Suchergebnisse

It has proven difficult to determine the direction in which corporatism is moving. This discussion is marred by two shortcomings: A bias towards the macro-level and the lack of a clear distinction between the stages of the policy process. Trying to remedy these shortcomings, this paper follows the development of corporatism over the twenty years since 1980 and uses this material to illuminate the causes of the development of corporatism. The analysis consists of a comparative study of seven Danish policy areas. By focusing on the meso-level within one country we gain the methodological advantage of being able to hold constant a number of variables at the macro-level which are difficult to control for in cross-national analyses. We are thus in a position to illuminate the explanatory value of a number of commonly advanced explanations of corporatism: partisan influences; state traditions; and policy specific factors. These explanations are all found wanting. The paper concludes by suggesting an alternative explanation more consistent with the Danish data, namely that corporatism be studied from a perspective placing politicians and agency at center stage. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

This essay provides a critical assessment of an important contribution to the debate on institutional efficiency and inefficiency in European policy-making: the thesis on the 'joint-decision trap'. This trap was identified by Fritz W. Scharpf, first in German federalism and later in policy-making in the European Union. The essay argues that joint-decision traps may be a much more prevalent phenomenon than envisaged by Scharpf. However, the essay demonstrates that joint-decision traps are not inherent to joint-decision systems. The basic argument of the essay is that the effects of joint-decision systems on public policy is contingent upon the central government's ability to threaten intergovernmental actors with exit. If this is possible, joint-decision systems turn into an asset. This argument is made on the basis of an analysis of intergovernmental relations in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark and a comparison of the Scandinavian systems with those of France and Germany. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Subcentral governments have gradually become more and more important in the general level of public economic activity in Western nations, To an increasing extent, macroeconomic management implies that the economic activity of subcentral governments is taken into account. But how can central governments coordinate the economic activity of numerous subcentral governments? What kind of intergovernmental arrangement is necessary? The author argues that fiscal federalism, the traditional approach to this problem, cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. The focus of fiscal federalism is on economic incentives in intergovernmental relations. The author argues that this is not sufficient. Fiscal federalism must be supplemented by a focus on political methods of influence. An analysis of Scandinavian and US ways of involving subcentral governments in macroeconomic management shows that the role played by subcentral government associations is crucial in the effectiveness of macroeconomic management.