Second-best mechanisms in queuing problems without transfers:The role of random priorities
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 90, S. 73-79
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 90, S. 73-79
In: Revue d'économie politique, Band 127, Heft 4, S. 559-578
ISSN: 2105-2883
Cet article propose une revue de la littérature des jeux coopératifs avec externalités. L'article présente différentes extensions du cœur et de la valeur de Shapley aux jeux sous forme de fonction de partition. Différents modèles non-coopératifs de formation de coalitions sont également discutés. Enfin, l'article considère deux applications : la fourniture de biens publics purs et la formation d'associations d'entreprises et caractérise différentes extensions du cœur dans ces applications.
In: The Manchester School, Band 70, Heft 1, S. 36-55
ISSN: 1467-9957
This paper provides a selective survey of recent approaches to coalition and network formation in industrial organization, and offers a unified framework in which the different approaches can be compared. We focus on two extreme forms of cooperation—collusive agreements and cost‐reducing alliances. We show that bilateral negotiations yield higher levels of cooperation than multilateral agreements, that the formation of a cartel depends on the sequentiality of the procedure of coalition formation, and that the size of alliances depends on the membership rule.
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 537
ISSN: 1756-2171
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15376
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7818
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4486
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Working paper
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 64, Heft 2, S. v-vi
This paper studies how Oates' trade-off between centralized and decentralized public good provision is affected by changes in households' mobility. We show that an increase in household mobility favors centralization, as it increases competition between jurisdictions in the decentralized regime and accelerates migration to the majority jurisdiction in the centralized regime. Our main result is obtained in a baseline model where jurisdictions first choose taxes, and households move in response to taxb levels. We consider two variants of the model. If jurisdictions choose public goods rather than tax rates, the equilibrium level of public good provision is lower, and mobility again favors centralization. If jurisdictions maximize total utility rather than resident utility, the equilibrium level of public good provision again decreases, and mobility favors centralization when the size of the mobile population is bounded.
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This paper studies how Oates' trade-off between centralized and decentralized public good provision is affected by changes in households' mobility. We show that an increase in household mobility favors centralization, as it increases competition between jurisdictions in the decentralized regime and accelerates migration to the majority jurisdiction in the centralized regime. Our main result is obtained in a baseline model where jurisdictions first choose taxes, and households move in response to taxb levels. We consider two variants of the model. If jurisdictions choose public goods rather than tax rates, the equilibrium level of public good provision is lower, and mobility again favors centralization. If jurisdictions maximize total utility rather than resident utility, the equilibrium level of public good provision again decreases, and mobility favors centralization when the size of the mobile population is bounded.
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Working paper
In: American economic review, Band 92, Heft 4, S. 1029-1043
ISSN: 1944-7981
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyse the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognised to form coalitions in simple games. We characterise those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.
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Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.
BASE
Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyze the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognized to form coalitions in simple games. We characterize those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players.
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