Suchergebnisse

Abstract: This article critically analyses three recent judgments, in which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has extended the notion of consumer contract under Article 15 of the Brussels I Regulation (BIR). It is argued that this extension, which will equally affect choice of law in consumer contracts under Article 6 of the Rome I Regulation (RIR), is too far reaching and leads to a mandatory protection of consumers. Such protection was neither envisaged by the legislator, nor is it necessary as a policy to establish a sufficient level of consumer protection. The author argues that a return to the idea of the passive consumer brings about more appropriate results. Resumé: Cet article analyse critique de trois arrêts récents, dans lessquelle la CJE a étendu la notion de contrat de consommation vertu de l'art. 15 règlement Bruxelles-I. Il fait valoir que cette extension, qui sera également affecter le choix de loi dans les contrats de consommation en vertu de l'art. 6 du règlement Rome-I, est trop grande portée et conduit à une protection obligatoire des consommateurs. Cette protection a été ni envisagée par le législateur, et il n'est pas aussi nécessaire pour établir un niveau suffisant de protection des consommateurs. L'auteur suggère que le retour à l'idée de consommateur passif apporte des résultats plus appropriés. Zusammenfassung: Dieser Beitrag unterzieht drei neuere Urteile, in denen der EuGH den Begriff des Verbrauchervertrags in Art. 15 Brüssel-I Verordnung ausweitet, einer kritischen Würdigung. Er ist der Aufassung, dass diese Ausweitung, die gleichsam die Frage des anwendbaren Rechts gem. Art. 6 Rom-I Verordnung betrifft, zu weit geht und zu einem zwangsweise Schutz des Verbrauchers führt. Solch ein Schutz war weder vom Gesetzgeber vorgesehen noch ist er notwendig um einen angemessenen Verbraucherschutz sicherzustellen. Der Autor schlägt eine Rückbesinnung auf die Idee des passive Verbrauchers vor, da diese zu angemesseneren Ergebnissen führt.

AbstractThis article analyses the relationship of the proposed Common European Sales Law (CESL) and the rules on mandatory and overriding provisions in private international law. The author argues that the CESL will not achieve its stated aim of taking precedence over these provisions of national law and therefore not lead to an increase in cross-border trade. It is pointed out how slight changes in drafting can overcome the collision with mandatory provisions. The clash with overriding mandatory provisions, the author argues, should be taken as an opportunity to rethink the definition of these provisions.

Abstract: This article discusses the initiatives to allow the use of English in German and French courts. The difficulties arising out of such initiatives are highlighted and the aims evaluated. The article illustrates how, at present, such proposals suffer from insufficient English language translations of statutes and highlights the legal and practical obstacles. The article demonstrates that language is not the primary reason why parties do not chose Germany or France as place of litigation and concludes that therefore the initiatives will not bring about the desired effect. Résumé: Cet article discute les initiatives pour permettre l'utilisation de l'anglais dans les tribunaux allemands et français. Les difficultés découlant de ces initiatives sont mises en évidence et les objectifs évalués. L'article montre comment, à l'heure actuelle, de telles propositions souffrent d'insuffisance de traductions des lois en langue anglaise, et souligne les obstacles juridiques et pratiques. L'article démontre que la langue n'est pas la raison principale pour laquelle les parties n'ont pas choisi l'Allemagne ou la France comme lieu de litige, et conclut donc que les initiatives n'auront pas l'effet désiré. Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel diskutiert die Initiativen bezüglich der Zulassung von englischer Sprache in deutschen und französischen Gerichten. Die Schwierigkeiten, die diese Initiativen hervorrufen, werden hervorgehoben, und ihre Zielsetzung bewertet. Der Artikel zeigt auf, dass derzeit die Vorschläge darunter leiden, dass keine hinreichende Übersetzung von Gesetzen in englischer Sprache vorliegt, und weist auf die rechtlichen und praktischen Hürden der Initiativen hin. Der Artikel zeigt, dass Sprache nicht der vorrangige Grund dafür ist, dass die Parteien nicht Deutschland oder Frankreich als Gerichtsstand wählen, und schlussfolgert, dass die Initiativen aus diesem Grund nicht den erwünschten Erfolg haben werden.

Abstract: The most frequent method by which companies borrow money takes the form of debentures, which are usually accompanied by a charge on the company's assets. One of the features of the company law which applies in Common Law countries, and which distinguishes it from that which prevails in most codified law systems on this issue, is the distinction made between the "fixed charge" and the "floating charge". Fixed charges normally take the form of legal mortgage over specified company assets, e.g. its land and buildings. A charge may also be fixed on the company's present and future book debts, which prevents the company from using the debts without the consent of the chargee. On the other hand, companies may also give a lender a "floating charge", being an equitable charge on some or all of the present and future property of the company. Normally such a charge relates to those assets which are constantly changing, such as the company's stock-in-trade. The company thus remains free to deal with the assets as it sees fit in the course of its business. The floating charge only becomes attached to an item if and when the charge "crystallizes", whereupon it becomes a fixed charge on all the current assets which it covers. A charge crystallises where the company is about to be wound up or in such other conditions as are specified in the trust deed or debentures – e.g. failure by the company to pay the agreed interest or to redeem the debentures as agreed. In the majority of cases, the category to which a particular charge belongs is clear beyond reasonable doubt; however, there are some charges which admit of some doubt in this respect. It was precisely such a borderline charge which is the subject-matter of the case under review, which landed before the Privy Council from the New Zealand Court of Appeal. Here, a company granted a charge over its uncollected book debts, which left it free to collect them and use the proceeds in the ordinary course of its business, but prevented the company from assigning or from factoring them. The underlying debenture was expressed in such a way as to create a fixed charge over the book debts. When the company went into receivership, the only assets available for distribution to creditors were the proceeds of the book debts which were outstanding when the receivers were appointed. The question arose whether the right of the company to collect the debts and deal with their proceeds free from security meant that the charge on the uncollected debts, although described in the debenture as being fixed, was nevertheless a floating charge until it crystallised through the appointment of the receivers. It was argued by the receivers that the charge was fixed and that the proceeds were accordingly payable to the company's bank, acting as the holder of the charge. However, of the charge was a floating charge at the time when it was created, then, through the combined effects of Schedule VII to the Companies Act 1993 and Section 30 of the Receiverships Act 1993, the proceeds were payable to the employees and the Inland Revenue Commissioner as preferential creditors. The judge at first instance ruled that the charge in question was a fixed charge. However, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal (New Zealand). The receivers appealed to the Privy Council. The question to be settled on appeal was whether a charge over the uncollected book debts of a company which left the latter free to collect them and use the proceeds in the ordinary course of its business was a fixed or a floating charge. The Council dismissed the appeal. It traced the history of the floating charge from its inception to the present day, paying particular attention to charges over book debts, and arrived at the following conclusions: (a) the characteristics of the floating charge as specified by Romer LJ in the landmark decision of Re Yorkshire Woolcombers Association