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AbstractThe Internet represents a powerful tool for racist groups to build a sense of group consciousness and promote their cause. In the current study, we examined the language used by racist (n = 87), anti‐racist (n = 50), and nonactivist (n = 1379) groups when describing their self‐defining beliefs online. We used computerized linguistic analysis software to measure psychological indicators and antecedents of group consciousness and to examine the persuasive techniques used in online group communication. Racist and anti‐racist groups were similar on some linguistic indicators of group consciousness (e.g., use of words reflecting perceived injustice), but differed on others (e.g., use of words reflecting group identification). Linguistic indicators of antecedents of group consciousness (moral foundations and focus on religion) differed across groups, with racist groups focused more on purity, respect for authority, and religion, and less on fairness than anti‐racist groups. Racist groups also used less cognitively complex language than nonactivist groups (but similar levels to anti‐racist groups). Our results contribute to understanding how racist groups promote their self‐defining beliefs online, and identify several key factors that should be considered when designing policies to reduce racist groups' growth and impact.

Following decreasing vaccination rates over the last two decades, understanding the roots of vaccine hesitancy has become a public health priority. Vaccine hesitancy is linked to scientifically unfounded fears around the MMR vaccine and autism which are often fuelled by misinformation spread on social media. To counteract the effects of misinformation about vaccines and in particular the falling vaccination rates, much research has focused on identifying the antecedents of vaccine hesitancy. As antecedents of vaccine hesitancy are contextually dependent, a one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to be successful in non-WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, and Democratic) populations, and even in certain (non-typical) WEIRD sub-populations. Successful interventions to reduce vaccine hesitancy must be based on understanding of the specific context. To identify potential contextual differences in the antecedents of vaccine hesitancy, we review research from three non-WEIRD populations in East Asia, and three WEIRD sub-populations. We find that regardless of the context, mistrust seems to be the key factor leading to vaccine hesitancy. However, the object of mistrust varies across WEIRD and non-WEIRD populations, and across WEIRD subgroups suggesting that effective science communication must be mindful of these differences.

The concept of prefigurative politics has re-emerged following recent worldwide uprisings, such as the Occupy movement, to which this concept has been applied. In applying a contemporary analysis to prefigurative politics, we explore the contribution of community-based recovery groups to the recovery movement, a socio-political movement in the fields of mental health and addiction treatment. We argue that collective action in recovery groups is derived from the formation of an opinion-based social identity and results in alternative approaches to unmet needs, creatively addressing these identified needs through the utilisation of personal, social and collective resources within an emerging recovery community. To illustrate our argument, we provide examples of community-based recovery groups and the approaches they use in addressing the identified needs of their recovery community. We conclude with an analysis of what community-based recovery groups and the wider recovery movement can contribute to a contemporary understanding of prefigurative politics. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

The concept of prefigurative politics has re-emerged following recent worldwide uprisings, such as the Occupy movement, to which this concept has been applied. In applying a contemporary analysis to prefigurative politics, we explore the contribution of community-based recovery groups to the recovery movement, a socio-political movement in the fields of mental health and addiction treatment. We argue that collective action in recovery groups is derived from the formation of an opinion-based social identity and results in alternative approaches to unmet needs, creatively addressing these identified needs through the utilisation of personal, social and collective resources within an emerging recovery community. To illustrate our argument, we provide examples of community-based recovery groups and the approaches they use in addressing the identified needs of their recovery community. We conclude with an analysis of what community-based recovery groups and the wider recovery movement can contribute to a contemporary understanding of prefigurative politics.

The concept of prefigurative politics has re-emerged following recent worldwide uprisings, such as the Occupy movement, to which this concept has been applied. In applying a contemporary analysis to prefigurative politics, we explore the contribution of community-based recovery groups to the recovery movement, a socio-political movement in the fields of mental health and addiction treatment. We argue that collective action in recovery groups is derived from the formation of an opinion-based social identity and results in alternative approaches to unmet needs, creatively addressing these identified needs through the utilisation of personal, social and collective resources within an emerging recovery community. To illustrate our argument, we provide examples of community-based recovery groups and the approaches they use in addressing the identified needs of their recovery community. We conclude with an analysis of what community-based recovery groups and the wider recovery movement can contribute to a contemporary understanding of prefigurative politics.

Western cultural environments present an increasingly challenging landscape for young people's mental health. To better understand how this cultural environment may be influencing the lives of young people, we conducted 50 semi-structured interviews with young Australians, discussing participants' values, life goals, social attitudes and behaviours, and life stressors. We find that while participants tended to see factors such as maintaining strong relationships and personal growth as important to them, their ambitions, attitudes, and social behaviours were often driven by self-centred and materialistic aims. Participants also perceived outcomes specific to these drivers, including poor social support, feelings of competitiveness, and uncertainties around their future, as significant contributors to the stress they experienced in their lives. These findings help us better understand how prevailing Western cultural norms, including individualistic and materialistic practices, may influence young people's psychological wellbeing.

We revisit the construct of political polarization and current distinctions between issue-driven and affective polarization. Based on our review of recent research on polarization from psychology, political science, and communication, we propose to treat polarization as a process that integrates the concepts of social identification (collective self-definition) with ideologically opposed camps - that is, psychological groups based on support or opposition to specific socio-political issues and policies (related to issue-driven polarization), and that of ideological and psychological distancing between groups (related to affective polarization). Furthermore, we discuss the foundations of polarizing groups – and more specifically, the role of conflicting collective narratives about social reality in providing an initial platform for polarization in a technologically networked world. In particular, we highlight the importance of online media in facilitating and enhancing polarization between ideologically opposed camps. As a theoretical contribution, the review provides a more functional conceptualization of polarization that can explain how polarization may occur across partisan fault lines and in domains outside of politics. We conclude with a discussion of new pathways to the study of polarization which this integrative conceptualization opens.

Research on group identification has shown it to be a surprisingly weak predictor of intentions to take large-scale social action. The weak links may exist because researchers have not always examined identification with the type of group that is most relevant for predicting action. Our focus in two studies (one in Romania and one in Australia, both Ns = 101) was on opinion-based groups (i.e. groups formed around shared opinions). We found that social identification with opinion-based groups was an excellent predictor of political behavioural intentions, particularly when items measuring identity certainty were included. The results provide clear evidence of the role of social identity constructs for predicting commitment to social action and complement analyses of politicised collective identity and crowd behaviour.

Research on group identification has shown it to be a surprisingly weak predictor of intentions to take large-scale social action. The weak links may exist because researchers have not always examined identification with the type of group that is most relevant for predicting action. Our focus in two studies (one in Romania and one in Australia, both Ns = 101) was on opinion-based groups (i.e. groups formed around shared opinions). We found that social identification with opinion-based groups was an excellent predictor of political behavioural intentions, particularly when items measuring identity certainty were included. The results provide clear evidence of the role of social identity constructs for predicting commitment to social action and complement analyses of politicised collective identity and crowd behaviour.

Despite the increasing citizen engagement with socio-political online communities, little is known about how such communities are affected by significant offline events. Thus, we investigate here the ways in which the collective identity of a far-right online community is affected by offline intergroup conflict. We examine over 14 years of online communication between members of Stormfront Downunder, the Australian sub-forum of the global white supremacist community Stormfront.org . We analyse members' language use and discourse before and after significant intergroup conflict in 2015, culminating in local racist riots in Sydney, Australia. We found that the riots were associated with significant changes in the collective beliefs of the community (as captured by members' most salient concerns and group norms), emotions and consensus within the community. Overall, the effects of the local riots were manifest in a reinvigorated sense of purpose for the far-right community with a stronger anti-Muslim agenda.

Whether the Australian government should officially apologize to Indigenous Australians for past wrongs is hotly debated in Australia. The predictors of support amongst non-Indigenous Australians for such an apology were examined in two studies. The first study (N = 164) showed that group-based guilt was a good predictor of support for a government apology, as was the perception that non-Indigenous Australians were relatively advantaged. In the second study (N = 116) it was found that group-based guilt was an excellent predictor of support for apology and was itself predicted by perceived non-Indigenous responsibility for harsh treatment of Indigenous people, and an absence of doubts about the legitimacy of group-based guilt. National identification was not a predictor of group-based guilt. The results of the two studies suggest that, just as individual emotions predict individual action tendencies, so group-based guilt predicts support for actions or decisions to be taken at the collective level.

Whether the Australian government should officially apologize to Indigenous Australians for past wrongs is hotly debated in Australia. The predictors of support amongst non-Indigenous Australians for such an apology were examined in two studies. The first study (N = 164) showed that group-based guilt was a good predictor of support for a government apology, as was the perception that non-Indigenous Australians were relatively advantaged. In the second study (N = 116) it was found that group-based guilt was an excellent predictor of support for apology and was itself predicted by perceived non-Indigenous responsibility for harsh treatment of Indigenous people, and an absence of doubts about the legitimacy of group-based guilt. National identification was not a predictor of group-based guilt. The results of the two studies suggest that, just as individual emotions predict individual action tendencies, so group-based guilt predicts support for actions or decisions to be taken at the collective level.