Suchergebnisse

Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob das österreichische System der Lohnfindung, trotz enormer Veränderungen der ökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen in den letzten Jahrzehnten, noch einer Lohnkoordination durch den Leitabschluss des Metallersektors folgt. Anhand einer quantitativen ökonometrischen Untersuchung auf Basis detaillierter Tariflohndaten zeigt sich, dass der Prozess der Lohnfindung immer noch am besten durch die Lohnführerschaft des Metallersektors erklärt werden kann. Zudem hat sich die Lohnkoordinationsfunktion des Metallerabschlusses wohl durch eine zunehmende Konzentration von Kollektivvertragsabschlüssen, die im Jänner beginnen, verstärkt. Ein kürzerer zeitlicher Abstand zum Abschluss des Metallersektors könnte dafür sorgen, dass die Signalwirkung des Leitabschlusses steigt und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, die bei einem zeitlich größeren Abstand wichtiger wird, weniger Wirkung entfaltet.

Im Zuge von Wirtschaftskrisen nehmen finanzielle Beschränkungen für Unternehmen häufig zu. Diese Liquiditätsengpässe dämpfen auch F&E-Investitionen, die gerade in ökonomisch schwierigen Zeiten, aufgrund der geringeren Opportunitätskosten, verstärkt unternommen werden sollten. Daher empfehlen sich stärker antizyklisch ausgerichtete wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen im Bereich der Liquidität und der direkten Forschungsförderung. Dadurch bleiben bei liquiditätsbeschränkten Unternehmen F&E-Kapazitäten erhalten und bei liquiden Unternehmen wird die Wirksamkeit der F&E-Förderungen erhöht.

Within a politico-economic model we first establish three hypotheses: (i) Retirees generally prefer a higher retirement age than workers, whereby just retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age, (ii) in equilibrium the level of the legal retirement age is increasing in longevity and (iii) decreasing in the public pension replacement rate. We then test these hypotheses empirically. Employing micro data for Germany we corroborate the first hypothesis with descriptive regressions and a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design. We show that just retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increase in the legal retirement age. On the basis of cross country panel IV regressions we provide evidence for the second and third hypothesis. We demonstrate that a one percentage point increase in the share of the elderly increases the legal retirement age by 0.3 to 0.5 years, and that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate reduces the legal retirement age by 0.5 to 3 years. We conclude that if policy contains the generosity of public pensions, increasing the legal retirement age becomes politically more feasible.

Within a politico-economic model we first establish three hypotheses: (i) Retirees generally prefer a higher retirement age than workers, whereby just retired individuals prefer the highest retirement age, (ii) in equilibrium the level of the legal retirement age is increasing in longevity and (iii) decreasing in the public pension replacement rate. We then test these hypotheses empirically. Employing micro data for Germany we corroborate the first hypothesis with descriptive regressions and a fuzzy regression discontinuity (FRD) design. We show that just retired individuals are indeed most in favor of an increase in the legal retirement age. On the basis of cross country panel IV regressions we provide evidence for the second and third hypothesis. We demonstrate that a one percentage point increase in the share of the elderly increases the legal retirement age by 0.3 to 0.5 years, and that a 10 percentage point increase in the replacement rate reduces the legal retirement age by 0.5 to 3 years. We conclude that if policy contains the generosity of public pensions, increasing the legal retirement age becomes politically more feasible.

Volunteers in nonprofit and public organizations can provide additional resources and exert positive influence on organizations, staff, and clients. However, the relationship between paid staff and volunteers is complex and may lead to tension, employee dissatisfaction, and, ultimately, workers leaving the organization. This article focuses on excessive worker turnover as a signal of delicate organizational health and analyzes whether volunteers are an important variable in explaining differences in excess turnover rates between organizations. Using Austrian survey data and applying Tobit regressions, we show that more volunteers in management tasks compared with volunteers employed in other tasks increase both the probability of experiencing excess worker turnover and the amount of excess turnover. This result is interpreted as a possible sign for volunteer–staff tension. Understanding the consequences of using volunteer labor for paid workers is important to prevent volunteering from backfiring on service capacity and quality in public and nonprofit organizations.