Suchergebnisse

I. Foundations. Conceptualizing social behaviour -- Hamilton's rule as an organizing framework -- The rule under attack : tautology, prediction, and casuality -- Kin selection and group selection -- II. Extensions. Gene mobility and the concept of relatedness -- The multicellular organism as a social phenomenon -- Cultural relatedness and human social evolution.

I contrast my picture of the relationship between the science and policy of animal sentience with that of Marian Stamp Dawkins, who thinks "the science of animal sentience and the politics of animal welfare should be kept separate" because they involve irreconcilably different standards of evidence. On my alternative picture, (i) the science of animal sentience, like any other empirical science, delivers evidence but not certainty; (ii) this evidence allows us to make better practical decisions, both within and outside science and (iii) the quality standards we apply to the evidence should be high in all contexts, including the formulation of public policy.

I contrast my picture of the relationship between the science and policy of animal sentience with that of Marian Stamp Dawkins, who thinks "the science of animal sentience and the politics of animal welfare should be kept separate" because they involve irreconcilably different standards of evidence. On my alternative picture, (i) the science of animal sentience, like any other empirical science, delivers evidence but not certainty; (ii) this evidence allows us to make better practical decisions, both within and outside science and (iii) the quality standards we apply to the evidence should be high in all contexts, including the formulation of public policy.

Abstract
I briefly present and motivate a 'skill hypothesis' regarding the evolution of human normative cognition. On this hypothesis, the capacity to internally represent action-guiding norms evolved as a solution to the distinctive problems of standardizing, learning and teaching complex motor skills and craft skills, especially skills related to toolmaking. We have an evolved cognitive architecture for internalizing norms of technique, which was then co-opted for a rich array of social functions. There was a gradual expansion of the normative domain, with ritual playing an important role in bridging the gap between concrete, enacted norms and general, abstract norms, such as kinship norms. I conclude by stating nine predictions arising from the skill hypothesis.

Abstract
I reflect on the commentaries on my 'skill hypothesis' from Andrews/Westra, Tomasello, Sterelny, and Railton. I discuss the difference between normative cognition and the broader category of action-guiding representation, and I reflect on the relationship between joint intentionality and normative cognition. I then consider Sterelny and Railton's variants on the skill hypothesis, which highlight some important areas where future evidence could help us refine the account: the relative importance of on-the-fly skill execution vs. longer-term strategizing, the relative importance of toolmaking vs. collaborative foraging, and the question of whether norms are encoded in control models themselves or in the goals and ideals that our control models help us pursue.

Drawing on the SAGE minutes and other documents, I consider the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be learned from the UK's initial response to coronavirus in the period January-March 2020, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppression of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression strategy. I introduce a distinction between "normatively light advice", in which no specific policy option is recommended, and "normatively heavy advice" that does make an explicit recommendation. I argue that, although scientific advisers should avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times in order to facilitate democratic accountability, this norm can be permissibly overridden in situations of grave emergency. SAGE's major mistake in early 2020 was not that of endorsing a particular strategy, nor that of being insufficiently precautionary, but that of relying too heavily on a specific set of "reasonable worst-case" planning assumptions. I formulate some proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to "worst-case" thinking in emergency planning. In an epilogue, I consider what the implications of my proposals would have been for the UK's response to the "second wave" of late 2020.

Drawing on the SAGE minutes and other documents, I consider the wider lessons for norms of scientific advising that can be learned from the UK's initial response to coronavirus in the period January–March 2020, when an initial strategy that planned to avoid total suppression of transmission was abruptly replaced by an aggressive suppression strategy. I introduce a distinction between "normatively light advice", in which no specific policy option is recommended, and "normatively heavy advice" that does make an explicit recommendation. I argue that, although scientific advisers should avoid normatively heavy advice in normal times in order to facilitate democratic accountability, this norm can be permissibly overridden in situations of grave emergency. SAGE's major mistake in early 2020 was not that of endorsing a particular strategy, nor that of being insufficiently precautionary, but that of relying too heavily on a specific set of "reasonable worst-case" planning assumptions. I formulate some proposals that assign a more circumscribed role to "worst-case" thinking in emergency planning. In an epilogue, I consider what the implications of my proposals would have been for the UK's response to the "second wave" of late 2020.

My commentary focusses on Mikhalevich & Powell's criticisms of the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle. I emphasize the pragmatic nature of my rationale for proposing that, rather than extending the scope of animal welfare protection on a species-by-species basis, we should be willing to protect entire Linnaean orders on the basis of evidence from a single species.

I focus on the possibility of sentience in zebrafish larvae. The evidence here prompts two intuitive reactions that are difficult to reconcile: the reaction that larvae, if sentient, should be protected in some way, and the reaction that larvae, if capable of nociception, should be used as replacements for adults. Both reactions are reasonable, but they can be reconciled only by constructing a framework for assigning degrees of protection in proportion to degrees of sentience.

I respond to commentaries by Elwood and Seth & Dienes and to a recent critique by Diggles, discussing the link between avoidance learning and sentience, the relevance of the clash between frequentist and Bayesian statistics, the risks to decapod welfare in aquaculture, and the broader concerns one may have about a "precautionary" approach to protecting invertebrates.

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should "give the animal the benefit of the doubt" or "err on the side of caution" in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what "applying the precautionary principle" means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area.

In debates about animal sentience, the precautionary principle is often invoked. The idea is that when the evidence of sentience is inconclusive, we should "give the animal the benefit of the doubt" or "err on the side of caution" in formulating animal protection legislation. Yet there remains confusion as to whether it is appropriate to apply the precautionary principle in this context, and, if so, what "applying the precautionary principle" means in practice regarding the burden of proof for animal sentience. Here I construct a version of the precautionary principle tailored to the question of animal sentience together with a practical framework for implementing it. I explain and defend the key features of this framework, argue that it is well-aligned current practice in animal welfare science, and consider and reject a number of influential counterarguments to the use of precautionary reasoning in this area

Most of the commentators so far agree that the precautionary principle can be usefully applied to the question of animal sentience. I consider various ways of refining my proposals in light of the suggestions. I amend BAR to implement C. Brown's suggestion that the scope of animal welfare law should be extensible by phylogenetic inference from orders in which credible indicators of sentience are found. In response to C. Brown, Mallatt, and Woodruff, I amend ACT to allow that a single credible indicator may sometimes call for urgent further investigation rather than immediate protection. In response to Paez, I amend ACT to clarify that cost-effective measures to safeguard the welfare of animals that satisfy BAR should be included in any legislation relevant to their treatment in any domain of human activity. I consider and decline other suggestions, including Browning's suggestion that BAR should admit anecdotal evidence. I resist the charges that my proposals yield inconsistent advice or amount to "fiddling while Rome burns." I argue that my proposals support the inclusion of decapod crustaceans in animal welfare law but do not (contra Reber) support the inclusion of microbes.

Chapter One: Introduction -- Chapter Two: Imagining Enlightenment – The Historical and Historiographical Context -- Chapter Three: Overture to a Moral Messiah - God, Goodness, and the Heretical Tendency -- Chapter Four: Material Messiah - Hobbes, Heresy, and a Kingdom Not of This World -- Chapter Five: 'No Spirit No God' - From the Light of Christ to the Age of Enlightenment -- Chapter Six: What Would Jesus Tolerate? - Reason and Revelation in Spinoza, Locke, and Bayle -- Chapter Seven: The Unity of God and the Wisdom of Christ - The Religious Enlightenments of Joseph Priestley and Thomas Jefferson -- Chapter Eight: Postscript and Conclusion