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As the budget for the development and production of new military aircraft tightens, modification of existing aircraft (MOD) has become increasingly important. This shift in emphasis has created a need for a high level parametric cost estimating method to estimate the cost of a MOD program early in the planning cycle. This report is the first volume of a series of reports documenting a multi-year project to support NAVAIR's initiative to develop parametric cost estimation models for MOD programs. This volume provides an overoview of the project, including a review of prior studies, the structure of data to be collected, and the forms used in data collection. Due to the proprietary nature of MOD program cost data, distribution of all future volumes of the report series except for the summary volume will be limited to selected Department of Defense agencies only. ; Naval Air Systems Command Cost Analysis Division ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This study examines the nature of nonrecurring cost items and develops systematic procedures for the government and contractors to follow in order to generate a database of nonrecurring costs which is both consistent and comparable. The objective was to develop a method for generating an analyzable set of data for parametric estimation of nonrecurring costs. Cost elements were analyzed and their cost drives were identified ; Naval Air Systems Command Cost Analysis Division Washington, D. C. ; http://archive.org/details/onfeasibilityofc00boge ; N0001986WR6347W.

A seminar was held to review some of the models used by the armed services for planning weapon procurement. Most of the effort was spent on the Navy's NNOR and the Air Force's Sabre Mix Methodologies. Even in an emergency situation, it is difficult to speed up the production rate of sophisticated, modern weapons. The time constant for increasing production rate for many weapons seems to be on the order of a year, whereas major wars are sometimes imagined to last for only several months. Given these supposed facts, the following question would seem to be crucial for the yearly POM process: How should a fixed budget be spent augmenting the current stockpile of weapons so as to maximize the effectiveness of the resulting stockpile? Operations Research techniques could play an important role in answering the question, since several favorable preconditions exist: The question must be asked repetitively, Combat modelling must inevitably be involved in assessing effectiveness, Lots of data are available that must be taken into account, and The problem of determining the best stockpile can be interpreted as one of mathematical optimization. For example, shows for a typical weapon the comparison between inventory and the Navy's 'programming objective profile' as determined by the NNOR (Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements). There is clearly a large difference between the two, particularly if the gap is compared to the yearly stockpile increment. One way of resolving the discrepancy between budgets and requirements would be to reassess requirements (possibly also budgets) until feasibility is finally achieved ; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. ; http://archive.org/details/notesfromstockpi00boge

The research summarized herein was sponsored by Director, Requirements and Analysis, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. ; The Productivity Enhancerent Capital Investment (PEXI) program is a funding program admainistered by the Defense Productivity Program Office (DPPO). The program was established in 1979 to improve the capital stock of Department of Defense activities. It is designed to enable managers to make timely investments in equipment and facilities which increase outputs of an organization in relationship to inputs. The program has separate funding sources depending upon the cost of investment. Projects costing less than $100K are eligible for 'fast payback" funds which are allocated by the respective military departments. The departments evaluate projects for investment criteria and dispense funds according to available resources and productivity strategies. Funding may be received within six months of a request. ; Prepared for: Director, Requirements and Analysis, Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Room 3D264, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301 ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Although there are numerous problems associated with the management of Federal information systems, the usual solutions proposed for these problems have had and will have little, if any, effects. This paper examines the characteristics of Federal information systems and shows that most proposed solutions are directed at symptoms of the problems and not at their underlying causes. These solutions do not reflect the public sector nature of Federal information systems and hence, are either unrealistic or ineffectual. The authors do not propose another panacea ; Naval Postgraduate School ; http://archive.org/details/federalinformati00boge ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The management of data processing systems in the Federal government is rapidly approaching a state of crisis.1 The Federal information systems inventory is a collection of outdated hardware as well as software techniques and systems which were abandoned 1 ong ago in the private sector. Projects have such long lead times that when systems are finally devel oped they are outmoded or no 1 onger meet current requi rements. A number of sol uti ons have been proposed which range from new rul es and procedures to i ncreased use of private contractors in delivering EDP resources. Many of the proposed solutions have more to do with the political philosophy of the proposers than with the realities of data processing management or the underlying political processes which make EDP management so complex in the government sector. This paper examines the causes of Federal FDP management problems and the political questions that must be resolved for any proposed solutions to succeed.

After all the publicity about defense procurement scandals, the Administration, Congress, and the public have been pushing to open defense acquisition to more competition. Congress enacted The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984. This report attempts to separate the myths from the facts of weapon system competition. It is unfortunate that many policy analyses, and many major acquisition decisions, were based on the myth that competing weapon systems should produce significant savings to the government. The fact is that dual source competition in major systems has resulted in additional costs to the government almost as often as it has produced savings. Theoretical explanations and empirical evidence are presented to shed some light on this major policy issue. This report summarizes the salient findings from a series of competition- related studies which we conducted for the Naval Air Systems Command Cost Analysis Division. We found a common thread in these studies which has implications for major systems acquisition policy making and the direction of future competition-related policy studies. (KR) ; Conducted for the Naval Air Systems Command with funds provided by the Naval Postgraduate School. ; http://archive.org/details/competitiveweapo00boge ; O&MN, Direct Funding ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.