Suchergebnisse

Studies of diversionary conflict typically claim that lower rates of economic growth and domestic unrest increase the risk of militarized interstate conflict. Research shows that these factors are also related to regime changes. Lower rates of economic growth and domestic conflict should increase the risk that governments are overthrown. This article investigates the comparative risk of economic growth and domestic turmoil on militarized interstate conflict and regime changes on a sample of over 100 countries from 1920-92. I find that higher rates of economic growth are related to violent militarized interstate conflicts and reduce the risk of regime changes. Democracy and economic development likewise provide internal stability and interstate peace. Yet the risk of regime change increases rapidly relative to involvement in an interstate conflict for states affected by high levels of domestic conflict, suggesting that any diversionary strategies are a risky gambit that have a high chance of failure. Adapted from the source document.

Are democracies generally peaceful? Studies have produced mixed evidence, both for and against this proposition. I review and update the literature on this topic and explore reasons why some scholars have come to emphasize those studies showing that democracies are no more or less conflict-prone than other states. This paper re-examines democracy and conflict at the state level of analysis from 1884 to 1999 using a broad sample of states and appropriate statistical estimators. The results show that democracies are less likely to initiate militarized conflicts. I also find that political competition has a stronger pacifying effect than executive constraints when disaggregating the Polity IV democracy index.

Abstract
This paper explores the networks that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) create in the international system and explore how states relate to each other in such networks. It focuses in particular on the network of IGOs that act as creators of and agents for hard international law. We introduce new data that allows us to investigate which institutional traits and functions are most closely related to IGOs' contribution to the implementation and enforcement of informal international law. We map out and explore the network of "highly legalized" IGOs for the years 1980–2005 as well as the affiliation networks emerging from states' membership in such IGOs. Combining international relations theory with network theory, we raise novel hypotheses on the potential impact of highly legalized IGO networks on states' conflict behavior and peace.