Suchergebnisse

When potential beneficiaries share knowledge and attitudes about a policy intervention, that can influence their decisions to participate and, in turn, change the effectiveness of both the policy and its evaluation. This matters notably in integrated social policies with several components. We examine neighborhood effects on the take-up of the schooling subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico.We exploit random variations in the local densities of program beneficiaries generated by the randomized evaluation. Higher program densities in areas of 5 km radius increase the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the junior-secondary level. These neighborhood effects exclusively operate on households receiving another component of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While several tests reject heterogeneities in impacts due to spatial variations in implementation, we find suggestive evidence that neighborhood effects stem partly from the sharing of information about the program among eligible households.

When potential beneficiaries share knowledge and attitudes about a policy intervention, that can influence their decisions to participate and, in turn, change the effectiveness of both the policy and its evaluation. This matters notably in integrated social policies with several components. We examine neighborhood effects on the take-up of the schooling subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico.We exploit random variations in the local densities of program beneficiaries generated by the randomized evaluation. Higher program densities in areas of 5 km radius increase the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the junior-secondary level. These neighborhood effects exclusively operate on households receiving another component of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While several tests reject heterogeneities in impacts due to spatial variations in implementation, we find suggestive evidence that neighborhood effects stem partly from the sharing of information about the program among eligible households.

When potential beneficiaries share knowledge and attitudes about a policy intervention, that can influence their decisions to participate and, in turn, change the effectiveness of both the policy and its evaluation. This matters notably in integrated social policies with several components. We examine neighborhood effects on the take-up of the schooling subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico.We exploit random variations in the local densities of program beneficiaries generated by the randomized evaluation. Higher program densities in areas of 5 km radius increase the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the junior-secondary level. These neighborhood effects exclusively operate on households receiving another component of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While several tests reject heterogeneities in impacts due to spatial variations in implementation, we find suggestive evidence that neighborhood effects stem partly from the sharing of information about the program among eligible households.

When potential beneficiaries share knowledge and attitudes about a policy intervention, that can influence their decisions to participate and, in turn, change the effectiveness of both the policy and its evaluation. This matters notably in integrated social policies with several components. We examine neighborhood effects on the take-up of the schooling subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico.We exploit random variations in the local densities of program beneficiaries generated by the randomized evaluation. Higher program densities in areas of 5 km radius increase the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the junior-secondary level. These neighborhood effects exclusively operate on households receiving another component of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While several tests reject heterogeneities in impacts due to spatial variations in implementation, we find suggestive evidence that neighborhood effects stem partly from the sharing of information about the program among eligible households.

When potential beneficiaries share knowledge and attitudes about a policy intervention, that can influence their decisions to participate and, in turn, change the effectiveness of both the policy and its evaluation. This matters notably in integrated social policies with several components. We examine neighborhood effects on the take-up of the schooling subsidy component of the Progresa-Oportunidades program in Mexico.We exploit random variations in the local densities of program beneficiaries generated by the randomized evaluation. Higher program densities in areas of 5 km radius increase the take-up of scholarships and enrollment at the junior-secondary level. These neighborhood effects exclusively operate on households receiving another component of the program, and do not carry over larger distances. While several tests reject heterogeneities in impacts due to spatial variations in implementation, we find suggestive evidence that neighborhood effects stem partly from the sharing of information about the program among eligible households.

The literature on aid effectiveness has focused more on recipient policies than the determinants of aid allocation yet a consistent result is that political allies obtain more aid from donors than non-allies. This paper shows that aid allocated to political allies is ineffective for growth, whereas aid extended to countries that are not allies is highly effective. The result appears to be robust across different specifications and estimation techniques. In particular, new methods are employed to control for endogeneity. The paper suggests that aid allocation should be scrutinized carefully to make aid as effective as possible.

Is there any relation between education and democracy? Once we correct for weak instruments and identify education as `weakly exogenous` we find new evidence that education systematically predicts democracy. Our results are robust across model specification, instrumentation strategies, and samples.

Why would bilateral donors intermediate aid through a multilateral and not extend aid directly? This paper suggests a trade-off: multiple bilateral donors for each recipient may imply coordination and strategic problems but intermediating through a multilateral may dilute individual donor objectives. The paper conducts traditional panel and truly bilateral regressions with bilateral-pair, fixed effects to model aid allocation decisions. The results confirm that politics is important for bilateral donors but also that aid fragmentation and strategic behavior affect aid allocation. Multilaterals solve strategic and coordination problems between donors and, while politics remains significant, there is some evidence for a dilution of this effect.