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What is the future of ?environmental? policy in times of earth system transformations and the recognition of the ?Anthropocene? as a new epoch in planetary history? I argue that fifty years after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, we need to revisit the ?environmental policy? paradigm because it falls short on five grounds. The paradigm (a) emphasizes a dichotomy of ?humans? and ?nature? that is no longer defensible; (b) is incompatible with more integrated research concepts that have overcome this human-environment dichotomy; (c) deemphasizes questions of planetary justice and democracy; (d) fails to deal with novel normative challenges of the Anthropocene; and (e) may risk political marginalization of central concerns of human and non-human survival. In the second part I discuss institutional implications, arguing for novel approaches in science collaboration, new institutional arrangements and a more central place for questions of planetary justice and earth-system risks in governance.

". an den Küsten – liest man – steigt die Flut / Der Sturm ist da, die wilden Meere hupfen / An Land, um dicke Dämme zu zerdrücken" – dieses "Weltende", das Jakob von Hoddis 1911, in der Endzeitstimmung vor Beginn des ersten Weltkrieges, erfühlte, findet knapp neunzig Jahre später eine ganz neue, nicht weniger dramatische Interpretation. "Es ist vermutlich zu spät, um die globale Erwärmung zu verhindern", so vermeldete das Umweltprogramm der Vereinten Nationen im Herbst 1999. So einfach, so knapp lässt sich die kommende Katastrophe des 21. Jahrhunderts umreißen. Wenn die derzeitigen Prognosen eintreffen, wird der Meeresspiegel steigen, werden Klimazonen sich verschieben, wird die Menschheit der Gefahr unvorhersehbarer Risiken eines veränderten und kaum verstandenen Klimasystems ausgesetzt sein (allgemein hierzu Schellnhuber 1998).

Freihandel und Umweltschutz, so die These dieses Papiers, schließen sich nicht aus. Sie erfordern jedoch begrenzte Reformen im Recht der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO), insbesondere mit Blick auf das Allgemeine Zoll- und Handelsabkommen (GATT). Unter anderem muß sichergestellt werden - hierfür bietet sich die geplante WTO-Jahrtausendrunde an -, daß weithin anerkannte internationale Umweltverträge, die Beschränkungen des Handels von ihren Parteien verlangen, mit dem Welthandelsrecht vereinbar bleiben. Andererseits müssen dem umweltpolitischen Unilateralismus der großen Welthandelspartner Schranken gezogen werden, um die Interessen der kleineren und schwächeren Staaten zu schützen. Dieses Spannungsfeld, so wird hier argumentiert, wäre zu lösen durch einen Beschluß der WTO-Ministerkonferenz zur verbindlichen Auslegung des GATT sowie des Übereinkommens über die Anwendung sanitärer und phytosanitärer Maßnahmen und des Übereinkommens über technische Handelshemmnisse. Diese Regeln sollten derart konkretisiert werden, daß sie umweltpolitisch motivierte Handelsbeschränkungen, die ausländische Herstellungsverfahren betreffen, zwar gestatten - aber nur wenn dies von bestimmten internationalen Umweltverträgen verlangt wird, die in einer Anlage zum Auslegungsbeschluß aufgelistet sind. Eine solche Klärung des Verhältnisses von Welthandels- und Weltumweltrecht würde das souveräne Recht kleinerer Weltmarktteilnehmer, insbesondere der Entwicklungsländer, auf die selbstverantwortliche Festlegung der für sie sinnvollen, finanzierbaren und - bei globalen Umweltproblemen - der für sie angemessenen Umweltstandards beschützen und den Vorrang des Multilateralismus in der Welthandels- wie Weltumweltpolitik gegenüber dem Diktat großer und mächtiger Staaten fördern. Das Kooperationsprinzip des Völkerrechts und die rule of law würden gestärkt, und es würde verhindert, daß das Freihandelssystem für das Durchsetzen einseitig verfügter Umweltstandards einzelner Staaten instrumentalisiert wird. ; This paper argues that to reconcile the objectives of free trade and environmental protection, limited reforms of international trade law are required. It must be guaranteed, on the one hand, that universally accepted international environmental agreements which mandate certain restrictions in trade remain compatible with international trade law, in particular with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). On the other hand, it is necessary to ensure that the interests of small and vulnerable states are protected against environmental unilateralism of the major global trading nations. This reform agenda could be accomplished, it is argued, through an authoritative interpretation of international trade law by the Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation, to the effect that environmentally motivated trade restrictions which are related to process and production Standards and which have extraterritorial application be compatible with WTO law, but only if mandated by international environmental agreements that have been previously accepted by the Ministerial Conference. Such a clarification of the relationship between international environmental law and international trade law would protect the sovereign right of smaller trading nations, particularly developing countries, to enact their own environmental Standards as may be appropriate and feasible according to their specific situations. It would also maintain the supremacy of multilateralism in both international trade and environmental policies, visa- vis unilateral action by the major trading nations. The principle of international co-operation and the rule of law would be strengthened, and attempts to use the international trade System for the enforcement of unilaterally decided environmental Standards would be precluded.

The »Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer« obliges industrialised countries to reimburse developing countries — through new and additional resources — all agreed incremental costs incurred by them in their efforts to save the ozone layer. To this end, a Multilateral Fund was established in 1990. The Fund's decision-making procedures grant developing countries the same voting powers as industrialised countries — an almost revolutionary precedent in North-South relations. In this paper, the work of the Multilateral Ozone Fund since its inception is being analysed, with special emphasis on the development and implementation of the notion of »all agreed incremental costs« between industrialised and developing countries. Since comparable institutional settings have been stipulated in the more recent treaties on climate change and biological diversity, the paper's concluding section draws five »lessons« from ozone politics for other international environmental agreements, in particular the emerging climate regime. ; Das »Montrealer Protokoll über Stoffe, die zu einem Abbau der Ozonschicht führen « verpflichtet die Industrieländer, den Entwicklungsländern die vollen vereinbarten Mehrkosten zu ersetzen, die ihnen durch die Umsetzung des Protokolls entstehen — und zwar durch neue und zusätzliche Finanzmittel. Hierfür wurde 1990 ein Multilateraler Fonds eingerichtet, dessen Entscheidungsverfahren den Entwicklungsländern die gleichen Stimmrechte gewähren wie den Geberländern — ein nahezu revolutionär zu nennender Präzedenzfall in den Nord-Süd-Beziehungen. In diesem Paper wird die bisherige Tätigkeit des Multilateralen Fonds seit seiner Errichtung untersucht, wobei die genaue Umsetzung des Konzepts der »vollen vereinbarten Mehrkosten« im Mittelpunkt steht. Da vergleichbare institutionelle Festlegungen auch für die neueren Übereinkommen zum Schutz des Klimas und der Biodiversität getroffen wurden, werden am Ende des Beitrages aus den Erfahrungen der Ozonpolitik fünf potentiell relevante Lehren für weitere internationale Umweltvereinbarungen — inbesondere das entstehende Klimaschutzregime — gezogen.

The Anthropocene as a new planetary epoch has brought to the foreground the deep-time interconnections of human agency with the earth system. Yet despite this recognition of strong temporal interdependencies, we still lack understanding of how societal and political organizations can manage interconnections that span several centuries and dozens of generations. This study pioneers the analysis of what we call ?deep-time organizations.? We provide detailed comparative historical analyses of some of the oldest existing organizations worldwide from a variety of sectors, from the world?s oldest bank (Sveriges Riksbank) to the world?s oldest university (University of Al Quaraouiyine) and the world?s oldest dynasty (Imperial House of Japan). Based on our analysis, we formulate 12 initial design principles that could lay, if supported by further empirical research along similar lines, the basis for the construction and design of ?deep-time organizations? for long-term challenges of earth system governance and planetary stewardship.

Numerous recent studies project that 'climate engineering' technologies might need to play a major role in the future. Such technologies may carry major risks for developing countries that are often especially vulnerable to, and lack adaptive capacity to deal with, the impacts of such new technologies. In this situation, one would expect that developing countries—especially the least developed countries that are most vulnerable—should play a central role in the emerging discourse on climate engineering. And yet, as this article shows in detail, the discussion about whether and how to engage with these technologies is shaped by experts from just a small set of countries in the Global North. Knowledge production around climate engineering remains heavily dominated by the major research institutions in North America and Europe. Drawing on information from 70 climate engineering events between 2009 and 2017 along with extensive document analysis, the article maps a lack of involvement of developing countries and highlights the degree to which their concerns remain insufficiently represented in politically significant scientific assessment reports. The article concludes by sketching options that developing countries may have to influence the agenda on climate engineering, reflecting on earlier attempts to increase control over novel technologies and influence global agenda setting.

This article analyses whether the European Union could lawfully enact border adjustments for energy taxes vis-à-vis other industrialised countries that are not party to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change without violating world trade law, in particular the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). We outline the rationale for border adjustments for energy taxes and conclude that despite remaining ambiguity in both the legal provisions and the pertinent case law, energy-related border tax adjustments are under certain circumstances compatible with world trade law. ; In diesem Artikel wird untersucht, ob die Europäische Union bestehende und künftig drohende Wettbewerbsnachteile infolge nationaler Energiesteuern mit Hilfe von Grenzausgleichssteuern (Border Tax Adjustments, BTA) gegenüber Nichtunterstützerstaaten des Kyoto-Protokolls von 1997 neutralisieren kann, ohne in Konflikt mit dem geltenden Welthandelsrecht zu geraten, insbesondere mit dem Allgemeinen Zoll- und Handelsabkommen (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT) und dem Subventionsabkommen (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, SCM Agreement). Unsere Analyse kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass trotz verbleibender Unklarheiten im Vertragsrecht und der Rechtsprechung der Grenzausgleich von Energiesteuern unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen im Einklang mit dem Welthandelsrecht steht.

Die Freisetzung persistenter organischer Schadstoffe (POPs) gilt inzwischen als ernstes globales Umweltproblem. Ende Juni 1998 trat im kanadischen Montreal ein zwischenstaatlicher Verhandlungsausschuß zusammen, um einen weltweiten Vertrag »über die Umsetzung internationaler Maßnahmen betreffend gewisser persistenter organischer Schadstoffe« auszuarbeiten. Nach der Klimakonvention, der Biodiversitätskonvention und der Desertifikationskonvention wird die UNChemikalienkonvention die vierte zentrale »Rio-Konvention« sein, in Nachfolge zum Erdgipfel von Rio de Janeiro von 1992. In diesem Papier werden diese Verhandlungen seit ihrer Entstehung und in ihren seitherigen Ergebnissen analysiert. Wir umreißen das Problem und die Datenlage zur Interessenstruktur, verknüpfen die derzeitigen mit den älteren Verhandlungen, analysieren den Stand der Politik in wesentlichen Konfliktfeldern, auch mit Blick auf andere Regime, um dann im Abschlußkapitel einige Perspektiven für die weiteren Verhandlungen und mögliche intensivere Forschungsarbeiten über die POP-Diplomatie zu skizzieren. Unsere empirische Basis ist die Auswertung der offiziellen Verhandlungsdokumente, eine Reihe von Interviews mit Verhandlungsteilnehmerinnen und -teilnehmen! sowie die verfügbare Sekundärliteratur. ; Persistent organic pollutants (POP) have been identified as major global environmental threat. In June 1998, delegates of several governments convened in Montreal, Canada, to start negotiating a UN convention »for implementing international action on certain persistent organic pollutants«. This treaty will be the fourth major Rio Convention, after the 1992 Climate Convention, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and the 1994 Desertification Convention. This paper analyses the POP negotiations with a view both to their history and their (still preliminary) results. We sketch the problem and available data on state interests; link present negotiations to other issue areas of international environmental diplomacy; examine the emerging regime in major areas of conflict; and offer some perspectives on the next round of negotiations and possible future research projects on »POP diplomacy«. Our empirical basis are official documents from the negotiations, a series of interviews with delegates as well as some secondary sources.

Global civil society is often uncritically seen as a democratic force in global governance. Civil society organizations claim to hold states and intergovernmental institutions accountable and channel the voices of the world's poorest people in policy making. Yet to what extent do they succeed in performing that role? This article assesses the representation of the poor in global civil society, with a focus on the negotiations of the Sustainable Development Goals, a process widely hailed as one of the most democratic ever organized by the United Nations. We first analyse how the poor and their local representatives are procedurally included in global civil society (procedural representation). We then quantitatively assess the actual representation of civil society organizations from the world's poorest countries in the civil society hearings of the SDG negotiations, where civil society was invited to speak on behalf of their constituencies (geographical representation). Finally, we evaluate the extent to which global civil society representatives who claim to speak on behalf of the poor legitimately represented the interests of these people (discursive representation). We found that global civil society fails to fully represent the poor on procedural, geographical and discursive terms, and eventually perpetuates postcolonial injustices in global sustainability governance.

With the onset of the new millennium, the longstanding need for reform of the United Nations system has gained new momentum. Efficiency gains and better coordination are desirable, though not sufficient to bring about improvement in international relations. It could therefore make sense to look for institutional innovations that would upgrade the pressing tasks of environmental and development policy in the eyes of national governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations, improve the institutional setting for the negotiation and implementation of new agreements and action programs, and strengthen the action capacity of the developing countries on these matters. The present paper points to and elaborates the need for a »World Environment and Development Organization« within the United Nations system, and outlines the shape it might be given. The intention here is to carry the debate, which has made considerable headway, into the science of politics and development. How will the expert community in the field of foreign relations and development cooperation, based on their theories and empirical knowledge, respond to the proposal?

Auf dem >Erdgipfel< 1992 in Rio de Janeiro bekannten sich Vertreter fast aller Industrie- und Entwicklungsländer zu dem Ziel, »eine neue und gerechte globale Partnerschaft aufzubauen«. Dieses Leitmotiv findet sich in vielen Umweltabkommen der jüngsten Zeit, in der Klimarahmenkonvention ebenso wie in der Biodiversitätskonvention und in der Konvention zur Verhütung der Desertifikation (Simonis 1996, 1998). Diese Abkommen enthalten neue Grundsätze und Instrumente der internationalen Regimebildung, insbesondere das Prinzip der »gemeinsamen, aber unterschiedlichen Verantwortlichkeiten« aller Staaten in Nord und Süd, aber auch neue Arten der Entscheidungsfindung und neue Verfahren der Erfüllungskontrolle.

Global environmental policy certainly could gain strength if the management of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) or of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) were made more efficient. However, such a minimalist strategy of efficiency improvement is no panacea: it can only be an element, not the core of a new global environmental policy. Therefore, instead of merely calling for improved efficiency and coordination, in this paper a proposal is made to establish a World Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) as a new specialized agency of the United Nations. At the very least, such an Organization should integrate UNEP, the CSD and the relevant Convention Secretariats (climate, biodiversity, desertification conventions); close cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) - and the existing UN specialized agencies would need to be ensured. Also, ideas are being presented on the decision-making procedures, the participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and on the financing of such a World Environment and Development Organization.

Wie kann die Wirksamkeit der Weltumweltpolitik verbessert werden? In diesem Paper plädieren die Autoren für die Gründung einer neuen Sonderorganisation der Vereinten Nationen: eine Weltorganisation für Umwelt und Entwicklung (World Environment and Development Organization). Hierin sollten einige bestehende Programme und Institutionen integriert werden, vor allem das UN-Umweltprogramm, die UNKommission zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung sowie die Sekretariate der relevanten internationalen Konventionen. Eine solche neue Sonderorganisation könnte den drängenden Aufgaben der Weltumwelt- und Weltentwicklungspolitik einen höheren Stellenwert bei Regierungen, internationalen Organisationen und privaten Akteuren verschaffen, das institutionelle Umfeld für die Aushandlung neuer Konventionen und Aktionsprogramme wie für die Umsetzung und Koordination der bestehenden verbessern und zudem die Handlungskapazität insbesondere der Entwicklungsländer stärken.

While the analysis of peace often stops with "negative peace" in conflict studies (Shields 2017), critical structural analyses of a transition towards peace risk to analytically emphasize how wartime structures extend into post-conflict times (see e.g. Lee 2020). In this article, by engaging with the two fields of conflict studies and political ecology, a framework is developed that allows a critical analysis of resilient structures and discourses from times of conflict, as well as of possible leverage points that could support a transition towards what is here conceptualized as "social ecological peace". The framework hence helps to understand in how far dimensions of prior violence have transformed into peace, and if certain dimensions of violence have continued, even though they manifest themselves in a different way. The framework builds on Galtung's conceptualization of violence and peace, but realigns "cultural violence" with Pierre Bourdieu's "symbolic violence". Additionally, for extending the framework with an ecological dimension and historical dimension, the notion of 'slow violence' by Rob Nixon is introduced. Applying the framework to Aceh, Indonesia, shows how cultural peace allows individuals to narrate and act out of a new identity, and in this way, enables them to put into effect structures of a new era of positive social-ecological peace. At the same time, discourses that are inherited from wartime and transform into peace time structures risk to carry violence in them. It becomes important to lay open the structural effects of the very discourses that have supported Aceh's autonomy, so that they may not further extend structural violence into peace times. This is likely to remain a challenge in a context that is described as still negotiating and struggling to enhance its autonomy (Setyowati 2020a). ; publishedVersion

Targets are widely employed in environmental governance. In this paper, we investigate the construction of the 2 ?C climate target, one of the best known targets in global environmental governance. Our paper examines this target through a historical reconstruction that identifies four different phases: framing, consolidation and diffusion, adoption, and dis- embeddedness. Our analysis shows that, initially, the target was science-driven and predomi- nantlyEU-based; it then becameprogressively accepted at the international level, despite a lack of broader debate among governments on the policy implications and required measures for implementation.Once the2 ?Ctargetwas endorsedat the level of theUnitedNations, thenature of the targetchangedfrombeingpolicy-prescriptive tobeinglargelysymbolic. In thisphase, the target became a disembedded object in global governance not linked to a shared agenda nor to coordinated andmutually binding mitigation efforts. The 2015 Paris Agreement marks the last stage in this development andmay have further solidified the target as a disembedded object. In the final part of the paper, wesuggestways to overcome the current situation and to develop the 2 ?C target into a fully fledged global environmental governance target.