poland's uniqueness in combination with increased (financial) support, became stronger. The analysis confirms the dominance of the governing party's narratives, but contrary to previous studies, detects nascent polarisation on climate policy between the right-wing political parties, on the one hand, and the centre-right and centre-left parties, on the other.

This article provides an explanation for the adoption and partial abandonment of subnational regional greenhouse gas emissions trading systems on the United States' East and West Coasts as well as the country's Midwest by focusing on gubernatorial entrepreneurship. The analysis is twofold: On the one hand, the article explores the motivations of governors to act as entrepreneurs, pushing for the adoption of the policy innovation 'greenhouse gas emissions trading systems'. On the other, it examines the interaction between contextual factors and gubernatorial entrepreneurship, arguing that this can explain the adoption and abandonment of subnational regional greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. The analysis suggests that strong gubernatorial entrepreneurs can seize windows of opportunity for ambitious climate policy that are opened by a federal-state context in which the federal government is inactive, creating a regulatory void. In doing so, they take a risk due to the uncertainty of whether the policy will be (politically) successful. Since politicians often are risk averse, trying to avoid blame for policy failure, such proactive gubernatorial entrepreneurship requires strong motivations. With the increasing likelihood of imminent federal policy, additional governors can become active but their entrepreneurship tends to be weaker since they react to a different window of opportunity in which they take a lower risk than the strong gubernatorial entrepreneurs. Also their motivations tend to differ from those of the proactive gubernatorial entrepreneurs.

This article argues that European Union (EU) risk regulation of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (EEE) was both a trigger and formative factor in the development of similar Chinese regulation. The attractiveness and global interdependence of the EU market in EEE impelled a response from Chinese policy-makers. Fostering the domestic industry's global competitiveness was one of the driving factors behind Chinese substance restriction regulation. Additionally, symbolic emulation and growing domestic environmental problems related to waste EEE infl uenced the Chinese policy agenda. Chinese substance restriction rules are not, however, a mere copy of EU regulation. The limited domestic capacity of the Chinese economy, administration, and legal structure to adopt policies similar to those of the EU explains, to a large extent, the emergence and partial persistence of differences between EU and Chinese risk regulation. In the course of the implementation and evaluation of Chinese substance restriction regulation, lessons learned from the EU's experience increasingly contributed to shaping the policy, leading to growing convergence.

1\. Introduction 5 2\. Emissions Trading 6 2.1 The Idea of Emissions Trading 6 2.2 US Pioneering Efforts in the 1990s 7 2.3 The EU Taking Over Pioneership 8 2.4 Unsuccessful North American Federal Initiatives in the 2000s 8 2.5 The Emergence of North American Subnational Emissions Trading Initiatives 9 3\. Transfer Mechanisms and Domestic Factors 10 3.1 Transfer Mechanisms 11 3.2 Domestic Factors 12 3.3 Research Methods 14 4\. The Role of the EU ETS in North American Initiatives 15 4.1 Triggers of the Initiatives 15 4.2 The Role of the EU ETS and the Transfer Mechanisms 18 4.3 Contact Patterns and EU Policy Promotion 19 4.4 Transferred Elements 20 4.5 Comparison 21 5\. Conclusion 23 Literature 25 ; This paper examines the ways in which the EU greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions trading system (ETS) affected the design of similar programs in North America. It investigates the conditions under which EU pioneering policy can play a role in extra-EU jurisdictions' policy-making. The empirical investigation finds that the EU's promotion of emissions trading was successful to some extent. The EU did not influence or trigger the inception of GHG emissions trading programs in North America. The EU ETS, however, played a role in the design process of the North American programs. Actors learned from elements of the EU system. Domestic North American factors were the triggers and drivers of the agenda-setting stage and dominated the policy adoption stage while the EU ETS significantly contributed to the policy formulation processes. The EU ETS played a role at the technical level rather than at the level of political deliberations and decision-making. The EU's policy promotion efforts depended on the demand in North America. The resonance and receptiveness in North America were decisive factors. The EU was not an importunate persuader. Learning from the ETS was to a significant part demand-driven.

In 2002, the European Union enacted ambitious legislation on the design and endoflife treatment of electronic products. This paper explores the external effects of these laws on the California. The EU Directives on the Restriction of Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment (RoHS) and on Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) influenced the introduction of similar regulation in other jurisdictions. This paper identifies the connections between EU and Californian e-waste legislation. It analyses the roles of interdependence and transatlantic learning and it outlines the systemic variables that shaped the diffusion of EU e-waste policy to California.

This article assesses the European External Action Service's (EEAS's) role in the evolution of EU climate diplomacy over the past decade and considers its future agenda. We distinguish between the EEAS headquarters and the EU Delegations/Offices in third countries. The EEAS headquarters has found a role as coordinator among the Council and Commission services as well as between 'Brussels' and the EU Delegations. What is more, the EU Delegations have engaged in various climate diplomacy activities and coordinate among Member State embassies. Despite its reliance on only a few staff members specialized in climate issues – both at the headquarters and Delegation level – the EEAS contributes to EU climate diplomacy formulation and implementation by providing a centralized venue for coherent geographic and thematic messaging and action.
European External Action Service, EEAS, climate diplomacy, EU Delegations

AbstractTrust in the chairs of global negotiations is a decisive factor facilitating successful outcomes. When negotiators trust the chair, they allow her to go beyond her formal procedural role by acting as a mediator, fostering the reaching of agreement. Negotiating parties must consent to a chair assuming substantive mediation functions. They cede parts of their control over the process to the chair when they are confident that the chair is competent and acts in good faith and everyone's interest. In this article, we develop a detailed conceptualization of trust in chairs of global negotiations and demonstrate its impact in two cases of United Nations negotiations that aimed to deliver a universal deal on climate change: the failed 2009 round in Copenhagen, and the 2015 round that culminated in the adoption of the Paris Agreement.