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The revolutionary upheaval in the southern Mediterranean and the slow reforms in most of the eastern neighbourhood have pushed the European Union to revise its approach to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In May 2011, the Commission presented a full review of the ENP, introducing an enhanced form of conditionality which should see more political and financial support being given to those neighbouring countries that implement more reforms and are more democratic. Characteristic of this 'more for more' conditionality is its strong bilateral dimension. While there is some rhetorical commitment to strengthening the regional dimensions of the ENP, for example, the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, few tangible proposals to that effect have been made. Notably, while the reviewed ENP repeats the goal of a 'Neighbourhood Economic Community' as a long-term objective of regional integration across the neighbourhood, it makes no proposals on instruments or strategy as to how to achieve that objective. This paper proposes that 'legally binding sectoral multilateralism' should be the EU's method and instrument of choice to reach that goal. This entails a pro-active strategy consisting of treaty-based legal integration between the EU and neighbouring countries and between the latter themselves, in sectors where such is clearly beneficial in its own right, as well as in the light of the long-term objective of a neighbourhood community. On the basis of two case studies, pertaining to the Energy Community Treaty and the draft Transport Community Treaty, the paper explores the benefits and weaknesses of this approach. The paper argues that the challenges posed by legal fragmentation in the wider European legal space can be overcome in order to reap the substantial economic and policy benefits spurred by legally binding sectoral multilateralism.

"This book presents legal and political ways and means to restructure the international community's efforts to stabilize the Western Balkans. As part of the international presence in the region, the European Union adopted sanctions, brokered political agreements, launched its first-ever police and military missions and directed economic, legal and administrative reforms to eradicate the roots of instability. yet, despite the comprehensive nature of the EU's actions, its strategies have been marked by confusion, its actions by concurrent or competing mandates of other international organisations. The Western Balkans still contain the possibility of a genuine security threat, hence there is a real imperative to move the region as a whole from teh stage of internaitonal protectorates and weak states to the stage of accession to the euro-atlantic organisations to which they aspire. The author argues that, under the leadership of the European Union, only a 'tough love' strategy, based on a firm but fair application of the conditionality principle, can lead to the integration of the Western Balkans into the European mainstream."--Book jkt

In response to Russia's full-scale invasion and gross violations of human rights in Ukraine, the EU has adopted no less than ten sanctions packages in the first year alone. Yet none of the targetted persons and entities were blacklisted under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR). This relatively new thematic sanctions tool, which is also known as the 'EU's Magnitsky Act', aims precisely at targeting the most serious of human rights violations and abuses worldwide, including genocide and crimes against humanity, the proof of which has —literally— been piling up in Ukraine. This raises the question whether the GHRSR is fit for purpose.
EU sanctions; Russia; Ukraine; genocide; crimes against humanity; human rights

With Joe Biden's victory, there is at least a four-year window to revive 'an alliance of democracies', face up to authoritarian powers and closed economies that exploit the openness on which American and European societies are built, and shape those parts of multilateralism that serve transatlantic interests.

With Joe Biden's victory, there is at least a four-year window to revive 'an alliance of democracies', face up to authoritarian powers and closed economies that exploit the openness on which American and European societies are built, and shape those parts of multilateralism that serve transatlantic interests.

In response to the need expressed by European leaders to protect their citizens better against security threats emanating from within and outside the EU's borders, a package of defensive measures has been developed with remarkable speed. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of defence is the most emblematic innovation in this regard. This unique form of enhanced cooperation was triggered under Article 46 TEU. Yet the political rhetoric surrounding its launch has raised expectations that the EU may not be able to meet. This is mainly due to misperceptions about the legal nature and enforceability of the so-called "binding" commitments agreed to. PESCO will need to overcome at least three key challenges: raising the level of ambition while ensuring inclusivity; maintaining credibility in case participating States do not comply with their commitments; and ensuring coherence with the many other building blocks in Europe's defence architecture. Arguably, legal commitments are the hardest in the area of industrial integration.With moves to incentivize capability development and create a single market for defence, the Community method will be applied to a field hitherto jealously shielded off by the Member States. This dimension of the incipient European Defence Union represents a game-changer in the integration process. "If you need a helping hand, you will find one at the end of your arm", Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, 16 May 2018.