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Abstract:The article analyzes the application of the principle of proportionality, or rather of the proportionality test as interpretative criterion of the Italian Constitutional Court, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. This criterion was originally adopted within the German legal order and then, thanks to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, it has spread in many countries including common law countries. Therefore, the proportionality test became one of the central concepts of global constitutionalism, as an instrument fostering the dialogue between the courts through the circulation of legal models and argumentative standards. The paper starts with an introduction relating to the development of European constitutions from the end of World War II up to now and containing mostly principles that are characterized by open and heterogeneous cases. Then, the paper analyzes the techniques of balance that are particularly used both in new legislation and case-law. The analysis continues with an examination of the case study, with special attention to Sentence n. 1 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (which declared the unconstitutionality of the electoral system for the election of Parliament) and the Decision of the EuropeanCourt of Justice of 14 June 2015 relating to the assessment of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, this paper examines European and non EU doctrine that has shown its main concern due to the wide discretion that these decision-making instruments allow. In fact, the most recent international theoretical debate has focused on the deficit of democratic legitimacy occurring in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and has drawn the attention to the inherent danger in the scrutiny of proportionality and, more generally, in all the interpretative techniques of balance.The above-mentioned fear involves the fact that the principle of proportionality,which is the «par excellence» instrument of the «AGE of balancing», ends up stifling the democratic political autonomy.Despite the undeniable risk that courts can go into a non-allowed land, subverting the delicate balance of the decisions of the representative bodies, this paper accepts the idea that the existence of an oversight body, aimed at criticizing and, when appropriate, correcting the majority decision, is an indispensable instrument to protect the fundamental values both of national and international legal orders. In short, constitutional courts do not find the basis of their democratic legitimacy in popular election, but in their function itself, so asthat the majority decision is also accepted by the minority forces if and to the extent it is the expression of shared values. ; Resumen:El estudio analiza el principio de proporcionalidad, o mejor dicho el test de proporcionalidad como técnica argumentativa aplicada por la Corte constitucional italiana, por el Tribunal de Justicia y por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Esta técnica argumentativa, nacida en el ordenamiento alemán, ya se ha expandido, gracias al obrar del Tribunal de Justicia entre otras cosas, a muchos países no solo de la Unión Europea, sino también de common law. Hasta podría decirse que el principio de proporcionalidad se ha convertido en uno de los conceptos centrales del constitucionalismo global, en calidad de instrumento que favorece el diálogo entre los Tribunales a través de la circulación de modelos jurídicos y standards de argumentación.Después una premisa sobre las constituciones de la segunda posguerra en la Europa occidental, en la que se enuncian más que nada principios, caracterizados por circunstancias abiertas y heterogéneas, se tratan por separado las técnicas de equilibrio elaboradas por el legislador y también por el juez ordinario. El estudio prosigue señalando la existencia de diversos precedentes, prestando atención especial a la sentencia n.º 1 del 2014 de la Corte constitucional italiana, que declaró incostitucional la ley electoral n.º 270 de 2005 para la elección del Parlamento italiano y a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (14 de junio de 2015) en materia de control de las políticas monetarias del BCE. Para terminar, se tiene en cuenta la doctrina europea y de países del common law, que expresa su preocupación por el alto nivel de discrecionalidad que acompaña a la utilización de estos instrumentos decisorios. El debate teórico internacional más reciente se centró en el déficit de legitimación democrática de los Tribunales constitucionales y llamó la atención sobre los peligros inherentes al escrutinio de proporcionalidad y más en general sobre las técnicas argumentativas de equilibrio. El temor que subyace es que el principio de proporcionalidad, instrumento por excelencia del age of balancing termine sofocando la autonomía de la política democrática.A pesar de los innegables riesgos inherentes a las operaciones de control efectuadas por los Tribunales constitucionales sobre las decisiones de losórganos representativos, el estudio acepta la tesis de la doctrina según la cual la existencia de un órgano de garantía, llamado a controlar y, llegado el caso, a corregir la decisión de la mayoría, constituye una herramienta irrenunciable de tutela de los valores fundamentales del ordenamiento, ya sea interno o supranacional. Los Tribunales constitucionales hallan el fundamento de su legitimidad democrática no en la elección popular, sino en la función llevada a cabo, gracias a la cual las las minorías aceptan las decisiones mayoritarias, en los casos y como expresión de valores compartidos.Abstract:The article analyzes the application of the principle of proportionality, or rather of the proportionality test as interpretative criterion of the Italian Constitutional Court, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. This criterion was originally adopted within the German legal order and then, thanks to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, it has spread in many countries including common law countries. Therefore, the proportionality test became one of the central concepts of global constitutionalism, as an instrument fostering the dialogue between the courts through the circulation of legal models and argumentative standards. The paper starts with an introduction relating to the development of European constitutions from the end of World War II up to now and containing mostly principles that are characterized by open and heterogeneous cases. Then, the paper analyzes the techniques of balance that are particularly used both in new legislation and case-law. The analysis continues with an examination of the case study, with special attention to Sentence n. 1 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (which declared the unconstitutionality of the electoral system for the election of Parliament) and the Decision of the EuropeanCourt of Justice of 14 June 2015 relating to the assessment of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, this paper examines European and non EU doctrine that has shown its main concern due to the wide discretion that these decision-making instruments allow. In fact, the most recent international theoretical debate has focused on the deficit of democratic legitimacy occurring in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and has drawn the attention to the inherent danger in the scrutiny of proportionality and, more generally, in all the interpretative techniques of balance.The above-mentioned fear involves the fact that the principle of proportionality,which is the «par excellence» instrument of the «AGE of balancing», ends up stifling the democratic political autonomy.Despite the undeniable risk that courts can go into a non-allowed land, subverting the delicate balance of the decisions of the representative bodies, this paper accepts the idea that the existence of an oversight body, aimed at criticizing and, when appropriate, correcting the majority decision, is an indispensable instrument to protect the fundamental values both of national and international legal orders. In short, constitutional courts do not find the basis of their democratic legitimacy in popular election, but in their function itself, so asthat the majority decision is also accepted by the minority forces if and to the extent it is the expression of shared values.Summary:1. PREFACE. 2. LEVELS OF BALANCE. 3. EQUALITY AND REASONABLENESS. 4. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE GERMAN MODEL. 5. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: a) Proportionality as legitimacy parameterof measures restricting fundamental freedoms. b) Proportionality as validity parameter of acts of the European institutions: the monitoring on the monetary policies. 6. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND EVALUATING PROPORTIONALITY: THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION FOR EU MEMBER STATES.7. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Resumen: El estudio analiza el principio de proporcionalidad, o mejor dicho el test de proporcionalidad como tecnica argumentativa aplicada por la Corte constitucional italiana, por el Tribunal de Justicia y por el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Esta tecnica argumentativa, nacida en el ordenamiento aleman, ya se ha expandido, gracias al obrar del Tribunal de Justicia entre otras cosas, a muchos paises no solo de la Union Europea, sino tambien de common law. Hasta podria decirse que el principio de proporcionalidad se ha convertido en uno de los conceptos centrales del constitucionalismo global, en calidad de instrumento que favorece el dialogo entre los Tribunales a traves de la circulacion de modelos juridicos y standards de argumentacion. Despues una premisa sobre las constituciones de la segunda posguerra en la Europa occidental, en la que se enuncian mas que nada principios, caracterizados por circunstancias abiertas y heterogeneas, se tratan por separado las tecnicas de equilibrio elaboradas por el legislador y tambien por el juez ordinario. El estudio prosigue senalando la existencia de diversos precedentes, prestando atencion especial a la sentencia n.o 1 del 2014 de la Corte constitucional italiana, que declaro incostitucional la ley electoral n.o 270 de 2005 para la eleccion del Parlamento italiano y a la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia (14 de junio de 2015) en materia de control de las politicas monetarias del BCE. Para terminar, se tiene en cuenta la doctrina europea y de paises del common law, que expresa su preocupacion por el alto nivel de discrecionalidad que acompana a la utilizacion de estos instrumentos decisorios. El debate teorico internacional mas reciente se centro en el deficit de legitimacion democratica de los Tribunales constitucionales y llamo la atencion sobre los peligros inherentes al escrutinio de proporcionalidad y mas en general sobre las tecnicas argumentativas de equilibrio. El temor que subyace es que el principio de proporcionalidad, instrumento por excelencia del age of balancing termine sofocando la autonomia de la politica democratica. A pesar de los innegables riesgos inherentes a las operaciones de control efectuadas por los Tribunales constitucionales sobre las decisiones de los organos representativos, el estudio acepta la tesis de la doctrina segun la cual la existencia de un organo de garantia, llamado a controlar y, llegado el caso, a corregir la decision de la mayoria, constituye una herramienta irrenunciable de tutela de los valores fundamentales del ordenamiento, ya sea interno o supranacional. Los Tribunales constitucionales hallan el fundamento de su legitimidad democratica no en la eleccion popular, sino en la funcion llevada a cabo, gracias a la cual las las minorias aceptan las decisiones mayoritarias, en los casos y como expresion de valores compartidos. Abstract: The article analyzes the application of the principle of proportionality, or rather of the proportionality test as interpretative criterion of the Italian Constitutional Court, European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights. This criterion was originally adopted within the German legal order and then, thanks to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, it has spread in many countries including common law countries. Therefore, the proportionality test became one of the central concepts of global constitutionalism, as an instrument fostering the dialogue between the courts through the circulation of legal models and argumentative standards. The paper starts with an introduction relating to the development of European constitutions from the end of World War II up to now and containing mostly principles that are characterized by open and heterogeneous cases. Then, the paper analyzes the techniques of balance that are particularly used both in new legislation and case-law. The analysis continues with an examination of the case study, with special attention to Sentence n. 1 of 2014 of the Italian Constitutional Court (which declared the unconstitutionality of the electoral system for the election of Parliament) and the Decision of the European Court of Justice of 14 June 2015 relating to the assessment of the ECB's monetary policy. Finally, this paper examines European and non EU doctrine that has shown its main concern due to the wide discretion that these decision-making instruments allow. In fact, the most recent international theoretical debate has focused on the deficit of democratic legitimacy occurring in the jurisprudence of constitutional courts and has drawn the attention to the inherent danger in the scrutiny of proportionality and, more generally, in all the interpretative techniques of balance. The above-mentioned fear involves the fact that the principle of proportionality, which is the «par excellence» instrument of the «AGE of balancing», ends up stifling the democratic political autonomy. Despite the undeniable risk that courts can go into a non-allowed land, subverting the delicate balance of the decisions of the representative bodies, this paper accepts the idea that the existence of an oversight body, aimed at criticizing and, when appropriate, correcting the majority decision, is an indispensable instrument to protect the fundamental values both of national and international legal orders. In short, constitutional courts do not find the basis of their democratic legitimacy in popular election, but in their function itself, so as that the majority decision is also accepted by the minority forces if and to the extent it is the expression of shared values. Summary: 1. PREFACE. 2. LEVELS OF BALANCE. 3. EQUALITY AND REASONABLENESS. 4. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE GERMAN MODEL. 5. PROPORTIONALITY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: a) Proportionality as legitimacy parameter of measures restricting fundamental freedoms. b) Proportionality as validity parameter of acts of the European institutions: the monitoring on the monetary policies. 6. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND EVALUATING PROPORTIONALITY: THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION FOR EU MEMBER STATES. 7. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Nella storia dell'uomo, ogni sistema sembra avere avuto un vertice del sistema politico che, pur tenendo conto di alcune e fin troppo note eccezioni, nella maggior parte dei casi ha coinciso con una persona fisica, quale che possa essere stata la durata temporale del suo mandato. In molti casi, le principali trasformazioni che hanno avuto luogo in uno Stato hanno proprio interessato la posizione ed i poteri del suo capo al punto che, si potrebbe dire, l'evoluzione nel tempo dei poteri che ad esso vengono riconosciuti consente una messa a fuoco dell'evolversi di tutta la forma di governo. Sulla base di queste considerazioni, si è tentato di tracciare l'evoluzione subita dal Capo dello Stato in Italia, per comprendere come la nostra forma di Stato e quella di governo si siano sviluppate dal 1848 ad oggi.