Suchergebnisse

This is a case study of 'development assistance' that demonstrates how the interests of the supposed beneficiary of such assistance – Mongolia – were discarded as soon as there appeared to be the slightest risk that, if served, those interests might have jeopardized the economic or political interests of the donor country (Switzerland) and/or those of its (Western) trading partners and their mining corporations. Donor interests were deemed to be put at risk by a government and donor sponsored research report that made a case for strengthening mining legislation pertaining to community development agreements in Mongolia. The offending research report also challenged the establishment view of the aetiology of the 'resource curse', emphasizing the predisposing conditions established by neoliberal design and international financial institutions and the roles of foreign mining corporations, which are rarely mentioned in conventional accounts. The case provides further evidence for the view that Western 'development assistance' rendered by state capitalist 'democracies' (and others) is first and foremost designed, directly or indirectly, to serve the interests of the countries providing such 'assistance' and that development rhetoric and practice is intended to create an impression of altruism where, in reality, little or none exists.

The toxicity of a single project of US 'technical assistance' to Iraq is demonstrated: first, by virtue of its unilateral design and implementation and hence its violation of state sovereignty and basic norms of well-intentioned development; second, by its support of a strong form of decentralization, which risked inflaming an already volatile political condition that its sponsors had helped to create and that could have contributed to the destabilization and fragmentation of the state; third, because the commercial interests of the US implementing firm seemed likely to drive the project along its toxic path at the greatest possible speed; and fourth, because, while the dysfunctional management of the project seemed likely to impose severe constraints on the achievement of its stated objectives and the speed at which it could progress, it nevertheless constituted a bad example of governance and one that seemed likely – whatever its objectives might have been – to do more harm than good. This constituted a striking instance of wilful violation of national sovereignty under the guise of development assistance, one that was perpetrated knowingly in the gravest of national circumstances and by the same hand that had created the crisis in the first place. A method of managing development assistance that gives greater control to the host government is suggested.

AbstractWith a view to establishing the likelihood of the occurrence of state capture and different forms of corruption and the feasibility of their management and prevention, important aspects of the historical, social, economic, political and governance context of Timor‐Leste are examined. This context is found to be conducive to various forms of state capture and systemic grand and petty corruption, and to be resistant to conventional short‐term technocratic anticorruption remedies. While the latter are likely to have public relations benefits that may be helpful to the maintenance of political stability in the short run, it is argued that significant anticorruption progress is a long‐term endeavour, achievable principally through: sustained impartial service delivery that undermines beliefs in patronage; hastening—through general education and the creation of a conducive legal environment for business—the emergence of leaders of integrity and the growth of a middle class; and the establishment of the rule of law. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractAn assessment is made of the state of sustainable human development (SHD) and the institutions of governance that are in the process of being established in the rebel‐held areas of Southern Sudan. The development roles of the main governance actors—government, civil society and the private sector—are examined and capacity‐building needs are described. The importance of good leadership, institutionalised partnerships between government and national and international NGOs, and capacity building for transparency and accountability is stressed. Most pointedly, the risks of allowing governance practices, suited to the management of a liberation struggle, to spill over into the civil administration of a peaceful state are emphasised. The conditions necessary for the institutionalisation of sound governance practices are discussed. Of particular importance are a genuine desire on the part of the leadership to establish such conditions and a willingness on the part of external donors to address issues of accountability and transparency openly in collaboration with the leadership. The data are also suggestive of broad development strategies that address the bases of SHD and empowerment. These broad strategies are designed to improve the very low levels of health and education that exist in the Southern Sudan, and thereby empower people to engage in economic activity and in governance decision‐making. Rehabilitation and maintenance of the physical infrastructure underlies all development activity. The findings highlight the governance difficulties faced by war‐torn societies, the challenges facing post‐crisis administrations and (confirming Caplan 2002) the need for such administrations to possess sufficient executive authority to be able to perform effectively in situations of 'pre‐state, post‐imperial chaos'. Most critical of all, however, is the genuine interest of the major powers in doing more than—when it suits them—extinguishing the flames of conflict or establishing acquiescent political regimes following the military pacification of 'rogue' or anarchic states. Effective post‐crisis administration and development calls for much greater commitment of resources from the major powers than has been forthcoming to date, reflecting a belief among them that equitable and sustainable global development is the preferred route to the prevention of such crises. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

AbstractThe vacuum left by the collapse of colonial empires has been filled by new forms of cultural and ideological imperialism conceived largely in the West. The new imperialism is evident in such notions as sustainable human development (SHD) and 'good' governance, which in many ways are prescribed for poor countries by rich countries. It is suggested that there is no one best way to 'good' governance or SHD and that, while elements of a universal best practice may be found, considerable room should be left for local variations.