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The outpacing development of doctrinal concepts of warfare at the present stage becomes an additional source of instability in the strategic landscape. Combined with the restructuring of the world order and the active introduction of emerging technologies, the development of new doctrines leads to increased escalation risks, including due to the poorly understood mutual influences of the operating factors in a complex environment. The Multi-Domain Battle theory is an excellent example of this impact. The article analyzes the main provisions of this theory in terms of potentially emerging escalation risks The problem is considered in the light of recent proposals for new escalation models, including the principles of the "escalation vortex" and the "wormhole escalation". The emerging risks of applying doctrinal principles that blur distinct thresholds in the escalation space, including the thresholds of clearly distinguishing between war and peace, are analyzed. It shows a direct link between the Multi-Domain Battle theory and the concept of "integrated deterrence", realized in the same logic of graded escalation control. A number of new emerging nuclear risks have been demonstrated, including links to long-standing theories of limited nuclear warfare options, as well as the new concept of the 2010s, the so-called "conventional-nuclear integration". Conclusions are drawn about the need to implement a structured sequence of practical steps aimed at limiting the escalation risks generated by this doctrinal concept. A possible connection of this sequence with the longer-term task of rebuilding and strengthening the arms control framework has been established.

Concepts of limited nuclear employment are increasingly important in the current landscape of nuclear strategy. They had evolved towards the end of the Cold War, mostly in the U.S., to offer hope for a way out of the stalemate of massive nuclear exchanges. An important role among these was played by the politico-military strategy of small-scale nuclear use for signaling purposes: demonstrating to the enemy our own resolve and intra-war bargaining for an end to the conflict on favorable terms. After the end of the Cold War, declining risk of a large inter-bloc war, deep cuts of nuclear weapons, and the transformation of strategic stability toward multilateral balances have prompted the major nuclear powers to adopt and work through scenarios of limited (single, in particular) use of nuclear weapons intended to de-escalate military conflicts and restore deterrence if it fails. To that end, different nuclear powers, both official and non-official, are adopting or at least considering adoption of limited nuclear options to different extents. It leads us to more complicated strategic environment lying completely out of the scope of existing arms control framework and even its theoretical models. Such politico-military signaling strategies are based on a corpus of the Cold War theoretical experience, but are still not well grounded, demonstrating paradoxes that can cause the opposite of what was intended originally. The lack of credible and effective methods of escalation control, that has persisted since the height of the Cold War, make situation potentially volatile. It is, therefore, increasingly clear that considerations of doctrinal issues about limited scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons, especially "signal strikes", need to be incorporated into the ongoing and prospective dialogues on strategic stability.

The paper provides a comparative analysis study of the dynamics and mechanisms of the strategic stability transformation both during the Cold War and at present. Drawing on the analysis of the factors affecting strategic stability in different time periods, the author outlines the priorities of this transformation. Its basic principles are confined to the stability of nuclear deterrence in any realistic scenarios and do not provide for practical action. Hence, one should distinguish them from applied solutions for calculating military-strategic balances and elaboration of arms control agreements. The latter depend on the current strategic landscape subject to constant, sometimes drastic change, as both the Cold War history and the recent developments testify. The choice of particular type of representation of strategic stability is determined by the nature of the most dangerous ongoing trends, and relies on a set of three basic groups of factors (political-military, military-technical, and military-strategic) existing at a given time. This necessitates constant revaluation of these factors and development of new practical measures to build up nuclear deterrence.The paper assesses the current set of relevant factors affecting stability of nuclear deterrence, and then compares it with the commonly used model of strategic stability based on the logic of arms control negotiations of the late 1980s. The author highlights the limitations of the latter model applicability to the present strategic landscape, and outlines the key factors that erode the current understanding of strategic stability (as it was stipulated in the 1990 U.S.–Soviet Joint Statement). In particular the author emphasizes the increasing complexity of international landscape as compared to the Cold War period: new and unanticipated challenges have affected all three above-mentioned groups of factors. The paper ends up with the analysis of the possible developments in the field of arms control that could alleviate tensions and increase strategic stability.

The post-Cold War conventional arms control system (CACE), based on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), has experienced a series of crises in 2000s early 2020s. The recent escalation of tensions between Russia and NATO merely finalized the process of disintegration of this system, resulting from a range of diverse factors. The CACE crisis was caused by long-term military-political, military-strategic, and military-technical shifts. Despite the complexity of the current military-political relations between Russia and NATO, the authors believe that it is already appropriate to begin searching for ways to restore the CACE regime, which would be optimal in terms of the evolving strategic landscape in the Euro-Atlantic region and would meet the security interests of the parties. The authors conclude that the starting point for creating a new CACE regime could be agreements on medium-range strike systems of various types of basing that do not distinguish between nuclear and conventional systems. Such a solution is achievable, primarily, in the mode of the Russia U.S. bilateral negotiations, which would simplify the task of reaching effective agreements and would also give an impetus for subsequent negotiations on nuclear weapons when the relations between the parties are normalized.

Received 23.12.2020. The U.S.–China confrontation, generating a military technology race, has been gradually developed over a long period of time after the end of the Cold War. The mission of countering U.S. forces in a possible armed conflict in the Southeast Asian region has led China to adopt a "counter-intervention strategy", better known by the designation "anti-access/area denial" (A2/AD). The U.S. responded by development of sea-based missile defense systems, which has dangerously damaged the military balance. The study shows that both countries independently faced the need to accelerate one of the most destabilizing types of modern weapons – hypersonic weapons – during this race that required specific military-technical solutions. The course of this arms race has led the U.S. to development of the "AirSea Battle" concept and then other more radical operational concepts, such as "distributed lethality", requiring a complete step-by-step restructuring of the Navy. A study of the behavior of both powers shows that, at the present stage, the "arms race" is increasingly becoming a more complex process of "technological race", in which it is at times difficult to distinguish the components of the dynamics of the civilian and military sectors of the economy and of advanced researches and developments. The U.S. adoption of the ambitious "Third Offset Strategy" program occurred simultaneously with the deployment of Chinese research in similar directions, including the improvement of command, control and communications systems, development of lethal autonomous weapons systems and military applications of artificial intelligence. One of the main questions in this regard is to what extent the U.S. dispersed model of innovation management can compete with the Chinese centralized model of "military-civil fusion" marked by its high ability to concentrate resources and at the same time – linkages with global markets through the national champion companies. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project "Post-crisis world order: challenges and technologies, competition and cooperation" supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

The article analyzes the reasons, nature and prospects for strengthening, especially in the context of the Ukrainian conflict, the attention of the leading world forces – the West, China and Russia – to the "Global South". The authors put forward and substantiate the concept of "turn to the South" in world politics. The thesis is put forward that the dynamics along the "North-South" axis, as well as the policy of sovereign states of the "global South" will have a significant impact on the reformatting of the world order along the "West-East" axis. The interaction of Russia and its partners in the EAEU with the states of Africa and the Middle East to solve global problems, primarily food and military-political security, is considered in detail.