Suchergebnisse

International relations theorists have tried to adapt prospect theory to make it relevant to the study of real‐world decision‐making and testable beyond the constraints of the laboratory. Three experiments with undergraduate samples were conducted in an effort to clarify the advantages and limitations of prospect theory as adapted to explain political behavior. The first experiment tested hypotheses regarding the impact of prospect framing on group polarization, but these were only weakly supported. The second and third experiments examined alternative adaptations of the concept of framing; the results suggest that the political science expansion of the concept of framing may, under certain conditions, produce clear and robust preference reversals.

Factors that may affect public support or opposition to U.S. military intervention in humanitarian crises around the world are examined to determine the impact of foreign policy frames on individual risk propensity. The source of the foreign policy frames, type of humanitarian crisis, location of the crisis and race/ethnicity/religion of the endangered population, tolerable ratios of U.S. lives saved/lost to foreign citizens saved/lost, and probability of casualty-free success are also investigated.

In this article, recent attempts to apply prospect theory to the study of international relations are reviewed and evaluated. The review of this literature leads to a number of theoretical and methodological critiques that are highlighted by an experiment that demonstrates the difficulties inherent in attempting to transport this theory across disciplinary boundaries. Of special importance is the introduction of verbal probability expressions into the experimental design. The results of the experiment provide some support for prospect theory, but differences in the results obtained for different verbal probability sets indicate that decision theorists need to be more concerned with the manner in which probabilistic information is conveyed to (and discussed by) decision makers.

This article builds on past framing research to probe the impact of casualty frames on the public's willingness to expend additional "blood and treasure" in an ongoing war. The rhetoric of "sunk costs" (often described as "sacrifices") that must be redeemed through further conflict is a well-known, yet irrational, trope. Utilizing an experiment embedded in a nationally representative survey on attitudes about Iraq, we find that "investment frames" increase support for the war among individuals who believe the U.S. "did the right thing in Iraq," but decrease support for the war among those who feel the U.S. "should have stayed out." We also find, however, that framing effects are inconsistent when the frames are attributed to sources. These latter results demonstrate the importance of including unattributed frames to evaluate source effects in framing research.

In the early stages of the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, military leaders resisted the release of body count and "casualty ratio" data. However, in the spring of 2004, the U.S. military (and American media) began to focus on the "limited" American casualties in specific operations versus the "significant" number of insurgents killed. This article examines the extent to which body count/casualty ratio "frames" and individual casualty tolerance influence public perceptions about the war and the success or failure of U.S. military operations. Two experiments were conducted pitting alternative casualty frames against one another to measure their relative impact. The results demonstrate the influence of framing effects on public perceptions and clarify understanding of the determinants and impact of casualty tolerance.