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Cover -- Halftitle page -- Title page -- Copyright page -- CONTENTS -- Illustrations -- Abbreviations -- List of Fridays -- Preface -- Recollections: An introduction to the English edition -- Introduction -- 1 The bitter harvest: The first ten years of Bashar al-Assad -- I. Wasted opportunities -- II. The Damascus Declaration -- III. Rebranding the regime and the consolidation of power -- IV. Precursors of protest -- V. Protest in the run-up to the revolution -- VI. Solidarity with the Libyan people as a political message -- 2 From spark to fire -- I. The Daraa uprising -- II. A peaceful popular revolution -- III. The Homs Clocktower Square sit-in -- IV. The end of the Clocktower Square sit-in -- V. Good Friday: The uprising of the cities of the Damascus countryside -- 3 Protests in the main squares -- I. Hama, memories revisited -- II. Deir ez-Zor: The effectiveness of youth groups -- III. Idleb -- 4 Masses in the cities: The revolutionary movement in Damascus and Aleppo -- Damascus -- Aleppo: Hesitation and apprehension -- 5 An armed revolution -- Prelude to armament -- Militarization begins -- Jisr ash-Shughur: A turning point -- Poor coordination, poor organization -- The Battle for Aleppo: A city in revolt or the attack of the countryside? -- The Battle for the Damascus periphery -- Ar-Raqqa Blitzkrieg -- 6 The regime's strategy -- The official discourse -- The media strategy -- Diagnosis and strategy -- The shabbiha -- 7 Ruralization of the party and sectarianization of the army: The origins of sectarian discourse and violence -- I. The roots of the sectarianization of the army and the militarization of sectarianism -- II. The social base of the Bathist regime and the process of ruralization -- III. The nature of the regime and the rise of the 'young wolves -- 8 Sectarian violence unleashed.

Intro -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. On the Problematic of Sectarianism -- 2. Mapping Terms: Towards Analytical Conceptualisation -- 3. Confessionalisation as a Prelude to Sectarianisation -- 4. Is a Ta'ifa a Community? -- 5. Firqa and Iftiraq in Islam -- 6. Social Conflict, Sects, and Foreign Intervention: The Tanzimat and the Events of 1860 -- 7. Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyya and Sects -- 8. Sectarianism, its Historicity, and Some Ethical Implications -- 9. Nothing Eternal About It -- 10. Is Modern Sectarianism a Product of Secularisation? -- 11. Community to Imagined Community, Social Sectarianism to Political Sectarianism -- 12. Sectarianism from Popular Participation in the Public Sphere to a Barrier to Participation -- 13. Majorities, Minorities, and Tolerance -- Conclusion -- Index -- Back Cover.

Intro -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Illustrations -- Abbreviations -- Introduction to the English Edition -- Prologue: On revolution and susceptibility to revolution -- Chapter 1: The Arab and the Tunisian in the Tunisian Revolution -- Chapter 2: Pre-Revolutionary times -- Chapter 3: From Gafsa to Sidi Bouzid -- Chapter 4: Parties and other associations before the upheaval -- Chapter 5: Diary entries : From uprising to revolution -- Concluding remarks -- Epilogue: The transitionary period: Democracy against all odds -- Postscript: Democracy Imperilled by Populism -- Bibliography -- Index.

This article tackles the historical basis and development of the issue of anti-Semitism and examines its perception and impact in the Arab world. The author argues persuasively that anti-Semitism is specific to European racism against Jews. He does not attempt to deflect the term by arguing, as some have done, that Arabs are a Semitic people, but rather unequivocally condemns anti-Semitism and racism of any sort. The author debunks major myths or misconceptions about anti-Semitism and deals frankly with questions of its political utility with regard to Zionism, Israel and Palestine. In the present day, Holocaust denial is unconscionable and, in the end, is not only morally unacceptable, but in the words of the author 'just plain stupid'. The author castigates Arab and Muslim groups which may take such a stance, arguing that the correct response and Arab reaction to the Holocaust was the simple, straightforward and rational one – a European tragedy, but not one for which the Arabs should assume responsibility.

The story of David and Goliath epitomizes the supremacy of intelligence, acumen, pragmatism and faith in God, over strength, power, military might and numbers. It is easy, of course, to illustrate the confrontation of David with Goliath in Bint Jbeil as an embodiment of this equation, but in a reversal of roles; the Arabs, represented by Hezbollah, were David this time, the weaker opponent armed with faith and intelligence, against power and formidable strength. However, there is another aspect of the myth, not addressed yet; Saul's jealousy of David could as easily have illustrated one of the parties to the war on Lebanon. David's king, Saul, who had failed so far to defeat Goliath, envied David his success and saw him as a threat. He harboured malicious intent towards him and resolved to pursue him until he was able to kill him (1 Samuel 17).

After situating the Palestine question in the context of U.S. global policy, this essay deconstructs the U.S.-Israeli conception of Palestinian statehood as an all-encompassing ""package deal"" solution replacing the final status issues of return, refugees, settlements, and borders. The Gaza disengagement, the author argues, is the first step in implementing this plan. With disengagement, Gaza becomes a strictly Palestinian problem, no longer an Israeli problem, and whatever negotiations may take place will henceforth be dominated by technical and procedural issues connected with the Strip. The whole point of this vision of statehood, according to the author, is to downgrade the Palestine problem to its ""true dimensions.""

After critiquing what have become the main axes of political debate in the occupied territories——suicide bombings, armed operations, and reform——the author emphasizes the imperative need for a comprehensive, inclusive resistance strategy. Elaborating upon five major ingredients that must be taken into account when developing a sound strategy——cost to the adversary, cost to Palestinian society, political discourse, a clear message to the adversary, and a clear message to the world——he argues that in the present phase a resistance strategy is not at odds with state building, and that the two should be pursued in tandem.