Suchergebnisse

Der 2002 beschlossene langfristige Ausstieg aus der Kernenergienutzung wird derzeit kritisch diskutiert. Sind mit dem Ausstieg steigende Strompreise und CO2 - Emissionen verbunden? Welche direkten und indirekten Wirkungen hat ein Rückgang der Kraftwerkskapazitäten? Wie würde sich ein Umsteuern in der Kraftwerkspolitik auswirken?

"Ziele hinsichtlich der Emissionen von Treibhausgasen (THG) für Nationalstaaten werden durch die Diskussion auf nationaler, europäischer und globaler Ebene geprägt. Diese Emissionsziele können, müssen aber nicht identisch sein, wie dies zum Beispiel in Deutschland und Großbritannien zu sehen ist. Da nach dem Kyoto-Protokoll die Verhandlungen über die Ziele für die sog. zweite Verpflichtungsperiode (ab 2013) spätestens 2005 beginnen sollen, wird die entsprechende Diskussion in Kürze an Dynamik gewinnen. Aber auch im Rahmen des EU-weiten Handels mit THGBerechtigungen, der am 1.1.2005 beginnen soll, ist eine zügige Festlegung von mittelfristigen Emissionszielen wünschenswert. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der vorliegende Artikel das nationale CO2-Reduktionsziel für Deutschland für 2005 sowie mögliche Ziele für alle Treibhausgase nach 2012. Dabei wird eine arithmetische Analyse der Emissionsintensität in Deutschland verwendet. Es wird unterstellt, dass auf Grund des allgemein erwünschten Wirtschaftswachstums Emissionsreduktionen nur durch eine Minderung dieser Emissionsintensität erzielt werden können. Die Berücksichtigung der Entwicklung dieser Intensitäten in der Vergangenheit kann Hinweise auf erreichbare Ziele in der Zukunft bzw. ggf. zusätzlich erforderliche Maßnahmen geben." (Autorenreferat)

Regardless of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the EU may decide to set itself a long-term greenhouse gas emission target and thus to continue its leadership role in international climate policy. As for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU may decide on a burden-sharing agreement as an integral part of such a long-term climate policy. Against this background I analyse three different options to distribute an overall budget of emission entitlements until 2042 among the member states of an enlarged EU. It is shown who wins and who loses with regard to compliance costs. As the member states' attitudes towards the different approaches are likely to depend on the relative attractiveness of the allocation options, a relevance threshold is introduced which may help to predict and understand the complexity of future climate negotiations in Europe.

Emission trading has become recently more and more import in environmental regulation. In the context of controlling greenhouse gas emissions, the directive on a Europewide trading scheme for large immobile sources may be perceived as one of the most important milestones in recent years. Prior to its start, however, a number of very specific design features have to be agreed upon. In the political discussion, the question of how to allocate emission rights is considered as one of the most important issues. So far, a distribution (almost) free of charge is the option of choice. An aspect that has interestingly attracted little attention in the past is the question of how to allocate emission rights over time. This may for example be done on the basis of a constant reference metric, as for example emissions in a certain fixed year, or on the basis of a rolling metric as for example emissions in the previous year. The following paper analyses four different allocation options in multi-period emissions trading that are currently discussed in the European context. The four options are applied for the electricity sector. A power market close to reality with five different types of power plants (hydro, nuclear, lignite, coal and gas) is simulated over two periods. The paper distinguishes between a market effect of emissions trading on the one hand and compliance costs for meeting the emission reduction obligation on the other. The market effect results from a price increase which is due to the fact that opportunity costs for using allowances, though received free of charge, must be considered. However, only compliance costs and not opportunity costs materialise as costs in the profit and loss account of utilities. It turns out that the electricity sector as a whole gains from the introduction of the instrument due to the increase of the electricity price. With regard to the different allocation options, it is found that utilities have different preferences depending on the fuel used.

After Future climate policy regimes may be based on the Kyoto-Protocol or on other policy instruments such as carbon-taxes. Any effective regime based on the Protocol requires the determination of the concrete contributions by each Party. This involves namely the time of contribution and the quantification of the contribution itself. By now many proposals exist for the two issues, as for example thresholds like GDP per capita for the question of timing or emissions per capita for an allocation of emission rights. Based on the two justice principle responsibility and equity of rights that form the basis for the so-called Brazilian Proposal and Contraction & Convergence respectively, a new approach is developed: Future emission rights are allocated on the basis of equal emissions per capita over time. By so doing not only are emissions per capita (EPC) taken into account during the allocation but also their evolution over time. I show that nations with high EPC may even be allocated negative quantities of emissions right due to their historical ?burden?. On the other hand, Parties with low EPC would be allocated large amounts of ?fair air? which can increase the incentive to accept absolute emission targets. Even though this approach may currently lack political acceptability, it offers another analytical reference point for the political bargaining process on future allocations.

After greenhouse gas emission trading on country level had been proposed by the Kyoto Protocol agreed on in 1997, a discussion on the introduction of national schemes with entities as participants ensued. This discussion also raised the question if and how such systems can be linked. We first discuss this issue with regard to technical feasibility and environmental integrity. We find that linking is generally not prevented due to technical reasons. Environmental integrity may, however, be endangered depending on the specific designs of the schemes to be linked. We then analyse the economic impact of linking national schemes. Even though linking national schemes can increase overall cost-efficiency this picture changes if systems are linked prior to the start of the first Kyoto commitment period. Seller and buyer may have different interests with regard to linkage and the transfer of AAUs (= emission rights under the Protocol). Voluntarily linking can thus not be expected. In case that the linkage is prescribed by super-national organisations as for example the EU commission, both winners and losers are likely to be produced. This in turn may refrain member states from approving such approaches.