Suchergebnisse

pt. 1. Overview and review of literature of cross-border mergers and acquisitions -- pt. 2. Trends, patterns, motives and determinants of UK cross-border mergers and acquisitions -- pt. 3. Integration and performance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions.

"Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM & As) activity continues to excite interest among academics and practicing managers, and has become an important vehicle for firms' internationalization and corporate restructuring over the past three decades. Despite the huge volume of global CBM & A activity, however, there are few books that carefully explore the strategies, motives, and consequences of global mergers and acquisitions. This book discusses and synthesizes the theoretical literature on the motivation and performance of international merger activities. Focusing on the UK as a top acquiring country in the European Union, the authors explore the recent trends in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, motives for cross-border mergers and acquisitions, the mergers integration process, home and host countries' macroeconomic consequences on mergers and acquisitions, and shareholder's wealth effects on CBM & A. This book explores and sheds much-needed light on the UK CBM & A market, what drives it, and what lessons can be learned for other regions around the globe"--

Manuscript Type: Empirical. Research Question/Issue: Past empirical efforts in corporate governance have examined the effects of large shareholders with excess control rights on tunneling activities. However, no study has systematically investigated the effects of multiple large shareholders on excess leverage policies and tunneling in an emerging country environment where minority rights protection is weak. In this study, we examine the role of multiple large shareholders and the effects of control contestability of multiple large shareholders on firm excess leverage decision and tunneling by controlling shareholders. Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of 2,341 Chinese firms for the years 2001 to 2013, we document that the contestability of multiple non-controlling large shareholders relative to controlling shareholders reduces the adoption of excess leverage policies, tunneling and enhances capital investment. Another intriguing finding is that the government, as a controlling shareholder, exerts significant influence and reduces the monitoring effectiveness of multiple larger shareholders. Theoretical/Academic Implications: By addressing the role of multiple large shareholders on excess leverage decisions, this study makes an important contribution to the corporate governance literature. We extend the recent developments in agency theory regarding the role of multiple large shareholders in constraining expropriation of controlling shareholders with excess control rights and their effect on firm leverage decisions. Our results support the theoretical models which indicate that the presence of multiple large shareholders is an important and efficient internal governance mechanism that mitigates a firm's agency costs, particularly, in an emerging market environment where corporate governance is weak and inadequate to curb the tunneling problem.

AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssuePast empirical efforts in corporate governance have examined the effects of large shareholders with excess control rights on tunneling activities. However, no study has systematically investigated the effects of multiple large shareholders on excess leverage policies and tunneling in an emerging country environment where minority rights protection is weak. In this study, we examine the role of multiple large shareholders and the effects of control contestability of multiple large shareholders on firm excess leverage decision and tunneling by controlling shareholders.Research Findings/InsightsUsing a sample of 2,341 Chinese firms for the years 2001 to 2013, we document that the contestability of multiple non‐controlling large shareholders relative to controlling shareholders reduces the adoption of excess leverage policies, tunneling and enhances capital investment. Another intriguing finding is that the government, as a controlling shareholder, exerts significant influence and reduces the monitoring effectiveness of multiple larger shareholders.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsBy addressing the role of multiple large shareholders on excess leverage decisions, this study makes an important contribution to the corporate governance literature. We extend the recent developments in agency theory regarding the role of multiple large shareholders in constraining expropriation of controlling shareholders with excess control rights and their effect on firm leverage decisions. Our results support the theoretical models which indicate that the presence of multiple large shareholders is an important and efficient internal governance mechanism that mitigates a firm's agency costs, particularly, in an emerging market environment where corporate governance is weak and inadequate to curb the tunneling problem.

This study explores whether the nature of ownership may condition the extent and impact of political connections on credit risk decisions. We find politically connected boards to exert significant influence on credit risk. Further evidence shows that ownership type of the bank moderates the link between politically connected boards and credit risk. Specifically, state owned banks appear to be more susceptible to credit risk while independent directors in private banks tend to be effective monitors. Our findings have important implications for bank stability and provide a means to measure the success of corporate governance reforms carried out in emerging countries over the past two decades.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of bank ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk. Design/methodology/approach: Using panel data on a sample of 88 Chinese commercial banks, with 826 observations over a period of 2003–2018, this study has applied system generalised method of moments regression to examine the impact of bank ownership structure and ownership concentration on credit risk. This study has used two measures of credit risk, which are non-performing loan ratio (NPLR) and loan loss provision ratio (LLPR). Findings: The results show that ownership type (both government and private ownership) exerts a positive and significant impact on credit risk. Measuring ownership concentration using Herfindahl–Hirchmann Index, the results indicate that concentration of ownership in the hands of government has a negative and significant effect on credit risk, whereas private ownership concentration positively impacts credit risk. Overall, the findings suggest that concentration of ownership in government hands reduces risk; however, private ownership concentration exacerbates credit risks. The results are invariant to both measures of credit risk, before and after the financial crisis. Practical implications: The findings provide useful insight to guide policy decisions in Chinese banks' lending policies and bank ownership. Originality/value: Using two ex post measures of credit risk, NPLR and LLPR, and one ownership concentration measure, HHI, this study deepens our understanding on the effectiveness of Chinese banks' corporate governance reforms on managing credit risks.

This study examines the motives, entry mode choice, and challenges of the international expansion in an emerging country context. Data were collected via interviews from 30 senior managers based on a sample of 10 Chinese commercial banks (CCBs) involved in international expansion over the period of 2001–2013. This study finds greenfield and mergers and acquisitions are the most popular foreign entry mode used by CCBs. The motives of emerging market banks' internationalization appear to be intrinsically linked to market development to serve customers operating in overseas market, government policies, and strategic knowledge sourcing. In terms of challenges, the study finds lack of management resources/technical capacity, culture, adapting to the host country regulatory environment, and lack of experience to be the main challenges to bank internationalization.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the motivation and post-merger operating performance (OP) of European utility sectors following mergers and acquisitions (M&A).Design/methodology/approachMotives behind M&A are examined by looking into the relationships between total gains, target gains and acquirer gains. Post-merger OP is measured by comparing the sample of European utilities with a matched portfolio based on size and market to book ratio with respect to five accounting indicators: growth in turnover, growth in earnings before interest and tax, return on assets, net profit margin and growth in fixed assets.FindingsSynergy is the primary motive for M&A in the European utility firms. This study also found that post-merger OP is negative and significant across all the five accounting indicators matched by size, and market to book ratio suggesting that utility mergers underperform in the long term. The findings suggest that gains accruing to utilities involved in acquisitions are short term in nature.Practical implicationsNegative post-merger OP bears important policy implications as in future antitrust/competition authorities should be more vigilant before approving utility mergers.Originality/valuePublic utilities possess several characteristics that are different from industrial firms and therefore need to be examined separately. Empirical literature on M&A is very limited on utilities. This study has addressed this gap by examining the motivation and post-merger OP of the European utility firms.

The paper investigates the effects of institutions and their interaction with firms' research & development (R&D) levels on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in China based on a sample of 680 European Union (EU) firms over the period of 1998 to 2008. Employing panel data estimation approaches and further augmented with the cross-validation technique, our results indicate that EU FDI in China is influenced by the host country's institutions, rendering support to the institutional theory. Our analysis indicates that the rule of law, institutional reforms and the interaction between institutional reforms and R&D have significant effects on FDI inflows in China. Further analysis suggests that the coefficient for the interaction between the rule of law and R&D is positive and significant after World Trade Organisation (WTO) entry implying that the effects of reforms following the WTO entry much outweigh the impact of rule of law in EU firms' decisions to invest in China. We also find evidence that EU firms tend to adjust their FDI levels in China in an attempt to reach the desired investment level.