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Cover -- Half title -- Series page -- Title page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Tables, charts, and diagrams -- Acknowledgments -- 1. The Effects of Institutions and Ideas on Policy Choice -- 2. Economic Policy Choices in the Southern Cone -- 3. The Effects of Institutions on Policy-Making Appointments -- 4. The Effects of Neoliberal Economists in Economic Policy Making -- 5. Privatization under Military Rule -- 6. The Professionalization of Economists -- 7. The Strategic Role of Ideas under Democratic Rule -- Notes -- References -- Index

This article compares military regimes in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay to show the political challenges military governments confront in implementing privatization policies. Using a case-study approach, it describes the effect of differences in long-standing characteristics of the armed forces, and in the military regime's governing institutions on the political survival strategies of military rulers. Analysis of the data on privatization under military rule in these countries suggests that consolidated one-man rule provides advantages over more collegial forms of military rule when it comes to selecting economic policy makers and directors of state-owned enterprises who will facilitate privatizing state enterprises. Furthermore, the findings reveal how rarely military regimes succeed in achieving their privatization goals.

Using a comparative framework, this essay argues against the claim that general Augusto Pinochet's Chile provides a model of economic development for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It suggests that Chile's experience represents an anomaly among military regimes. The evidence presented shows that Chile's choice of economic policy was not a function of economic efficiency but, like Argentina and Uruguay, was chosen on the basis of political expediency. (DSE/DÜI)